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UNITED STATES TAX COURT 
WASHIN GTON. D. C. 202 17 
CHAMBERS o r 
SAM UE L 8 . STERRETT 
J UDGE 
October 30, 1980 
Martin D. Cohen, Esq. 
Attorney, Internal Revenue Service 
District Counsel, Western Region 
Main Post Office 
P.O. Box 2031 
Los-Angeles, ~alif. 90053 
Robert N. Harris, Jr., Esq. 
c/o GLA 
1306 North Berendo Street 
Los Angeles, Calif. 90027 
Re: Church of Scientology of California 
v. Commissioner, Docket No. 3352-78 
Gentlemen: 
The attached memorandum contains my preliminary 
evidentiary rulings with respect to respondent's con-
tentions concerning alleged violations of well-defined 
public policy (see Respondent's Trial Memorandum, pp. 
6-8). During the trial, either at the beginning of 
respondent's case-in-chief or at the time he proceeds 
to present evidence with respect to this issue, the 
Court will submit the attached document into the 
record.· The attached document is provided to the 
parties for their convenience and is intended to aid in 
their trial preparation. 
Enc. 
Very truly yours, 
Sau4(_.i,,~ 
Samuel B. Sterrett 
Judge 
October 30, 1980 
Memorandum to the Parties 
From: Judge Samuel B. Sterrett .S,J,..f~ 
Re: Evidence With Respect to So-Called Public Policy Issues 
In petitioner's October 25, 1979 Motion for Protective 
Order, this Court was asked to determine whether section 
50l(c) (3), I.R.C. of 1954, requires that organizations 
seeking exempt status comply with public policy. This 
Court specifically considered whether participation, if any, 
in crimina_l activity such as burglary, theft, forgery, 
unlawful interception of oral communications, and petitioner's 
so-called "fair game" policy could be grounds for denial 
of exempt status. 
Pursuant to a Court order dated December 21, 1979, 
respondent filed its trial memorandum on September 22, 1930. 
Therein, under Roman numeral II, "Respondent's Contentions," 
respondent set forth alleged policies and activities of 
petitioner which "in the aggregate ... amount to substantial 
recurring violations of a clearly· defined public policy." · 
By Memorandum Sur Order dated April 1, 1980, the Court 
determined that section 501(c) (3) exemption from taxation 
could be denied if more than an insubstantial part of the 
organization's activities violated well-defined public 
policy. This requirement applies equally to all organi-
zations or trusts seeking exemption from tax under section 
50l(c) (3). However, where a religious organization seeks 
exemption the requirements of compliance with well-defined 
public policy must be narrowly drawn. Absent a compelling 
state interest, such requirements must not infringe upon 
petitioner's constitutional right to exercise freely its 
religion. Cf. Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 
1971), affd. per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 
(1971), and Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F.Supp. 
890 (D.S.C. 1978) (on appeal to 4th Circuit). 
Generally, section S0l(c) (3) grants exempt status to 
organizations or trusts which have as their exclusive purpose 
the advancement of religion. The Court seeks to determine 
if the organizatign is both organized and operated for 
religious purposes. We are not unmindful that the parties 
in the instant case have stipulated that petitioner is 
organized as a religious organization. Therefore, broadly 
( 
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stated, the remaining issue is whether petitioner is operated 
exclusively for religious purposes. Because of petitioner's 
status as an organized religion, respondent is limited on 
the so-called puhlic policy issue to offering evidence which 
tends to establish that the Church is engaged in prohibited 
activities or that the actual practice of the religion 
would violate criminal or civil law. In the latter situation, 
respondent would also have to establish that a compelling 
state interest exists which would justify the limitation 
on the exercise of petitioner's religion. See N.L.R.B. v. 
Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). Under 
no circumstances would the Court deny petitioner exempt 
status based upon its religious beliefs. The focus of the 
inquiry is on petitioner's ~ctibhs and not on its beliefs. 
This Court is not concerned with singular, minor, non-
recurring violations of civil or criminal law. Such activity 
would not be sufficient grounds for denial of exempt status. 
Augusta Golf Assn., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.Supp. 272 
(S.D. Georgia 1971). The Court will only consider evidence 
that tends tti establish that more than an insubstantial 
part of petitioner's activities involves conduct so egregious 
as to be patently offensive. 
With these guidelines in mind, we address respondent's 
trial memorandum and his contentions therein. We note 
immediately that none of the following allegations have been 
proven nor do we accept the truth thereof. The question 
presented is whether any of respondent's contentions go 
beyond the direction of the Aprill, 1980 Order. If so, 
then evidence offered in support of that contention will 
not be admissible. However, respondent will be entitled 
to make an offer of proof with respect thereto. 
Specifically, respondent contends that the following 
activities violate clearly defined public policy: 
(a) "Conspiracy to impede and obstruct the Internal 
Revenue Service, a felony under 18 U.S.C. §371." 
The Court will accept evidence on this contention because 
such evidence would tend to establish illegal activities on 
the part of petitioner outside the practice of religion. 
(b) "Wrongful and malicious divulgence of personal 
and intimate information provided by petitioner's members 
during auditing (confessional) session in reliance upon 
petitioner's deliberately false representation that such 




The so-called priest-penitent privilege is a rule of 
evidence. Cal. Evid. Code §§1033, 1034. The privilege is 
intended to protect the priest as much as the penitent. 
Cal. Evid. Code §1034, Comment (West, 1966). Further, we 
note that respondent's accusation contains inflammatory 
language and is without objective standard. This Court 
will not be put in the position of determining what is a 
"wrongful and malicious divulgence" of such information. 
Unless the information was used for such improper purpose 
or activity as blackmail or extortion (see "g" infra), 
the Court will not consider evidence on this contention. 
(c) "Pervasive violations of the individual rights 
of human dignity by subjecting members to 'amends' projects 
and RPF (Rehabilitation Project Force), involving enforced 
performance of humiliating :·and degrading acts." 
(d) "The infliction of serious, deleterious mental 
and psychic damage as the direct result of petitioner's 
dangerous brainwashing techniques." 
(e) "Depriving individuals of their own self-determinism 
and ability to form ·their own moral judgments through the 
use of brainwashing techniques . " 
The above three contentions are overly broad, vague, 
require subjective determinations, and are at least in part 
respondent's own characterization of peti t -ioner' s religious 
practices. To accept evidence on these contentions would 
amount to inquiring into petitioner's religious practices 
and would be in violation of petitioner's constitutional 
rights to freedom of religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602 (1971). Accordingly, we will not allow respondent to 
present evidence with respect to the above three .contentions. 
(f) "Removal of large amounts (over $5,000.00 in each 
instance) of currency or its equivalent from the United 
States without disclosure in violation of 31 U.S.C. §1101." 
The Court will accept evidence on this contention. 
(g) "Recurrent and pervasive use of blackmail, intimi-
dation and other egregiously anti-social acts by way of 
implementing petitioner's 'fair game' policy." 
As stated in the Memorandum Sur Order of April 1, 1980, 
the Court will permit evidence on this issue to the extent 
that the evidence tends to establish that petitioner violated 
criminal and civil law. Accordingly, we read this paragraph 
narrowly. 
'. ( . 
" 
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(h) "Petitioner's 'disconnect policy,' resulting in 
enforced dissolution of marriages and other close family 
relationships." 
Respondent contends that petitioner required its 
parishioners to terminate association with individuals 
who were not Scientologists or friends thereof. This 
contention involves an inquiry into religious beliefs and 
practices. It is not one which would lead to evidence that 
petitioner engaged in non-religious, , illegal activities. 
Accordingly, any evidence offered with respect to this 
contention will be found inadmissible. 
(i) "Insistence upon and use of non-voluntary lie 
detector (i.e., E-Meter) security checks as a condition of 
employment (or continued employment) in direct violations 
of state laws." 
Petitioner has indicated to the Court that the E-Meter 
is a religious artifact and that it is used in religious 
rituals. Accordingly, if it is established that the E-Meter 
is in fact a religious artifact, the Court will not admit 
any evidence in support of this contention. 
(j) "Involuntary ·detention (equivalent to false impri-
sonment) and also in violation of 18 u.s.c. 1581 and 1583." (sic) 
The Court will allow evidence with respect to this 
contention. 
(k) "Drastic punishment of members and employees." 
This contention is overly broad, vague and requires 
subjective determinations. Further, it may relate to the 
actual practice of petitioner's religion. Accordingly, 
except to the extent ::that such activity would be in violation 
of criminal or civil law, the Court will not admit evidence 
with respect to this contention. 
(1) "Violations of 46 U.S.C. §§103, 105, 107 and 108 
and related provisions by registering petitioner's fleet of 
ships as private yachts used for pleasure, whereas in fact 




(m) "Requiring members to violate 18 U.S.C. §1544 
by falsely stating to United States immigration authorities 
that they (such members) were travelling abroad as tourists 
and vacationers, whereas in fact they either were on covert 
missions, were carrying undisclosed currency in violation 
of law, or were travelling in the scope of their employment 
by petitioner in order to perform duties as such." 
(n) "The use of telex devices for the purpose of 
carrying on illegal covert activities in violation of the 
Federal Communications Act; together with conspiracy in 
furtherance of such purpose." (sic) 
The Court will consider evidence with respect to the 
above three contentions to the extent that the evidence 
tends to establish violations of civil and criminal law 
and relates to non-religious activity. 
* * * * 
We do not believe that respondent seeks a heresy trial; 
nor would we allow one. We wish to reiterate that the . 
trial will not be an inquiry into the beliefs of petitioner. 
We do not intend to reenact the Salem witch trials or to 
conduct a search for heretics in our midst. See A. Miller, 
The Crucible. It is a fundamental tenet of our American 
society that people of any religious persuasion can come 
to our shores to pursue their beliefs peaceably and freely. 
From the days of the Pilgrims, we have welcomed those who 
suffered religious persecution regardless of their religious 
dogma. Therefore, we will not conduct a trial into the 
merits of petitioner's beliefs. On the other hand, we 
will not ignore infringrnents on the constitutional rights 
of others that result from the acts of _petitioner. Such 
infringement is not the type of activity in _furtherance 
of religion ±hat is exempt under section 501(c) (3). 
Accordingly, this Court will only permit respondent to 
introduce evidence that tends to show that petitioner engage d 
in acts against others that violated -civil or criminal law or 
were contrary to well-defined public policy. In this connection 
the respondent will have to convince the Court first of the 
existence of a well-defined public policy before the Court 
will receive evidence that said public policy has been 
contravened by alleged acts of petitioner. 
' 
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October 9, 1981 Conference /".A- . . __ . _ L.. ~ ) 
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No. 81-3 A--~-;-~ ~~ ~  
BOB JONES UNIVERSITY ~ Cert to CA4 (Hall, Merhige 
~~  [D.J.]; Widener, dissenting) 
v • _a~~ ~
UNITED STATES ~~~ Federal/Civil ~ Timely 
~ ~ t.-z--~ ~ ,t/£,£~~ Hu.:.u 
1. SUMMARY: Petr, a religio~ school practicing racial z.z. ,,d__ .,-,:c-
di~ ation, ch ~ R 's ref~ rd it tax-
exempt status under the Service's interpretation of I.R.C. 
§S0l(c) (3), which grants a tax exemption to religious, 
scientific, educational and charitable institutions, among 
others. This case is straight-lined with Goldsboro Christian 
Schools v. United States, No. 81-1. 
ho• 2. FACTS AND B'.:>LDING BELOW: Petr is a nonprofit school 
~ ,~~1.-<JL 0-.8 !_! I - / , &fl-It o~ Cb#- 7, ~- Lt's+. 1/~ /J~ {i ';; Q_~s+, dl/'-- -
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"giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics 
revealed in the Holy Scriptures," App. to Pet. for Cert. A2-A3. 
Petr has about 5,000 students from kindergarten through graduate 
school. 
Petr strictly forbids interracial dating and marriage, 
excluding or expelling any student who has ever dated or been 
married to someone of another race, or who even advocates 
interracial dating or marriage. Petr excluded blacks entirely 
until 1971, when it began admitting married blacks only. Since 
" -~ 19~ ver, it has admitted blacks without regard to marital 
~ ·~·-
Until 1970, the IRS recognized petr as a tax-exempt 
organization under I.R.C. §501(c) (3) 1 • At that time, however, 
the Service announc f d an interpretation of §501(c) (3) under which 
it would no longer recognize as exempt any private school 
discriminating on the bas is of race. The IRS issued a final 
notice of revocation to petr in January 1976, effective as of 1 
December 1970. 
1section 501(c) (3) specifies that any organization 
operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public 
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or 
to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of 
its activities involve the provision of 
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals 
qualifies for tax-exempt status. 
' 
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Petr then brought this action in D.S.C. (Chapman, J.} for a 
refund of $21 in federal unemployment taxes for the year 1975. 
The government counterclaimed for about $490,000 in taxes for the 
years 1971 to 1975. The district court held that petr could ,66 
discriminate on the basis of race yet still qualify as a tax-
exempt institution. 
Over a dissent, CA4 reversed. Citing Green v. Connally, 330 
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.} (three-judge district court; Leventhal, 
J.}, aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 997 (1971) 2 , with approval, CA4 
concluded that §50l(c} (3) must be read against its background in 
the law of charitable trusts, which demands that a "charitable" 
institution not violate public icy, including the policy 
against government subsidy of racial discrimination. Petr's 
discrimination on the basis of race (before 1975} and racial 
association (after 1975} thus barred it from the benefits of 
§ 50 1 ( C } ( 3 } . 
--------,.. 
CA4 went on to find §50l(c} (3), so interpreted, to withstand 
attack under the Free Exercise Clause: not only is the 
government interest in eliminating racial discrimination in 
education ~ m_e_elling, but § 5J)l (c} (3) does not prohibit petr from 
continuing its racial practices. Moreover, even if petr 
abaoooned its discriminatory conduct to obtain tax-exempt status, 
21n Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.11 
(1974}, this Court noted that its affirmance of Green lacked "the 
precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary 
controversy" because the IRS had adopted the plaintiff's position 




it could continue to preach the evils of miscegenation, and 
students of petr could continue to refuse to date or marry 
outside their own race. 
CA4 also found no Establishment Clause problems. The 
section as interpreted has an unassailably secular purpose; its 
enforcement requires governmental inquiry into petr's racial 
policies only, and therefore does oot threaten excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion; and, though the section 
plainly favors religions that do oot restrict racial mixing, the 
governmental interest in doing so is at least as strong as that 
sustaining anti-polygamy statutes and Sunday closing laws. 
Circuit Judge Widener dissented. He pointed out that petr 
is a religious organization serving educational purposes, not 
merely a school operated by a church, so that the internal 
affairs of a church are at issue. He disagreed with the 
majority's use of the law of charitable trusts, noting that 
§50l(c} (3) enumerates "charitable" purposes on an equal footing 
with "religious" and five other listed purposes. As for public 
policy, Judge Widen~r found the First Amendment policy 
guaranteeing freedom of religion to ·be more weighty in this 
context than wha~eve_r policy might exist against providing at 
most indirect governmental support to organizations 
discriminating on the basis of race. He noted that this Court 
has declared that "[t]he grant of a tax exemption is not 
sponsorship since the government does oot transfer part of its 
revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the 





3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues cert. should be granted 
because CA4's decision conflicts with established principles on 
an important federal issue not yet settled by this Court. Petr 
agrees with Judge Widener that CA4 misinterpreted §50l(c) (3), and 
argues that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses forbid 
the government from requiring religions to meet minimum standards 
of acceptable doctrine before receiving tax benefits. 
Seven amici (including the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, the National Association of Evangelicals, the General 
Conference Mennonite Church, and a group supporting the Amish) 
also urge that cert. be granted. They share a concern that CA4's 
decision read broadly--that tax exemption is available only to 
those whose religious practice does not run contrary to 
administratively and judicially determined "public policy"--
threatens religious freedom. 
Despite its approval of the decision below, the SG's office3 
does mt oppose this petition. According to the Acting SG, the ----IRS is meeting "substantial" resistance to enforcement of its 
position regarding §50l(c) (3), so that the Service has been 
"impeded in its efforts to achieve even-handed enforcement" 
without "unseemly confrontations with religious claims." The 
Acting SG concludes that "a definitive decision by this Court 
will dispel the uncertainty surrounding the propriety of the 
Service's ruling position and foster greater compliance on the 
3The SG is disqualified from this case. 
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part of the affected institutions." 4 
4. DISCUSSION: The issue presented here merits, but has 
yet to receive, plenary consideration by this Court. 
Nonetheless, oot only is there no split i n the Circuits, but the 
question has been squarely addressed elsewhere only in one other 
Circuit, in the decision of the three-judge district court in 
Green, supra. Therefore, despite whatever administrative 
discomfort continuing litigation might pose to the IRS, the Court 
should postpone consideration of this question pending further 
development of the issues in the Courts of Appeal. 
I recommend: deny. 
There is a response. 
September 18, 1981 Cartwright Opn in pe tn 
4The Ashbrook Amendment (section 103) to the Treasury, 
Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559, prohibits the IRS from 
using funds to enforce any rule or procedure "which would cause 
the loss of tax-exempt status to private, religious, or church 
operated schools under Section 50l(c) (3) ••• unless in effect 
prior to August 22, 1978." The Ashbrook Amendment does not apply 
l to the present litigation because the Service's policies and procedures at issue here were established before August 22, 1978. 
• 
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UNITED STA TES 
Cert to CA4 (Butzner, Murnaghan 
per curiam; -Murnag ~ r ;el4) 
dis sen ting) 
Federal/Ci vi 1 Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr, a religious school practicing racial -discrimination, challenges the IRS's refusal to afford it tax-
exempt status under the Service's interpretation of I.R.C. 
§50l(c) (3), which grants a tax exemption to religious, 
educational, scientific and charitable institutions, among 
others. This case is straight-lined with Bob Jones University v. 
~ ' lL-» ,AJ <il-3 ~14. cn-i Od-Cf Cox/ Ld 
United States, No. 81-3. . ,s~ -l--f,.,,n,u.,: ~ , ~ l'-1-
D~ ~~ Ue.ry 1~\-ere.-s~,~ t)(..(Jl_s-koA . f:\\ ' ----,0 - _ , w ~ il:' //: 
I \ .  n , • P-(' ~ J I Is pos I -1--, o-n ~ '--fr.u__ t' e£R 
~ l f-S v.i ~ ~ 0 ~ 6 7lu- S' &-~ nof ofl~ Ol-1 
~{)-~ c[?- <'~~ ,•~d-J-1,_./-, ;,_ Or~ -f:O~ w/r!W S,p /4/ ? fl( vr 
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2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Petr is a nonprofit school for 
kindergarten through twelfth grade, "giving special emphasis to 
the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy 
Scriptures." App. to Pet. for Cert. Ga. Since its inception, it 
has discriminated against blacks--no black has ever been 
admitted. Because of its racially discriminatory policies, the 
IRS has never granted it tax-exempt status under I.R.C. 
§50l(c) (3). 1 Petr brought this action in E.D.N.C. (Hemphill, J.) 
for a refund of about $3,500 in federal taxes for 1969 through 
1972. The government counterclaimed for about $160,000 in taxes 
for the same period. On cross motions for summary judgment, the 
district court ruled for the Service, finding that the tax 
benefits of §50l(c) (3) are unavailable to organizations 
practicing racial discrimination. 
CA4 affirmed over a dissent, treating the case as 
"identical" to that of Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 
F. 2d 147 (CA4 1980) (No. 81-3: straight-lined with this case), 
and relied on the opinion in that case. 
In Bob Jones University, CA4, citing Green v. Connally, 330 
1section 50l(c) (3) specifies that any organization 
operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public 
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or 
to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of 
its activities involve the provision of 
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, 
qualifies for tax-exempt status. 
- 3 -
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge district court; Leventhal, 
J.), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 997 (1971) 2 , with approval, agreed that 
§50l(c) (3) must be read against its background in the law of 
charitable trusts, which demands that a "charitable" institution 
not violate public policy, including the policy against 
government subsidy of racial discrimination. 
CA4 found §501 (c) (3), so interpreted, to withstand attack 
under the Free Exercise Clause because the government interest in 
eliminating racial discrimination in education is compelling, and 
because §50l(c) (3) merely taxes, but does oot prohibit, a 
religious school pursuing a racially restrictive admissions 
policy. 
CA4 also found no Establishment Clause problems. Section 
50l(c) (3), as interpreted, has an unassailably secular purpose; 
its enforcement requires governmental inquiry into a school's 
racial policies only, and therefore does oot threaten excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion; and, though the section 
plainly favors religions that do oot restrict racial mixing, the 
governmental interest in doing so is at least as strong as that 
sustaining anti-polygamy statutes and Sunday closing laws. 
Circuit Judge Widener dissented. He disagreed with the 
majority's use of the law of charitable trusts, noting that 
21n Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.11 
(1974), this Court roted that its affirmance of Green lacked "the 
precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary 
controversy" because the IRS had adopted the plaintiff's position 
during the course of the litigation. 
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§50l(c) (3) lists "charitable" purposes on an equal footing with 
"religious" and five other enumerated purposes. As for public 
· policy, Judge Widener found the Fir st Amendment policy 
guaranteeing freedom of religion to be more weighty in this 
context than whatever policy might exist against providing at 
most indirect governmental support to organizations 
discriminating on the basis of race. He ooted that this Court 
has declared that "[t)he grant of a tax exemption is not 
sponsorship since the government does oot transfer part of its 
revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the 
church support the state." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 
675 (1970). 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends cert. should be granted 
because the decision below raises recurring questions concerning 
the proper construction of §50l(c) (3). Petr argues CA4 erred in 
agreeing with the IRS that an "educational" institution must also 
be a "charitable" organization in the common law sense to qualify 
for tax exemption under §50l(c) (3). Petr suggests that in so 
construing the section, the IRS, an executive agency, has, in 
effect, rewritten the statute, violating the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Finally, petr argues CA4 erred by failing 
to construe §501 (c) (3) in such a manner as to avoid "difficult 
and sensitive questions arising out of guarantees of the First 
Amendment Religious Clauses," NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 
4 9 0 , 5 07 { 19 7 9 ) • 
Petr also contends that, as interpreted by CA4, §50l{c) (3) 
violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses by requiring 
religions to meet minimum federal doctrinal standards in order to 
- 5 -
merit federal tax benefits. Petr argues cert. should be granted 
to review th is question bee ause many tax-exempt religious 
organizations put into practice doctrines that may be contrary to 
federal "public policy." Petr ootes, for example, that the Roman 
Catholic Church discriminates against women in the employment of 
clergy. 
The SG's office 3 does not oppose this petition, despite 
approval of the decision below. The Acting SG states that the 
IRS is meeting substantial resistance to enforcement of its 
position regar,ding §501 (c) (3), so that the Service has been 
"impeded in its efforts to achieve even-handed enforcement" 
without "unseemly confrontations with religious claims." The SG 
concludes that "a definitive decision by this Court will dispel 
the uncertainty surrounding the propriety of the Service's ruling 
position and foster greater compliance on the part of the 
affected institutions. 114 
4. DISCUSSION: The issue presented here merits~ but 
has yet to receive, plenary consideration by this Court. 
Nonetheless, oot only is there there no split in the Circuits, 
but the question has been squarely addressed elsewhere only in 
3The SG is disqualified from this case. 
4The Ashbrook Amendment (section 103) to the Treasury, 
Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559, prohibits the IRS from 
using funds to enforce any rule or procedure "which would cause 
the loss of tax-exempt status to private, religious, or church 
operated schools under Section 50l(c) (3) ••. unless in effect 
prior to August 22, 1978." The Ashbrook Amendment does not apply 
to the present litigation bee ause the Service's policies and 
procedures at issue here were established before August 22, 1978. 
.. 
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one other Circuit, by the decision of the three-judge district 
court in Green, supra. Therefore, despite whatever 
administrative discomfort continuing litigation might pose to the 
IRS, the court should postpone consideration of this question 
pending further development of the issues in the Courts of 
Appeal. 
I recommend: deny. 
There is a response. 
September 22, 1981 Cartwright Opn in petn 
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I recommend denial. ~he case is now moot. The lodging 
by the pltfs in the Green case appears troubling initially. 
Green was affirmed by this Court by order: below, a three-judge 
court entered a declaratory judgment to the effect that tax-
exempt status cannot be given racist schools. The three-judge 
court in Green expressly reserved, however, the question whether 
racist ~ schools could be given tax-exempt status. 
Goldsbos Jones are both religious schools, and their 
status is not, therefore, covered by the judgment entered by the 
Green court. 
This case would P{Obably be mo~t anyway, but in stating 
that he is giving tax-exempt s t a t us t o racTh t religious schools, 
the SG is not doing anything inconsistent with the Green 
declaratory judgment. 
There is a related cert petn on the J,anuary 22 
Conference list. In Regan v. Wright, (CA DC) (Wright, Tamm, & 
Ginsburg) (Tamm dissenting) the SG seeks cert in a case in which 
the CAD ave standing to challenge the enforcement of the 
regulation wit o 1 ax-exemp status from racist schools to 
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BOB JONES UNIVERSITY 
v. 
UNITED STATES 
c::::;,~~ r' -=---=-, 
(Sarne) 
SUMMARY: On October 13, the Court granted cert and consolidated 
these cases to review petrs' challenges to the IRS' refusal to g r ant 
. ~ 
them tax-exempt status under i_R.C. §501(c) (3) and related co9/1 
provisions. The SG now seeks to have the CA 4 judgments vacated as 
moot. Petr Bob Jones University joins in this request. 
--' 
~1, ~le~ 13~ 
~ 
- 2 -
THE SG'S POSITION: The SG advises that since the government 
acquiesced in the grants of cert in these cases, the Treasury 
Department has undertaken to reinstate the tax exempt status of 
both petrs, to refund to them the . social security and unemployment 
taxes in dispute, and to revoke the Revenue Rulings that were relied 
I 
upon to d e ny petrs tax exempt status under the Code. 
PETR'S POSITION: Petr Bob Jones University joins the SG's --request in the belief that the SG is now correct on the merits and 
the case is now moot. Petr - further requests, in conjunction with 
vacating the judgment below, that the Court declare it the "prevail-
ing party" (within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1988) regarding its 
counterclaim against the United States, with directions to the 
parties to settle the amount of fees. 
Amicus Lawyers' Committee for Civil· Rights Under- Law: Amicus 
lodges a letter to advise the Court that the plaintiffs in a case 
pending in the DC (DO entitled~ n v. Regah are seeking injunctive 
• 
relief to prevent the Secretar~ sury from taking the 
action described by the SG above. Amicus alleges that the Secretary's 
action would violate prior orders in Green v. Connolly, 330 F.Supp. 
1150 (D. D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) 
DISCUSSION: In light of the SG's revised position, the case now 
appears moot in this Court, despite the amicus lodging. As such, an 
order should be entered vacating the judgments below and remanding to 
the CA 4 for consideration of mootness. There the facts noted by 
amicus could be considered. 
As to petr's additional request, no special action of the Court 
is necessary. Rule 50.2 of the Rules of Court states that costs shall 
3 -
be allowed to petr when this Court vacates a judgment, and the 
typical order of this Court so provides. Expenses related to 
printing of briefs and attorneys fees are not taxable and are 
therefore left to the parties to present, if necessary, to the 
DC. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
~l/rlc/J ~ ~~ itJ "\' 
From: Mary L--t.-v~~~ 
en,- - ~ ~ - ~ ~ 
~~ ~ 9-1-~~ ~~~j 
81-1 & , 81 ~3, Goldsboro Chf istian Schools v. u.s. t In Re: Nos. 
& Bob Jones University v. U.S. ~ ~ ef--~. 
The NAACP has just filed a motion asking for leave to 
intervene as party respondent and leave to file additional papers in - ------------------------
support of affirming the judgment below and, in the alternative, for 
leave to file an amicus brief in support of the affirmance of those 
judgments. 
The NAACP has branches in both Goldsboro, N.C., and 
Greensville, s.c., the cities in which the petr schools are located. 
The NAACP notes that although the present parties may not 
be adversaries, the question remains whether the petitioners and 
other racially discriminatory schools may qualify as charitable 
institutions within the meaning of §503(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. The NAACP argues that if it is allowed to intervene in 
support of the judgments below, the case will not be moot. And the 
NAACP notes that it could not have made a more timely motion, given 
the gov't's sudden turn around. The NAACP also argues that the ~ N'~ 





r ~Cl. l1-<- P l o.,.u..J c,.. r~ cJ..,. r 
"""1 ~ .....Jti. C]"1,0- v\AOO~ 
Cf'-
' 
The motion to intervene probably should not be granted 
without briefing on it because there are serious standing issues. 
2. 
The problem with continuing with this case now, at this 
point, is that the posture has changed substantially from that 
considered by the lower courts, and it might be best to have lower 
courts consider the challenge to the gov't's withdrawal of the 
regulations (and develop the appropriate record) prior to this 
Court's review. On the other hand, it would do no harm to allow the 
NAACP to file an amicus brief on standing and mootness (including 
whether a case in which it would serve as resp to challenge the 
withdrawal of the regulations is really the same case considered by 
the lower courts or a new case brought to this Court as an original 
matter). 
On balance, given the rather sudden withdrawal by the 
gov't, I would lean to allowing the NAACP to file an amicus brief 
and postpone the decision on the gov't's motion to dismiss until 
after that brief is received. 
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Oft- ,Ci: OF THE CLERK 
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE S;.rKEME COURT, U.S. 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW . ---·- - . --' 
SUITE 520 • 733 FIFTEENTH STREET. NORTHWEST • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 • PHONE (202) 828-8700 
CABLE ADDRESS: LAWCIV, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
January 21, 1982 
Hon. Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Stevas: 
Re: / Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. 
v. United States, No. 81-1 
Bob Jones University v. United 
States, No. 81-3 
On January 14, on behalf of the Lawyers' Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law (which has filed a brief amicus 
curiae with the consent of the parties in the above-captioned 
cases), I lodged with your office copies of a motion for 
injunctive relief filed on January 13 in Green v. Regan, Civ. 
No. 1355-69 (D.D.C.). In my letter to you of that date, I 
explained that attorneys for the Lawyers' Committee had 
concluded that the Green proceedings may have an effect upon 
the question of mootness raised in these two cases by the 
Memorandum for the United States filed on January 8, 1982, 
and for that reason we felt obligated to inform the Court of 
the filing of our motion. I also indicated that we would 
keep the Court informed about any developments in the Green 
matter. The purpose of this letter is to report to you on 
the current status of the proceedings and, respectfully, to 
suggest what we believe may be a desirable and appropriate 
course of action at this time. 
There has been as yet no action by the district court in 
Green. However, responses by the United States and by the 
other parties in Green to our January 13 motion will be due, 
according to our reading of the local rules, no later than 
Monday, January 25, 1982. 
Amicus Lawyers' Committee believes that neither the 
Goldsboro nor the Bob Jones case is moot. The events of the 
past week, reported in the press (which we hope will be clari-
/h, ~ ,__.;_ ~k;C~)~:..j,½ 
~ ~ 0-~ fh-~ 




. LA WYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 
• 
Hon. Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk 
January 21, 1982 
Page Two 
fied in the government's response in Green and/or in a further 
filing by the United States in these cases) have reinforced 
our judgment about the mootness question. 
Since the Court has not yet acted on the suggestion of 
mootness contained in the January 8 Memorandum for the United 
States, and since no party or amicus has addressed that issue, 
we very respectfully suggest that it would be appropriate 
and helpful for the Court to seek the views of the parties 
and the amici on the subject of mootness before reaching any 
determination. Amicus Lawyers' Committee would, of course, 
be pleased to provide the Court with its views on the subject 
pursuant to any schedule established by the Court. 
I should appreciate your notifying the Court of these 
matters in any manner which is appropriate. 
/c 
cc: Hon. Lawrence G. Wallace 
William B. Ball, Esq. 
James Edward Ablard, Esq. 
William G. McNairy, Esq. 
Norman J. fuachkin 
Counsel of ecord for 
Amicus uriae Lawyers' 
Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law 
• 
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SUMMARY: The NAACP moves for leave to intervene as resp in 
support of affirming the judgments below. Alternatively, the NAACP 
moves for leave to file an arnicus brief, and to participate in oral 
argument. 
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS: The present motion, generated by the 
1/ 
SG's recent decision to dismiss these cases as moot,- is filed by 
!/See Legal Office memo dated January 14, 1982. 
~ v ~ ({2--u. AIA-A-cP ~ µJ /µ>.A- Fr,~ 
r ~ ..Jo r~ ~ ~ 1 IU4-i~ rh .,~ I ft ./er{XM.fl.. , 
r,,11J/J#- \ 
- 2 -
the NAACP in the belief that their "interests would no longer be 
protected adequately by the parties before the Court." Movants, 
who are a New . York corporation organized to combat racial discrim-
ination, advise that the respective Greenville and Goldsboro NAACP 
branch presidents have chiidren attending schools in the cities where 
I 
the schools at issue are located. As such, movants argue, their 
interest in racially non-discriminatory public education has been 
directly affected by this litigation. Movants contend that their 
interest extends to the use of their tax dollars to subsidize this 
illegal racial discrimination in their respective communities. Addi-
tionally movants maintain that membership in the NAACP is directly 
impeded by the Bob Jones University which requires expulsion of stu~ 
dents affiliated with any organization that advocates interracial 
marriage. 
Movant asserts that the cases .are not _moot despite the SG's 
motion to dismiss. Such action by the SG, movant contends, contra-
venes this Court's decision in Cort v. Green, 404 U.S. 957 (1971). 
DISCUSSION: Intervention in this Court is seldom granted, and 
is even more rarely granted when the movant was not a party below, 
absent the most imperative reasons. See Ohio Bureau of Employment 
Service v. Hodory, 429 U.S. 814 (1976). In the absence of same, 
grant of leave to f~le an amicus brief is generally more appropriate. 
The motion to intervene should be denied (as should leave to file 
2/ 
the amicus brief is the Court intends to vacate and remand).-
1/21/82 Caldwell 
2/Because the SG has moved to dismiss, the Court may have no 
alternative but to vacate and remand to the CA 4 for consideration 
of mootness. However because the news media continue to report some 
degree of uncertainty in the Executive Branch on the proper approach 
to these cases the Court may wish to relist for the Feb. 19 Conf. 
pending clarification of that uncertainty. 
r 
\ , 
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FOR .TH:: :::: : sTR: ~7 C? C CLUY. 9, A Cl rtCUIT ~, 
1"1o. 80-1124 Sc-~em'- 0 - Te"'m -rt: ... v.__1 .. • i 1 19 81 
Inez ~-:right, indi vic:-:.12.lly a..7d on 
be~alf of her minor chilc=e~, 
0::;car Cl 2y Renfro, ;._-:-:::1c:1y :::.:ee 
Renfro, Lisa Marie ~=isht, and 
E?:-iron 1-....:,toni 1•;ric;h::, Jr., et al., 
;a.ppella:.:ts 
v. 
Civil Action No.· 76-1426 
U,.::c.a .:.:i:.::-s C:.:- :: .:;,~ 1·-,-:::•-:=--'.i-
lor 1:;e pi;1,i_cr _cf Cc.ic•r.:.=ia C;.·.:.;;1. 
.,GE A. f;SL!:.~ 
~R..~ 
Donald T. Regai, Secre-::a=y of 
the Treasury, et sl. _________________ J _______________________ _ 
No. 82-1134 
Hilliam H. Green, 0:1 his o·.-.7l be:-ialf 
and on behalf of his ~i~o= c:-iilcren, 
et al. , 
Appell2~ts 
v. 
Donald T. Regan, as Secret2.~y of 
the 7reasury of t~e u~i~ec S~ates, 
et al. 
Civil Action No. 69-01355 
BEFOR:2: h'::-isht, 7·~-n:n and Ginsburg, Circuit Judges 
0 RD ER 
On consicera~ion o= ~ovants' request for an injunctio~ 
pending a?peal in No. 82-1134, for an injunction under the 
"All 1~ri ts Act" to preserve the status quo and protect the 
potential effective:1ess of this court's decision in No. 80-1124, 
and for consolidatio~ o~ Kos . 82-1134 and 80-1124, · it is hereby 
ORDZRED that the a??lication to consolidate Nos. 82-1134 
and 80-1124 is de~ied; and it is further 
ORDERED that the no-::ion for an injunction pending appeal 
in ~o. 82-1134 be referred forthwith to the motions panel for 
e::pedi tious consiccr~tion; a:r.• it is further 
.A•~ ,.Tl ~ 
,., ::~ ~ ~ • •• - ~ 'rTJ ;; 
~.:.-. .;...,..:;:...,:... 
T'-1 o. s 0-112 i; 
82-1134 
~ w 
r=:-::...-..,. @: ..,. .,,.._ " t-:.:.--.-~ .. -~.,.., . w: ,........~ .............. ~ . -:- _JC,.) ,</y>~~- +J,1 
_ ::·' ".! ~ ".' , _..,- .-. • - • , ; ,. !, t -. n .t.. - ;• ·. ~ >",,. ~ ll G 
~ ..,,. . _,..-:-- ....- ,q...-...,..... ~ ~ .......- ,c,, .,, ;:>- .,; ,,._,,,,.. ~•~ 
FOR -T~:; :5, R f CT CF COLV•~ 91 A CIRCUIT ,. 
Sept2mber Term, 19 81 
-2-
ORD:E:ili:D tpat .,_. J... -Lne mo ... ion :.:or relief unc.er the "All Writs 
Actn in No. 80-1.l2~ b2 filed ana that a · response thereto . by 
the Secretary of tbe Treasury and the Co~issioner of Internal 
Revcn~e be filed.wit~in fifteen days of the date.of this order; 
and i 7. is further 
ORDERED, that to preserve the status quo pending res?onse 
to tte motion in ~o. 80-1124 an~, thereafter, the court's 
dete=~ination of its authority to cotisider a~d decide the iss~es 
pres2r.ted, ·see Unite:: S~ates ·v. Un.ited Mine 1•:orkers, 330 U.S. 
258 (194 _7), the Secretary of the Treasury and Co:-:u:1issioner of 
Internal Revenue are directed not to grant or restore federal 
t~x-exernp7. status pu=suant to 26 U.S.C. i SOl(c) (3) to any 
school that unlawfully ciscriwiDates on the basis of race, '------
~ Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) ,, by fa~ _ling t.o 
maintain a "racially nondiscriminatory policy as to stu1ents," 
as that term _is d2fined in the declaratory judg:.:ent in Gre2::1 v: · 
Connally, 33d F.Supp. ilSO, 1179 (D.D.C.), aff'd rnern. sub ncm. 
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SUMMARY : Late yesterday , the SG filed a motion for leave t o 
file a brief out of time (along with the brief ), and a motion for 
leave t o file a motion for divided argument out of time (along 
with the motion ). Petr Bob Jones University has filed a n 
opposition t o both motions . 
Motion for Leave to File a Brief Out of Time : The SG' s 
brief , due January 10 , was not filed ; in its stead on January 8 
was filed a suggestion of mootness . On February 1 8, the CADC 
(Wright , Tamm, Ginsburg , order) in Wright v . Reqan , No . 80-1124 , 
enjoined the Secretary of Treasury and IRS Commissioner from 
granting or restoring tax-exempt status to any school that 
practices racial dis crimination . ~he SG now maintains that th e 
Secretary of Treasury's decision to honor this order changed the 
posture of the cases, making his sugges tion of mootness " no 
longer appropriate . " As such , he desires to proceed to oral 
argument and to file a late brief on the merits . 
Motion for Leave to File a Motion For Divided Argument : The 
SG's brief on the merits : (1 ) supports petrs ' argument that §50 1 
(c) (3) of the I.R.C. does not authorize the IRS to deny them tax-
exem?t status as "religious" or " educa tional" institutions 
because of their racially discriminatory poli~ies ; and (2) 
opposes petrs ' constitutional claim that their firs t Amendmen t 
right to free religious belief and exercise guarantees them tax -
exempt status . As such , the SG agrees with the suggestion mad e 
by several arnici that the Court should appoint counsel to argu e 
in support of the judgments below . The SG further moves t o 
divide argumen t evenly (20 minutes each ) among the SG , petrs an d 
• 
- 3 -
the selected amicus . 
Petr Bob Jones University opposes 1 and argues that: (1) no 
non-party should be granted intervention at this level ; and in 
fact there is no non-party whose own rights are threatened by 
this litigation; the NAACP has only articulated "genera lized 
grievances;" (2) reversal of the judgment below is in order since 
the SG has now conceded the statutory argument ; and (3) it would 
be unfair to permit an amicus to argue on behalf of the 
government without allowing certain religious organizations to 
argue as amicus on behalf of petrs with an equal amount of time . 
Discussion: The plethora of motions require decisions on the 
following: 
(1) Suqgestion of Mootness : The cases no longer appear moot . 
As petrs observe , the SG "seeks an ultimate result unfavorable to 
the rights of petitioners ... ," on constitutional gro unds, 
despite the fact that the SG no longer opposes petrs on statutory 
grounds. Thus , dismissal for mootness seems inappropriate in 
light of the ''renewed" case or controversy , as well as the SG 's 
"withdrawal" of his earlier suggestion of mootness. 
(2) SG's Mo tion to File a Brief out of time : If the cases 
proceed to argument , a merits brief from the SG no doubt is 
necessary. Rule 35.4 provides for enlargement of the time for 
filing "pursuant to order of the Court ... " 
1Petr advises that his opposition was drafted in 
anticipation of the SG's motions . He states that he cannot 
respond directly since he had not been provided with copies of 




f i 1 i ng "pursuant to order of the Court . . . " 
(3) Motion of Petr in No . 81-3 for Order Directinq Resp t o 
Act in Accordance with its January 8 Memo : Petr has cited no 
authority for its request which seems particular l y inappropriat e 
in light of the SG ' s '' withdrawal" of hi s suggestion of mootness . 
(4) Motion of NAACP for Leave to Intervene , or Participate 
as Amicus : (See Legal Office Memo dated January 21 , 1982 .) 
( 5) Mo tions of Various Amici for Leave to File Brief s: The 
Court ' s Rules do not provide for filing of amicu s briefs in 
support of motions , etc . and petrs h ave correctly noted that the 
amici briefs are untimely , do not support a "party , '' and do not 
articulate anv clea r interest in the litigation . I recommend 
that these motions be denied (unless the Court is inclined to 
appoint an amicus to argue in support of the judgment below) . 
(6) Motion of the SG for Divided Argument and Leave to File 
Motion for Div ide d Argument : The motion for leave to file a 
motion for div ided argument should not be d e nied as untimely due 
to the peculiar development of this case . As such I recommend 
that leave to file be granted , but that the motion for divided 
argument be denied. In my view, sufficient controversy is 
presented by the views of petrs versus the SG - on· the 
constitutional issue . No oral argumen t need be presented o n the 
statutory claim since arnicus may duly address this issue in a 
brief that might later be filed in support of th e SG ' s merit s 
brief . This approach would avoid the need for appointment o f 
"special counsel" or selection of an amicus to argue in favor of 
the judgment below . 
2/2 6 Caldwell 
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Motion of Solicitor General 
for Leave to File Motion for 
Divided Argument Out of Time. 
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SUMMARY: Late yesterday, the SG filed a motion for leave to 
file a brief out of time (along with the brief), and a motion for 
leave to file a motion for divided argument out of time (along 
with the motion). Petr Bob Jones University has filed an 
opposition to both motions. 
Motion for Leave to File a Brief Out of Time: The SG's 
brief, due January 10, was not filed; in its stead on January 8 
was filed a suggestion of mootness. On February 18, the CADC 
(Wright, Tamm, Ginsburg, order) in Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124, 
enjoined the Secretary of Treasury and IRS Commissioner from 
granting or restoring tax-exempt status to any school that 
practices racial discrimination. ~he SG now maintains that the 
Secretary of Treasury's decision to honor this order changed the 
posture of the cases, making his suggestion of mootness "no 
longer appropriate." As such, he desires to proceed to oral 
argument and to file a late brief on the merits. 
Mot i on for Leave to File a Motion For Divided Argument: The 
SG's brief on the merits: (1) supports petrs' argument that §501 
{c) (3) of the I.R.C. does not authorize the IRS to deny them tax-
exempt status as "religious" or "educational" institutions 
because of their racially discriminatory poli~ie~; and (2) 
opposes petrs' constitutional claim that their first Amendment 
right to free religious belief and exercise guarantees them tax-
exempt status. As such, the SG agrees with the suggestion made 
by several amici that the Court should appo i nt counsel to argue 
in support of the judgments below. The SG further moves to 
divide argument evenly (20 mi nutes each) among the SG, petrs and 
- 2 -
status under I.R.C. §50l(c)(3) and related codal provisions. Now pending 
before the Court is the SG's suggestion of mootness, as well as four motions 
for leave to file amicus briefs in opposition to the suggestion of mootness. 
FACTS: Following the grant of cert, the SG fil~d a memorandum with the 
Court on January 8 stating that the government: (1) would refurxi the disputed 
tax payments; (2) had begun the process of granting or restoring petrs' 
tax-exempt status; and (3) was revoking the revenue rulings arxi revenue 
procedures pursuant to which that status had been withheld. Thus, it appeared 
that the United States was granting petrs' the relief which gave rise to this 
litigation. However on January 18, the President announced that the 
government opposed tax-exempt status to petrs and other racially 
discriminatory private schools and was sul:rnitting legislation to Congress to 
prevent this result. This statement was contained in a letter from the 
President to Congress which explained the President's view that "agencies such 
as the IRS should not be permitted ••. to govern by administrative fiat by 
exercising powers that the Constitution assigns to the Congress." The 
President also announced that the IRS would not act on any applications for 
tax exemptions filed in response to the January 8 IRS policy statement, 
pending congressional action on the legislative proposal. A Treasury 
Department release on the same day clarified that a special exception would be 
made for petrs' cases herein, meaning that petrs would be granted tax-exempt 
status "as required by the menorandLUI1 in support of the motion to vacate as 
filed in the Supreme Court on January 8, 1982." 
On February 18, 1982, the CAOC in Wright. v. Regan., No. 80-1124, entered 
the following injunction: 
• 
- 3 -
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury and C,orrmis-
sioner of Internal Revenue are directed not to 
grant or restore federal tax-exempt status .•• 
to any school which unlawfully discriminates on 
the basis of race •••• 
MOTION OF 'fHE NAACP FOR LEAVE 1D INTERVENE OR PARTICIPATE AS AMICUS: (See 
I 
Legal Office memo dated January 21, 1982.) 
MOTION OF LAURENCE TRIBE AND BERNARD WOLFMAN FOR LEAVE TO FILE .A BRIEF AS 
AMICI: Amici as "teachers, scholars, and students of constitutional law and 
tax law. • . " suhni t that they have an interest "in the preservation of this 
Court's special role as arbiter of nationally significant controversies .••• " 
Amici urge the Court either: (1) to proceed to resolve the merits with the 
assistance of suitable intervenors or amici; (2) to dismiss the writs as 
improvidently granted, leaving in place the CA 4's final judgments; or (3) to 
refer the matter to the CA 4 for further proceeding~ prior to a final 
resolution by this Court. Amici argue that the cases are not moot since the 
Executive has suhnitted legislation to Congress ·that would retroactively 
affirm the decision of CA 4. Moreover, the memorandum in support of the 
motion to vacate as filed with the Supreme Court on January 8, 1982 does not 
require the grant of exemption since it is not an order. But even though the 
SG's new position does not moot the cases, argue Amici, it casts doubt on the 
adequacy of the SG's future representation of its earlier position. Thus the 
proper remedy would be one of the three alternatives proposed above. 
MOTION OF THE LAWYERS' Ga1MITTEE, ET AL., FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENrAL 
BRIEF AS AMICI: Relying upon~. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) 
and Church of Scientology v. United States, 485 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1973). 
Amici oppose the SG's suggestion of mootness for substantially the same 
reasons advanced by amici above. 
- 4 -
MOTION O.F AGE~IES OF THE UNITED GHURCH OF qnu~ FDR LEAVE TO FILE AN 
AM;ICUS BRIEF: This amicus brief shares the view, for substantially the same 
reasons noted above, that these cases are not moot. Amicus further argues 
that petrs have no claims under the Free Exercise Clause because, they 
I 
c·ontend, the revenue ruli~s at issue do not inhibit any person associated 
with petrs from following their religious convictions. 
OPPOSITION BY PETR BOB JONES UNIVERSITY 'ID THE TRIBE-WOLFMAN MOTION FDR 
LEAVE 'ID FILE AN .Al1IQJS BRIEF: Petr argues: (1) Under Rule 36.2 the motion 
is untimely as it was not filed within the time allowed for the filing of the 
brief of the "party supported;" (2) .Amici do not support a "party," but 
rather a "position;" (3) .Amici lack any substantial or concrete interest in 
the outcane of these cases. Petr Goldsboro joins in this opposition, and 
further opposes the amicus filing by the United Church. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMO FDR PETR GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS: Petr contends 
that a case or controversy remains since the government interprets the CAOC's 
recent injunction as prohibiting the Treasury Department from granting the 
tax-exempt status as stated in the SG's January 8 memo. Thus, petr requests: 
(1) that the Court enter "an appropriate Order" permitting the Sec. of 
Treasury and the IRS to grant petrs the relief promised by the SG in his 
January 8 memo to the Court; (2) that the Court take no further action until 
the relief promised by the SG is granted; (3) that the relevant portion of the 
CA 4 judgment be vacated and the case remanded for appropriate judgment; and 
(4) in the absence of the government granting petrs the relief requested, that 
the Court set the case for argument. Petr Bob Jones University similarly 
requests an "appropriate order." 
- 5 -
DISCUSSION: The Clerk's Office advises that the SG intends to file 
further motions in these cases later today, in the nature of: (1) a request 
that the Court appoint an amicus to argue the position earlier advanced by the · 
SG; and (2) a request that the Court divide arglllilent evenly amorg petrs, the 
I 
SG, and the amicus. Further cooment is expected on the suggestion of 
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Honorable Alexander L . Stevas 
Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
U.S. Department o f Justice 
Office of the Solicitor General 
Washington , D.C. 20530 
March 4, 1 982 
Re : Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. 
United Stat es of America, No . 81-1 and 
Bob Jones University v. 
United States of America, No. 81-3 
Dear Mr . Stevas: 
Pursuant to your request I enclose, for lodging, 15 copies 
of the January 1982 draft brief in the above-referenced cases, 
refer red to in the fo otnote appended to the Questions Presented 
in the government's brief on the merit s . 
As noted in that footnote, the draft brief was previously 
furnished by the Department of Justice in January 1982 to the 
Senate Finance Comm i ttee and House Ways and Means Committee. The 
House Ways and Means Committee subsequently released cop i es of 
that draft brief to the public . The citations in subpo i nt D of 
the Argument port ion of the draft brief would have included , i n 
final print, reference to this Court's opinion in Haig v. Agee, 
No . 80-83 (June 29 , 1981), slip op. at 18-20. 
Enclosures 
cc : All counsel of record . 
Yours sincerely, 
\~(b 
/ Lawrence G. Wallace 




Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: March 5, 1982 Conf. discussion of Bob Jones University, et 
al., Nos. 81-1 & -3; and Green v. Regan, No. 81-1626 
The Court now has before it eight motions by various 
parties (and non-parties) in the Bob Jones cases. These are 
listed in the memos from the Legal Office. ( I am told another 
Legal Off ice memo is due imminently.) In addition, the Court 
has a motion from petr Green in Green v. Regan, No. 81-1626, to 
expedite consideration of his petn for cert to the CADC and to 
consolidate with the Bob Jones cases. My view is that the 
Court should DIG the Bob Jones case and deny the motion to ex-
pedite and consolidate in Green v. Regan, thus deciding that 
case in the normal course. 
appeal in Green v. Regan.) 
(The CADC has not yet decided the 
The SG originally suggested to the Court that the Bob 
Jones and Goldsboro cases were moot. His reasoning then was 
that the Administration had reversed its tax policy and would 
grant tax exempt status to Bob Jones and Goldsboro. The SG now 
says his "previous suggestion of mootness is . • . no longer .. 
appropriate." SG's Motion For Leave To File Brief Out Of Time 
3 (filed 2/25/82). 
2. 
The SG gives two reasons for his most recent change in 
position. First, the President has proposed legislation giving 
the IRS express statutory authority to deny tax exempt status 
on grounds of racial discrimination. Second, the CADC in 
Wright v. Regan had entered an injunction ordering the govern-
ment "not to grant or restore federal tax-exempt status pusuant 
to 26 u.s.c. §50l(c) (3) " The SG makes the following 
observation: 
The District of Columbia Circuit's 
order in Wright changes the posture of these 
cses before the Court. In light of that 
court's order, the Secretary has determined 
not to grant or restore tax-exempt status to 
petitioners, or to revoke the pertinent Reve-
nue Rulings, pending final disposition of 
these cases by this Court. Our previous sug-
gestion of mootness is therefore no longer 
appropriate. In this circumstances, we believe 
it would be appropriate for this Court to pro-
ceed with adjudication of the issues on which 
certeriorari was granted. 
SG' s Motion For Leave To File Brief Out Of 
Time 3 (filed 2/25/82). 
The SG now wants the Court to consider the merits of 
this suit: whether §50l(c) (3) provides sufficient legislative 
,p ___..... 
authorization for the IRS's actions, and, if so, whether those 
actions are constitutional. Bob Jones and Goldsboro, of 
course, argue that there is no legislative authorization and, 
even if there is, the IRS action is unconstitutional. The SG 
argues the Constitution does not forbid the IRS's action. But 
he agrees with Bob Jones that the statute does not provide suf-





This agreement means that, in the ordinary course, 
this suit should have been settled. But the SG has two motives 
for seeking a judgment from this Court, as far as I can see. 
First, he would like an advisory opinion on the constitutional-
ity of the Administration's proposed legislation. Obviously 
this is not an adequate rationale for hearing the merits of 
this case. 
Second, the government is prevented from granting Bob 
Jones an exemption by the CADC's injunction in Wright v. Regan. 
Upon inspection, / this also turns out to be an extremely pecu-
liar reason for this Court to hear the merits of a case other 
than Wright v. Regan. 
wr i .9.!!.!_ v. Regan is the same case as Green v. Regan, in 
which Green now seeks cert, expedition, and consolidation. 
{Green's motions are on the March 5 Conf list.) This 
Green/Wright case arose out of the renewed efforts to enforce 
the ten year old three-judge court order barring §50l{c) (3) tax 
exemptions to racially discr imatory schools. See Green v. 
Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 {1971) {Leventhal, Waddy, Pratt), 
aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 {1971). This 
--=-
declaratory judgment did not purport to apply to religiously-
motivated school discrimination. See 330 F. Supp. at 1169 {"We 
are not now called upon to consider the hypothetical inquiry 
whether tax exemption ot tax-deduction status may be available 
to a religious school that practices acts of racial discrimina-
4. 
tion because of the requirements of the religion. Such a prob-
lem may never arise ..•. "). 
On 1/13/82, Green moved for further injunctive relief 
based on this declaratory judgment. The requested relief would 
have barred the Administration's announced plans to grant Bob 
Jones a tax exemption. The DC denied relief on 2/4/82. Green 
appealed to the CADC on 2/5/82. The CADC issued its famed in-
'-- - --• -- ~ ,,,,...-, ,....__, 
junction pendente lite on 2/18/82 (copy attached). The CADC 
has not yet ruled on this 
On 3/3/82, Green petitioned for cert to the CADC, ex-
pedited consider at ion, and consolidation with Bob Jones and 
Goldsboro. He argues that his case presents the same issue as 
the Bob Jones case, that the SG has requested that Coit v. 
Green be overruled, that Green's rights will be determined by 
any decision in Bob Jones, and that cert prior to CADC judgment 
is appropriate due to "the overwhelming public importance of 
the issue presented " 
I think that the CADC injunction in Wright v. Regan 
should be initially determined by the court that granted that 
pendente lite order: the CADC. The CADC presumably will re-
view its interlocutory order if it is allowed the chance to 
decide the appeal that Green has filed. If the disappointed 
party so desires, it can seek review from this Court after the 
CADC decision. Certainly this interlocutory injunction is not 
a sufficient justification for this Court to decide the merits 
5. 
of the separate Bob Jones cases, in which the litigants agree 
the decision to be reviewed is in error. 
My general feeling is that the Reagan administration 
has a political problem on its hands that it would like this 
Court to solve. In the absence of any disagreement between the ?/2.-
parties, the Court should decline the opportunity. I recommend ~~ t 
a DIG on Bob Jones (thus avoiding the need to decide whether to 
appoint Prof. Tribe as oral amicus, etc.) and denial of Green's 
motion to expedite. I will, of course, be happy to do any fur-
ther work on this case if you would like additional informa-
tion. 
. . 
' t , 
March 5, 1982 Conference 
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M:>tion of Petitioner in No. 81-3 for 
SllIIIlary Reversal. 




BOB JONES UNIVERSITY 
v. 
UNI TED Sf ATES 
M:>tion of Petitioner in No. 81-1 for 
SLDJillary Reversal, 
(Same) 
SUMMARY: In addition to the motions already pending before the Court in 
J, /{ 
these consolidated cases,l both petrs now move for surrmary reversal on the -ground that the SG, on behalf of the United States, has confessed error. 
FACTS2 AND CO:tq'TENTIONS: 
-
The SG has now filed the government's brief on 
the merits which states (at 49): "The judgments of the court of appeals should 
be reversed.'i As its basis for that conclusion, the SG states: 
1see surrmary of motions· in L. 0. memo dated February 26, 1982. 
{\ 2see L. 0. maro dated February 25, 1982. , -A .. ,,, _L, · JA -1-:-- -k /J.~ 
~~· ~ ~~~&&~dAA~· ,~;J1,4,r:fftE>1A~tVJlT-<-( 
~~ ~ ~ ~JJ~·vf~~zli~M~#d 
• 
- 2 -
"In the succeeding sections we argue - contrary 
to the Government's position below - that Sec-
tion 50l(c)(3) does not permit the Con:missioner 
of Internal Revenue to withhold congressionally 
authorized tax exemption from otherwise quali-
fied 'religious' and 'educational' organizations 
based solely on an administrative determination 
of failure to conform to the national policy. 
Our contention is, not that the policy which we 
fully accept and implement is wrong, but that the 
Internal Revenue Code - from which all 1the Con:mis-
sioner's authority is derived - neither authorizes 
nor contemplates this kind of broad administrative 
discretion." (Id_ at 13). 
Accordingly, petrs move for Sl.DIIIlary reversal as an alternative to their 
earlier request for an order directing the United States to comply with the 
SG's January 8 memo. 
DISQJSSIQN: It is becoming increasingly difficult to discern the 
gover~ ent's position in these consolidated cases. ~~ the SG filed 
a suggestion of mootness. On~ ary ~ in the SG's motion for leave to file 
a motion for divided argument, the SG stated that the. government supported 
petrs' statutory argl.llilent regarding interpretation of §50l(c)(3), but opposed 
petrs' First Amendment claim to abridgement of religious freedom. Also on 
February 25 in the SG's motion for leave to file a brief out of time, the SG 
stated that his earlier suggestion of mootness was "no longer appropriate," 
apparently because of the CADC order enjoining the Sec. Treas. from restoring 
tax exempt status. , / the SG's brief on the merits states that the United 
States lacked admin1Strative authority to deny petrs tax exempt status. Thus, 
although the cases arguably are not moot because of the CADC order, there is 
some question whether a real controversy remains. ------ - -Nevertheless, the proper resolution of the cases if the SG truly does not 
disagree with petrs would be dismissal under Rule 43.J upon subnission to the 
Clerk of a letter by both parties stating their agreement, not an order 
granting sl.DIIIlary reversal. 
I recoomeoo that sl.DIIIlary reversal be denied. 
There is no response. 
3/4/82 Caldwell 
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M:)tion of ~h Carolina Association 
of Black Lawyers for Leave to File a 
Brief as .Amie.us Curi_ae_ 
(Same) 
StJMM_,\RY:: Amic,us_, the North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, moves 
for leave to file an amic,us brief in support of affirming the judgments below. 
CONTENTIONS: Regarding its interest in the litigation, amicus states 
• 
that its members are attorneys who practice in and around Goldsboro, North 
Carolina, who have clients and associates as parents of children in the 
Goldsboro area, and who have battled at the forefront of the civil rights 
struggles in the past three decades. _, :C. '- ~~ 
-:i: ()~ -1-n ~ o,9Af~~l£7J!:w~ 
~ ~ Tt:Uikd. ~ ~ ~ O . ~ ti)_ • ,Jhh,J 




Ami_cus seeks leave to file its brief on the merits. It recognizes the 
requirement of Rule 36 to file ~iG~s briefs within the time allowed for 
filing the merits brief by the party to be supported. (In this case resp's 
brief, al though due January 13, was filed March 3.) However, amic.us. argues 
that this case requires some amplification of the Rule because: (1) resp's 
/ 
March 3 brief represents a repudiation of its position as maintained in CA 4; 
and (2) arguably a true resp's brief, i.~., one that supports the judgment 
below, has not yet been filed. Accordingly, am_i_cus suhnits that its brief 
should not be deemed untimely. 
DISCUSSION: This case continues to present hybrid circumstances not 
contemplated by the Rules of Court. Although there may be sound reasoning for 
denying leave to file amicus briefs in support of motions since the Rules do 
not provide for acceptance of such briefs, the same cannot be said for amicus 
briefs regarding the merits. As such I recoornend that the motion be granted 
for the reasons advanced by am~cus. 
3/17/82 
PJC 
te~ s/1'b/<e2 Ca1'.dwell 
,, 
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Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: 3/19/82 status of Bob Jones , 
G~· Dl6' J 
I adhere to my views in my 3/4/82 memo. By my count, 
there is now 11 motions now pending before the ~ourt in the Bob 
Jones cases. -Simply by way of a table of contents, I list 
them. 
1. Motion of N.C. Ass'n of Black Lawyers to file as 
amicus. 
2. Motion by Green to expedite Green v. Regan (CADC 
appeal that has not yet been decided) and consolidate with Bob 
Jones. 
3. Motions of Bob Jones and Goldsboro for summary 
reversal. 
4. Motion of Bob Jones for order directing SG to act 
with respect to SG's 1/8/81 memo. 
5. Motion of SG to proceed with argument and for 
Court to appoint an amicus to represent the judgment below. 
6. Motion of SG to file late brief. 
7. Motion of SG for leave to file late motion to di-
vide argument. 
8. Motion of NAACP to intervene or to participate as 
amicus. 
9. Motion of L. Tribe & B. Wolfman to intervene or to 
participate as amicus. 
10. Motion of Lawyers' Committee to intervene or to 
participate as amicus. 
11. Motion of United Church of Christ to intervene or 
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FOR THE DIST RICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 82-1134 
Willi am H. Green , on his own 
behalf and on behalf of hi s 
minor children, et al., 
Appellants 
v. 
September Term, ;g 82 
c-~;:-,..-! ~ 7-.· ..... (' -.•, • , ,r ,_ l 
b ,. <::ivil _·Ac'tion:-' No . 69-013 55 
•• ·' ~ 1 - .::!::,:: C!:·c~;t 
FIL~D i/,/i,R 2 4 ,982 
·~ 
GEo::df A. ns1-1rn 
Donald T. Regan, as Secretary of 




BEFORE: Tamm, Ginsburg and Bork , Circuit Judges 
0 RD E R 
Upon consideration of the motion for injunction pending 
appeal, of the responses and reply thereto, and o f the request 
by intervenor Clarksdale Baptist Church for oral argwne nt on 
the motion for injunction pending appeal , it is 
ORDERED that the motion for injunction p ending appeal is 
denie d. Virginia Petroleum J obber s Ass 'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 
(D.C. Cir. 1958). It is 
FURTHJ;:R ORDERED that the request for oral argument on the 
motion for injunction pending appeal is denied. 
Per Curiam 
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FOR TH E DIST RIC T OF COLUM~IA CI RC UIT 
t~ o. 8 0 - 112 '1 
Ine z Wright, individua lly and on 
b e half of her minor children , 
Oscar Clay Renfro, Anthony Lee 
Renfro, . Lisa Marie Wright, and 




Donald T. Regan, Secretary of 
the Treasury, et al. 
Scvternber Term, f9 81 
I 
Civil Action No. 7 6-1426 
j ,_,J l , , 
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BEFORE: Wright, Tamm and Ginsburg , Circuit Judges 
0 R D E R 
Upon consideration of the motion for injunction under 
the "All Writs Act," and of the responses and reply the r eto , 
it is 
ORDERED that the Order of th is -Court o f February 18, 1982 , 
is continued in force as herein provided. That Order directed 
the Secretary of tl)e Treasury and Comrnissioner of Internal 
Revenue "not to grant or restore federal tax-exempt status 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3) t o any sch ool that unlawfully 
discriminate s on the basis of race , see . Runy on v. Mccrary, 
427 U.S. 160 (197 6 ), by failing to maintain a 'racially non-
discriminato ry policy as to students ,' as that term i s defined 
in the dec l aratory judgment in Gre e n v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 
1150 , 1179 (D.D.C.), aff ' d mem. s ub norn. Coit v . Green , 404 U.S. 
997 (19 71) ." If appc~llant s ,;-;r i ght , ~:~. ~_! -, do not no tifv t his 
Court wi thin 20 days f rom th e d a te of this Order that th e y have 
,, 
---- ...... _ .. ·:--
\ ·-: 
··-· 
'JW~ • ~-f ~ g .~ .ft -r<l. tf.,--1' ,.,. ~ Jt. ~ ,:e ~ -!\,-;-. ~ ~ ~ TT 
~ u t :tr.12' !t! ~ ~ a Il-IZ" z ~ n V.h~-i :or r ..c-~ r r + ~ t,zl 
? 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 80-112 4 September Term, 19 81 
-2-
filed in the District Court a motion for injunction requesting 
relief similar to the relief granted by this Court's February 18, 
1982, Order, then this Court's Order of February 18, 1982, shall 
be vacated 20 days from the date of this Order. If appellants 
do so notify this Court, then this Court's Order of February 18, 
1982, shall remain in effect until the District Court r~les on 
the motion for injunction and p ending any appe al to this Court 
from that rulin g . See Fe d.R.App. P. 8(a). 
Per Curiam 
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REGAN, Sec. of Treas . 
/ 
Motion to Expedite Consideration of 
and to Consolidate with Nos. 81-1 
and 81-3 
Sl]MM.ARY: Bob Jones University (petr in No. 81-3) has filed a memorandum 
- - ---
in opposition to the motion of petrs herein to consolidate with Nos. 81-1 
(Golpsboro_ Ch_r_istian Schools, Inc . . v. United States) and 81-3 (Bob _Jones 
Univ,ersi,ty v. United States) . 
FACTSl AND CONTENI:IONS: Although the motion of petrs herein sought 
expedited review and a grant of cert as well as consolidation, Bob Jones 
University opposes only the consolidation, arguing: (1) petrs herein are not 
parties in Nos. 81-1 and 81-3 and have no connection to the litigation; and 
(2) petrs deserve no greater status than that which they currently enjoy,~. 
as an amicus. 
. 1· .. . ' 
See Legal Office Meroo dated March 4, 1982. 
~ G~ ~h>~~\Qe_~/CM ------- ' 
,; ~~f\Q~. /3,JoJ6J'W.,a' W....i:l/U~ /'-<-<(~ 
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81-3 for order directing respondent to act with respect to 
respondent's memorandum of January 8, 1982. Motion of SG for leave 
to file brief out of time. Motion of the SG for leave to file 
motion for divided argument out of time. Motion of petitioner in 
81-1 and 81-3 for summary reversal. Supplemental memorandum of 
petitioner in 81-1. Motion of North Carolina Association of Black 
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CHAMBE RS OF 
.:§u.pr tmt <!f cu.rt cf tJr t ~b .:§taus 
'lllasfringtcn. 'lt). QJ. 2ll,?Jt~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 8, 1982 
Re: Nos. 81-1 - Goldsboro Christian Schools v. U.S. 
81-3 - Bob Jones University v. U.S. 
Dear Chief: 
I have been doing some more thinking about the 
appointment of counsel in the above cases. I have 
ended up by suggesting that we appoint William T. 
Coleman. It would appear to me that he has all of 
the qualifications. If there is any question, I 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.§u:p-rmtt Clf tturl ttf f4.t ~h ~tau,s-
~~lptr.ghm. gt. C!f. 20.;i~.;l 
April 9, 1982 
RE: Nos. 81-1 Goldsboro Christian Schools v. U.S. 
81-3 Bob Jones University v. U.S. 
Dear Chief: 
I enthusiastically support Thurgood's suggestion 
that we appoint Bill Coleman to argue Nos. 81-1 and 
81-3 in support of the judgment. 
The Chief Justice 
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GOLDS8CRC CHRISTIA~ SCHOOLS V. UNITED STATES 
BOB JO~ES UNIVERSITY V. UN1TED STATES 
~t~ 
~ 
Motion of Naticnal Asscciation fer the Advancement 
ot Colored Pecole, et al. for leave to intervene or 





-----Motion of Laurence Tribe and Bernard Wolfman for 
leave to file brief as amjci curiae. 
Motion of Lawyers' Com"ittee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, et al. fer leave to file a supplemental brief 
as amici curiae. -
Motion of Agencies of the United Church of Christ 
for leave to file a brief as a~icus curiae. 
Responcent's suggestior. of mootness. (Typewritten) 
Motion of petitioner ir No. 81-3 for order directing 
res ~~~nt to act with respect to respondent's 
memorandu" of January 8, 1982. (Typewritten) 
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave tc file 
brief out of time. c-r;-oewritten) 
~
Motion of the·· Solicitor General for leave to file 
motion for divided argument out o f tl ~e. 
 (Typewritten) 
10.~A.AA Motion of petitioner in No. 81-3 for summary 
IJ"V"' - { r e v e r s a l • 
~
~ Motion of petitioner ir. No. 81-1 for summary reversal. 
Ju>~ Su~ ntal memorandu" of petitioner in No. 81-1. 
-T-~ - ~ Motion of North Carolira Association of Black 
//__~Lawyers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae. 
...,,,.,,,,. (Relist -- CJ) 
81-1626-CFX GREEN, WILLIAM H., ET AL. V. REGAN, SEC. OF TREAS. 
~ 
Motion to ex pe dj,te consideration of and to 
p- consolida t e with Nos. 81-1 and 81-3. (Typewritten) (Also petition for writ of certiorari) CRelist -- CJ) 
Court ................... . "Voted on .................. , 19.~J?ril 16, 1982 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned ................. . , 19 . . . No. 
Submitted ............... . , 19 .. . Announced . .. ............ . , 19 .. . 
BOB JONES UNIVERSITY 
vs. 
UNITED STATES 
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HOLD 
FOR 
Burger, Ch. J ........ . .. , ..... . 
Brennan, J .............. , ..... . 
White, J . . .... . ......... , ..... . 
Marshall, J . ........ . ... " .... . 
Blackmun, J .. . .. . ...... , ..... . 




J URISDICTION AL 
STATEMENT 
M ERITS I MOTION 
N I POST I DIS I AFF I REV IAFF I G D 
ABS~NT 
Rehnquist, J ............ , ..... . • • • • • • • I • • • • I• • • • • ~ • • •I• • • • 
Stevens, J .............. , ...... , .... , ... . 





lfp/ss 04/30/83 Rider A 
GOLDSl SALLY-POW 
In identifying these organization, largely taken at random 
from the hundreds on the list, of course, I do not imply 
disapproval of their being exempt organizations. Rather, 
they illustrate the commendable tolerance by our 
government of even the most strongly held divergent views, 
and a recognition that even small minority groups are 
entitled to share the privilege of tax exemption. Seen. 
4 below. 
.:§u.prtmt C!Jttttti llf tqt ~nitdt .:§tafts: 
Jias-fitngfon. ~. C!J. 211ffe '!-.;l 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
August 25, 1982 
Re: A-207 (Nos. 81-1 and 81-3) Goldsboro Christian 
Schools, Inc. and Bob Jones University v. 
United States 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
William T. Coleman has filed his brief in this case, 69 
pages in length and with it a motion "for leave to file brief in 
excess of page limit." 
Let me have your views. 
Regards, 
August 26, 1982 
A-207 Goldsboro Christian and Bob Jones v. U.S. 
Dear Chief: 
I have no objection to the motion o.f.: Mr. Coleman 
to file a brief in excess of 50 pages. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
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\ 
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States 
I p_ z g J.-/-/U--f 1 
Bob Jones Univers't v. United ~ tates 
Mark Newell -;!.. ~ ~~' ~ ~ ~ ~t:,;; f ~ 
~f~•~ J,4A.-~f-/3~~(41~U.S 7~¥-ij~ ,Pu:;l-
~d_~~zt z£.e~fall ~ • C::C • .It ~,4' ,L_ ~ 
~~ a,+-<- Questions Presented ~,J-4...,-UG,H..L.~ 
~ /,':A4•:~ J.u.sv~~~~u.v~/1/Jg/11'3i 
-r, 1_. Whe,ther ~t ~e Int~rnJJ.-~~ven~e Cod~ auth~rizes the IRS M -
, ~ ~ ~ 4., 't  - ( p '32 J, &-...,~~h.A. 
revoke the tax-exempt stqtus of private scnools thqt gj s9riminate 
~?D /2!J~"f'~~,,<,~4~~/.d~ p6-f,...~ 
on the basis of race. ~ ~ .L~e .•~~<--~ ~ 
tA,c.. ~~{ 3 ~) ~ ~I-~h.. 4-~ 'l ~f ~~tr'3 '3 2 . 
2. Whether the Firilt Amendment forbids such revocation o r>-' 
tax-exempt status if the schools' racial discrimination is based 
on religious belief. :3 .. ~ /t1AA"''--(~ wm-f ~ i.f-f1"36) 
3. Whether the equal-protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the Government from granting tax-exempt sta-
tus to racially-discriminatory private schools. 
1,l ----- ,, 13~e-~~?,v~~s~ ~ 






A. Statutory Background 
1. Statutory Provisions 
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from tax-
ation a large number of organizations, including "Corporations, 
and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing 
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to fos-
ter national or international amateur sports competition (but 
only if no part of its activities involve the provision of ath-
letic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty 
to children or animals II 26 u.s.c. §501(c) (3). 
Section 170 (a) (1) allows "as a deduction any charitable 
contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is 
made within the taxable year." Section 170 (c) (2) (B) defines 
"charitable contribution" as a gift for the use of any organiza-
tion that is exempt from taxation under §50l(c) (3). 
2. Regulations 
The Treasury Department has issued regulations 
r~ \'-
"'-~~ 
~f~~"'.I implementi nlj-~ 
§501(c) (3). The term "religious" is not defined, as are "chari-
table," "educational," and other terms. No reason for this omis-
sion is apparent. One may speculate that the IRS thought the 
meaning of "religious" sufficiently obvious so that a further 
definition was unnecessary. 
of that view. 
This case demonstrates the falsity 
"Charitable" is defined as follows: .......------.. -
The term 
501 (c) (3) 
"charitable" is used in section 
in its generally accepted legal 
- -
sense and is, therefore, not to be construed 
as limited by the separate enumeration in sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) of other tax-exempt purposes 
which may fall within the broad outlines of 
"charity" as developed by judicial decisions. 
Such term includes: Relief of the poor and 
distressed or of the underprivileged; advance-
ment of religion; advancement of education or 
science; erection or maintenance of public 
buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of 
the burdens of Government; and promotion of 
social welfare by organizations designed to 
accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) 
to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to elim-
inate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to 
defend human and civil rights secured by law; 
or (iv) to combat community deterioration and 
juvenile delinquency. (26 C.F.R. §l.50l(c) (3)-
l(d) (2) .) 
"Educational" is defined as relating to 
(a) The instruction or training of the indi-
vidual for the purpose of improving or devel-
oping his capabilities; or 
(b) The instruction of the public on subjects 
useful to the individual and beneficial to the 
community. 
An organization may be educational even though 
it advocates a particular position or view-
point so long as it presents a sufficiently 
full and fair exposition of the pertinent 
facts as to permit an individual or the public 
to form an independent opinion or conclusion. 
On the other hand, an organization is not edu-
cational if its principal function is the mere 
presentation of unsupported opinion. (26 
C.F.R. §l.50l(c) (3)-l(d) (3) {i) .) 
3. 
✓~venue Rulings ft;z;::::-~-'A-,4, ~ ~ 
~ ~ ~~;_~ 67 the IRS denied tax exemption to an organization that 
ti'-'~~ .. - a~U~"'k.JS-b/~~ 
~ ~ estricted use of a recreati~ o memb~ certain 
pf)' race. The Service ruled that §501 (c) (3) anmO (c) do not apply 
• to "any organization whose purposes are not charitable generally accepted legal in the sense or to any contribution for any 
• 1410--1 
• 
- -1171> ~ 4. 
purpose that is not charitable in the generally accepted legal 
sense." Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113, 117. This was the 
first unequivocal expression of the position that all exempt or-
ganizations must qualify as "charitable," as well as the first 
time the Service denied tax-exempt status on the ground that an 
organization discriminated on the basis of race. 
In 1970 the IRS announced that it could "no longer legally 
j us ti fy" allowing tax-exempt status for racially-discriminatory 
private schools or treating gifts to such schools as charitable 
contributions under §170. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, 
reprinted in Brief for Coleman at App. A. The decision cited the 
strong federal policy against racial discrimination, particularly 
discrimination in education, 
discriminatory private schools - -----~----------
generally-accepted legal sense. 
B. Facts 
1. Bob Jones (81-3) 
and concluded that racially-
were not "charitable" in the 
Petr Bob Jones University was incorporated as a nonprofit 
organization in South Carolina in 1952. It provides instruction 
at all levels: -----. kindergarten to grade 12, college, and graduate 
school. 
subjects. 
More than 50 accredited degrees are offered in secular ~· Bob Jones has a separate nondegree program, the In-
stitute of Christian Service, whose purpose is to teach the prin-




be "born again" Christians. All 





screened as to their religious beliefs, though more than 100 de-
nominations are represented in the student body. Student conduct 
is strictly regulated. 
Bob Jones forbids its students to date or marry a person of 
another race. Until 1971 this principle, which is based on reli-
gious belief, was implemented by excluding blacks from enroll-
ment. From 1971 to 1975 only unmarried blacks were excluded. 
Since 1975 there has been no set restriction. The school still 
refuses to admit an applicant married to someone of a different 
race, and it will expel any student who engages in or advocates 
interracial dating or marriage. 
Prior to 1970 Bob Jones was tax-exempt under §50l(c) (3). In 
response to a letter from the IRS concerning its 1970 change in 
policy toward racially-discriminatory private schools, Bob Jones 
stated that it did not admit black students and that it would not 
alter the policy. The IRS commenced administrative proceedings 
that led to withdrawal of Bob Jones's tax-exempt status, effec-
tive December 1, 1970. (Bob Jones's unsuccessful attempt to en-
join those proceedings was the subject of Bob Jones University v. -
Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974) .) 
• 
- - 6. 
2. Goldsboro (81-1) 
Petr Goldsboro Christian Schools was incorporated as a non-
profit organization in North Carolina in 1963. It provides in-
struction from kindergarten through grade 12, and satisfies the 
state requirement for secular education in private schools. The 
school seeks to give "special emphasis to the Christian religion 
and the ethics revealed in the Holy scriptures." High school 
students are required to take one Bible course each semester. 
Each class begins with a prayer. Students are not required to 
profess any particular religious beliefs, but must adhere to cer-
tain standards of conduct . 
Based on its reading of the Bible, Goldsboro maintains a 
racially-discriminatory admissions policy. Noncaucasians have 
been accepted, however, and in practice the policy excludes _only 
blacks. Goldsboro' s adherence to this pol icy led to the IRS' 
withdrawal of Goldsboro's tax-exempt status. 
c. Decisions Below 
1. Bob Jones 
Bob Jones brought suit in D.S.C. seeking refund of $21 in 
federal unemployment taxes for the year 1975. The Government 
counterclaimed for $490,000 in federal unemployment taxes for the 
period 1971-1975. The DC (Chapman, J.) found that Bob Jones' /j C.. 
racially-discriminatory policy was based sincerely on religious 
belief and that the school qualified as a religious and educa-
tional organization under §50l(c) (3). The IRS had no authority 





policy. 468 F. Supp. 890 (1978), Bob Jones Pet. at A38. 
The CA4 reversed. 639 F.2d 147 (1980), Bob Jones Pet. at 
Al. Judge Hall, joined by visiting Judge Merhige (E.D. Va.), 
held that the IRS had authority to withhold tax exemptions and 
that doing so did not violate Bob Jones' First Amendment rights. 
Judge Widener dissented. 
2. Goldsboro 
Goldsboro brought suit in E.D.N.C. seeking refund of about 
$3400 in social security and federal unemployment taxes for the 
period 1969-1972. The Government counterclaimed for $160,000 in 
taxes for that period. The DC (Hemphill, J.) assumed (apparently 
without deciding) that Goldsboro's policy was based sincerely on 
religious belief, but ruled for the Government. 
1314 (1977), Goldsboro Pet. at Sa. 
436 F. Supp. 
The CA4 affirmed. Judge Butzner and Judge Murnaghan af-
firmed on the basis of Judge Hall's opinion in Bob Jones, while 
Judge Field dissented on the basis of Judge Widener's dissent in 
Bob Jones. Goldsboro Pet. at la. 
4 
-------- D. Related Proceedings ~ff~ 
Uf~~ In Green v. Connally, ~ 30 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) 
~;l~~ 
 (three-judge court), the DC held that under §501 (c) (3) racially-
.,,,,--
discriminatory private schools are not entitled to tax exemp-
tions. The case did not involve racial discrimination based on 
religious belief. The court enjoined the IRS from granting tax-
exempt status to any private school in Mississippi (where the 




er iminatory admissions pol icy. This Court summarily affirmed. 
Green v. Coit, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). 
II '' 
In 1976 the plaintiffs reopened the case, asserting that the - --IRS had not complied with the injunction and seeking expanded 
relief. Generally they wanted to require a special showing of 
nondiscrimination by schools that (1) had been found discrimina-
tory in nontax proceedings or (2) had insignificant minority en-
rollment and had been formed or substantially expanded in re-
sponse to public school desegregation. One week later parents of 
black children in several states brought a class action seeking 
nationwide relief similar to that sought with respect to Missis-
sippi in the reopened Green case . This is the Wright case. The 
/[/IA-~ 
v-N I ti 1 v If/,, fi WAA-'(li. DC consolidated the cases. 
In response the IRS proposed new procedures essentially the ~ 
same as those requested by the plaintiffs. Any "reviewable 
school" -- one that fit within one of the two categories de-
~ d in the previous paragraph -- would have "the burden of ~ 
~ 
clearly and convincingly rebutting this prima facie case of ra-
cial discrimination by showing that it has undertaken affirmative 
steps to secure minority students." 43 Fed. Reg. 37296, 37298 
(Aug. 22, 1978). Congress prevented these affirmative action 
requirements from taking effect. 




IRS from doing more than it previously had been doing with regard 
to tax exemption for racially-discriminatory private schools. 
In 1979 the DC dismissed in Wright, holding that plaintiffs 






requested relief would thwart Congress' will as expressed in the 
recent amendments. Several months later the DC granted the re-
quested relief in Green, and expanded the injunction to encompass 
religious schools. 
The CADC reversed in Wright. 656 F.2d 820 (CADC 1981). A 
divided CADC panel (Judge Ginsburg, joined by Judge Wright) held 
that the plaintiffs have standing and that Congress did not in-
tend to prohibit courts, as opposed to the IRS, from requiring 
expanded requirements for private schools to obtain tax exemp-
tion. Judge Tamm dissented. Cert was filed in October 1981, No. 
✓ 
81-757. The petition is being held pending disposition of Bob 
Jones and Goldsboro. 
D. Proceedings in this Court 
This Court granted cert in these cases in October 1981. In 
January 1982 the SG informed the Court that the Reagan Adminis-
tration had determined to revoke the IRS regulations, making the 
cases moot. Two things changed. First, under great pressure ) the 
Administration proposed legislation to authorize the IRS to with-
hold tax exemptions from racially-discriminatory private schools. 
Second, the CADC panel in Wright enjoined the Government from C'A,£){. 
granting tax-exempt status to any racially-discriminatory private Wtn,,tr --school. The CADC justified this as preserving the status quo in 
Wright . 
The SG then argued that the cases were not moot. The Court 
voted not to dismiss cert as improvidently granted. William 
Coleman was asked to support the decisions below as amicus curi-
• 
- - 10. 
ae. Sundry other amici briefs have been filed: 
Supporting affirmance are: 
-Lawrence Lewy [a private citizen who for some reason thinks 
it imperative that this Court be aware that the Commonwealth of 
Virginia recently acted to ensure that withdrawal of the IRS reg-
ulations would not lead to withdrawal of similar state regula-
tions]; 
-Independent Sector [which requests aff irmance on a very 
narrow ground so that other organizations will not be affected]; 
-Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith; 
-National Association of Independent Schools; 
-ACLU and American Jewish Committee; 
-Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; 
-NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc; 
-NAACP; 
'Z l -International Human Rights Law Group [which argues that 






Supporting reversal are: 
v -National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs; 
-American Baptist Churches in U.S.A and United Presbyterian 
Church in U.S.A.; 
-Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal 
Society; 
-Congressman Trent Lott; 
-National Association of Evangelicals; 
-National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom; 
, 
• 
- . ~~ 
,t_e__~£'~ 11. 
✓ 
-General Conference, Mennonite Church; 
-Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints;{~) 
-Church of God in Christ, Mennonite; 
-Church of God, A/K/A Worldwide Church of God. 
II. Discussion 
The Court must decide only two of the three issues. The 
first issue is¼fiether the IRS h:: authority to withdraw tax----exempt 
@ If the 
status from schools that practice racial discrimination. 
{i.e. ~WlM-1---J > 
answer is yes, the Court must decide whether such a with-
--.." 
drawal violates the First Amendment rights of religious schools. 
( l,-L. ~ ~J,,,- 1'2-~/-u-..,, ~") 1 {l) I_!:_ the answer is ~ , the Court must decide whether the grant of 
" tax-exempt status to racially-discriminatory private schools vio-
lates the equal-protection component of· the Fifth Amendment. 
A. The Statutory Issue: IRS Authority to Withhold Tax Exemptions 
1. Significance of Coit v. Green 
~ 
~ Q This Court summarily affirmed the 
~l, nally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) 
holding in Green v. Con-
(three-judge court), aff'd 
l41 
tr' 
sub n om. Green v . Co i t , 4 0 4 U. S . 9 9 7 ( 19 71) • Subsequently, the /JJ-
5~ 
~fo/ 
Court declared that since the IRS had reversed its position dur- ~ 
ing the litigation and agreed with the plaintiffs, this summai ~ ~ 
affirmance "lacks the precedential weight of a case involving a 
truly adversary controversy." Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 
U.S. 725, 740 n.11 (1~74) (Powell, J.). Despite this statement, 
Coleman and many amici urge that Green is binding. They cite 





stated that despite the IRS' 
n~~~ ~ ~ 
. ~- -,,~B-j I J:(<5 /4l,7 
~~~~~ 
JSOl)~J-o"U~~ 
change in position in Green "[a] ~ 
sharp adversary contest remained." Id. at 823. 
In my view the Court's statement that Green is entitled to 
little weight disposes of these contentions. In any case the ~ 
argument is irrelevant. The Court took these cases to render a 
decision on the merits, not to argue about whether the decision 
already has been made. 
2. Application of §50l(c) (3) to Petrs 
Under the regulations petrs appear to qualify as educational 
~:~1,Eaanizations under §50l(c) (3). Either can be described as "An 
~ organization, such as a primary or secondary school, a college, 





uled curriculum, a regular faculty, and a regularly enrolled body 
of students in attendance at a place where the educational activ-
ities are regularly carried out." 26 C.F.R. §1.SOl(c) (3) ~ 
(1) (d) (3) (ii). IM.-1qb1 {~f 3 ~ 
The problem is that the IRS...-\has determined that "education- ~ 
al" is modified by the broad definition of "charitable." Since a 
-L~ 
racially-discriminatory A organization is not charitable, petrs 
fail to meet the educational exemption. The validity of this ---. 
IC "' 
construction is the central issue in these cases. ---- - -
tion. 
Bob Jones also claims to qualify under the religious exemp-
The DC found that Bob Jones "composes its own religious 
order." Bob Jones Pet. at A45. Coleman responds that Bob Jones 
has a substantial secular function, and thus is not "organized 
and operated exclusively for" religious purposes. 
Coleman's interpretation seems reasonable. A Sunday school 
- -
13. 
or a seminary would be devoted exclusively to religious purposes. 
(Cf. IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, reprinted in Bob Jones J.A. 
at 239, suggesting that the policy does not apply to seminaries.) 
Bob Jones' Institute for Christian Service might well be the 
tfr, same. But Bob Jones also has a secular program, from kindergar-
~~ ten through graduate school. It educates students in secular 
V.~subjects and prepares them for work in the secular world. Even 
✓~ though the -~chool maintains a heavy religious orientation in 
1)/"' ~ :/h;,.se endeavors, it is reasonable to conclude that the purpose is 
"✓.,,,,Jl"~cj ex<"~ ely religious. J //?5 ' 
,. ~ ~ ~:~tely this issue is not significant. to the issu:_ of ~ 




• ----------- -- ~r Y _/ tions must conform to the fundamental public policy agains ~ h,_,~ 
. racial discrimination in education. If this theory is incorrect,:::;:.:, 
~ythen both petrs qualify under §50l(c) (3) as educational organiza-
~; a.. tions. If the IRS' theory is correct, then it does not matter 
i>1r1{ 11:".'.'( whether B~b Jone: qual ~fies :s --;;-;, e~ gious organization or only 
~r as an educational organization. The same overriding public poli-
vi-' ~ y would apply. This explains why the CA4 did not bother to de-
✓}1, 
(.vV '5 
cide for which exemption Bob Jones qualified. 
/fl5 ~ . I hasten to add that the character of Bob Jones as a predom-
;~.Aantly or exclusively religious organization is significant to 
~~ First Amendment issue. In my view application of the public 
~ icy doctrine to churches or seminaries would violate the First 
1
kl~e~ If Bob Jones were deemed comparable to such undeni-
~ y religious organizations, then withdrawal of its tax exemp-





Bob Jones as a "church" in considerable depth at pp. 30-32 
infra.) But this is a separate issue from the issue what the 
statute and the IRS regulations require. 
3. Language of the Statute 
The SG argues that §501 (c) (3) 's disjunctive enumeration of 
eight purposes manifests "Congress' intent to accord tax-exempt 
status to any organization organized and operated for any one of 
the designated purposes or functions." Brief for United States 
at 14. As Justice Rehnquist suggested in his dissent from denial 
of cert in vPrince Edward School Foundation v. United States, 450 
U.S. 944, 947 (1981), which you~ n~ , this arguably shows "Con-
gress' intent that not all educational institutions must also be 
charitable institutions (as that term was used in the common law) 
in order to receive tax-exempt status." To hold otherwise would ---------
/ 
render superfluous the rest of the statutory language. -----~ - - .. --
This "ordinary meaning" argument has force but is r 
{Y"" posJ_ tive . .. It is not irrational to argue that 
not dis-
Congress used 
an all-encompassing sense and that the rest of 
~ · ..-tVj- i,IV ;})e terms merely specify the types of purposes to which "char i ta-
~r ~ ble" refers. ~ o, §170(c) provides deductions for "charitable 
v·. y ~ ~ibutions," which are defined as encompassing "religious, 
,i}f.)'' ~ ? table, scientific, literary, or educational purposes." This 
~U,) at least is one indication that Congress used "charitable" in a 
~ broader and more all-encompassing sense. 
~ More important, the "plain language" of the statute does not 
convey unambiguously the intended meaning of the enumerated 
terms. The IRS is not required to grant §50l(c) (3) exemption to 
- -
15. 
any organization that asserts it is "educational" under the stat-
IL 
... , 
ute. An "educational" organization must meet some standards. 
The IRS must draw these standards from somewhere. It at least is 
plausible that Congress intended to use the standards provided by 
the common law of charities, which encompassed educational orga-
nizations. Thus I do not believe the issue can be resolved on 
the basis of the language alone. 
c~r~~~ 
~-e~ 
4. Legislative History 
Congress did not expressly act to withhold tax exemptions 
from racially-discriminatory private schools. The issue never 
was placed before Congress until after the IRS rulings. This 
cannot resolve the question. Agency authorizations often are 
construed to permit consideration of factors or events never 
contemplated by the Congress that enacted the authorizations. 
The basic question debated by the parties is whether Con-
gress meant "charitable" only in the ordinary sense of "relief 
for the poor" or in the broader sense of "benefiting the public." 
Each side arms itself with numerous references to the common law, 
congressional reports, and agency constructions. No unambiguous 
answer is apparent. _____... 
Coleman has the better of the argument on 
main points he puts forward. First, the specific word -~------~- ~ 
1 ikely was used in its broader common-law sense. 
nized as charitable 
if the SG is correct that "charitable" re-
of the poor," many purposes today recog-
e.g., park preservation, environmental 





qualify for §50l(c) (3) exemption because they fit within none of 
the enumerated purposes. See Brief for Coleman at 25 n.23. I do 
not think that Congress intended to so limit the scope of 
§501 (c) (3). Therefore, I agree with the IRS' 1959 regulation 
giving "charitable" its "generally accepted legal meaning." 
Second, I agree with Coleman that Congress generally intend-
ed to exempt organizations that benefited the public welfare. 
There are a number of statements by Congress to the effect that 
the exemption is 
based upon the theory that the Government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its 
relief from the financial burden which would 
otherwise have to be met by appropriations 
from public funds, and by the benefits result-
ing from the promotion of the general welfare. 
(H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 
(1938).) 
Combining this purpose with the broad definition of "charitable," 
it is reasonable to view the common law of charities as a general 
~ guide for determining which organizations qualify. 
81,,L---f' ~ VV The problem, however, is that this entire analysis is rather 
~ Vf I \' H~r unilluminating. The b rucial question is the extent of the IRS' < 
"1 J/1? ~ authority. That Congress generally intended to exempt "charita-
~ ble" organizations does not lead inexorably to the conclusion 
that the IRS has authority to make individual determinations that 
an organization is not "charitable" because it violates some norm 
~ of public policy. There is not a single specific indication in 
~~the legislative history that Congress meant to endow the IRS 
~. ' an agency without expertise in making common-law determinations -
- with this broad power. 
That the IRS has some authority in determining what consti-
-"o/ , ,. ~ 
~I~~~~~ ~u~~ ~~-::7~ 
~ ' ~+-~ 
1-I- IA.- ~ t. ~~ be doubted. As Judge exempt organ1za ion tutes an 
Leventhal's Green opinion argued, the IRS surely has the power to 
determine that the hypothetical "Fagin's school for pickpockets" 
does not qualify for tax exemption. See 330 F. Supp. at 1160. 
The IRS must define exempt purposes and determine whether an or-
g ani za tion serves those purposes. The general common law of 
charitable trusts is one useful source for developing these defi-
nitions. 
This "Fagin's school" example does not, however, demonstrate 
that Congress must have intended to authorize the IRS to withhold 
exemption from all educational groups that violate public policy. 
This "school" presumably would fail to qualify because it does 
not serve the educational purposes envisioned by the statute, 
i.e., because it does not instruct the public "on subjects useful 
to the individual and beneficial to the community." 26 C.F.R. 
§l.50l(c) (3)-l(d) (3) (i) (b). That cannot be said of Bob Jones or 
Goldsboro. Their disqualification rests not on their failure to 
offer the type of education contemplated by Congress, but on 
their violation of an independent public policy. It is one thing 
for the IRS to define statutory "purposes," and quite another for 
it to require organizations that undoubtedly serve those purposes 
to conform as well to administratively defined standards of "pub-
lic policy." 
-t l R, 5 c_t)A-"- Furthermore, it is not true that the IRS simply can refer to 
:..----:~ 11 \./ ~ e common law. There is no federal common law of charitable . ..... 
• V trusts, and the standards differ from state to state. Green was -- -
able to find at most a "trend" toward disallowing racial dis-
I 
- - 18. 
crimination in educational charities. See 330 F. Supp. at 1160. 
The IRS' 1970 ruling cited no common law decisions. It simply 
cited the general principle that "A trust for a purpose the ac-
complishment of which is contrary to public policy, although not 
forbidden by law, is invalid," and concluded that racially-
discriminatory schools fail under that standard. 
In essence the IRS created its own "common law" of chari-
table organizations. Other policies against racial discrimina-
tion may have been drawn upon, but the agency itself created the 
policy of excluding racially-discriminatory private schools from 
§501 (c) (3) tax exemption. Such broad agency discretion never 
should be lightly inferred from a silent legislative history, and 
this especially is true where the agency is not a regulatory 
agency given a mandate to promote the "public interest," but an 
agency created for the purpose of collecting tax revenues. The 
legislative history does not provide specific support for broad 
IRS authority to define and apply a common law of charitable or-
ganizations. 
5. Doctrines of Judicial Construction 
There are a number of judicial doctrines employed to resolve 
difficult issues of statutory construction. None provides much 
help here. 
a. Deference to Administrative Construction 
Normally when the language and legislative history are am-
biguous courts will defer to a reasonable agency construction. 
The doctrine does not apply here. Neither the 1959 regulation, 




legal meaning," nor the 1970 ruling itself is contemporaneous 
with enactment of the statute. 
Indeed, the 1970 decision was a reversal of position 
occuring in the midst of the Green v. Connally litigation. Cole-
man is persuasive that this decision was the product of years of 
study and of high-level administration decisionmaking, including 
the personal approval of President Nixon. But the fact is that 
the ruling was issued after the three-judge DC in Green had found 
"grave constitutional questions" with giving tax exemptions to 
racially-discriminatory private schools and had issued a prelimi-
nary injunction against such exemptions. This judicial pressure 
makes it impossible simply to defer to the IRS' construction. 
(One may note that the IRS later responded to the Wright litiga-
tion by proposing regulations incorporating the precise relief 
sought in that suit; perhaps all one needs to do to obtain a fa-
vorable IRS interpretation is to bring a lawsuit.) 
b. The Doctrine of Avoiding Constitutional Questions 
An oft-used means of interpreting ambiguous statutes is to 
adopt the construction that avoids creating a constitutional 
question. Both sides invoke the doctrine, which demonstrates 
that it is unhelpful here. No matter how the statute is con-
strued, a serious constitutional problem arises. 
___, 
c. The "Public Policy" Doctrine 
A typical rule of judicial construction is that Congress did 
not intend to benefit violators of law or public policy. In Tank 
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958), the 
Court relied on a "presumption against congressional intent to 
) 
- - 20. 
encourage violation of declared public policy" in refusing to 
allow the deduction of fines imposed for violation of state laws. 
In a subsequent case the Court upheld the deductability of legal 
expenses incurred in an unsuccessful defense of a criminal prose-
cution, stating that "where Congress has been wholly silent, it 
is only in extremely limited circumstances" that the Court has 
applied the "public policy" doctrine. Commissioner v. Tellier, 
383 U.S. 687, 693-94 (1966). The test is whether allowance of a 
deduction would "frustrate sharply defined national or state pol-
icies proser ibing particular types of conduct," policies "evi-
denced by some governmental declaring of them." Id. at 694. 
These "public policy" cases were the primary basis of Judge 
Leventhal's opinion in Green. He argued that allowing tax exemp-
tions for racially-discriminatory private schools would frustrate 
the clear and strong policy against racial discrimination. These 
cases do establish that the Court has been willing to infer a 
"public policy" limitation on the tax laws, even in the absence 
of specific congressional intent. This fact at the least makes 
plausible the view that the IRS has authority to deny tax exemp-
tions to organizations that violate public policy. I do not be-
lieve, however, that such a broad application of this "public 
policy" doctrine is warranted. 
This line of cases deals primarily with "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expenses. The problem was that if lawbreakers 
could deduct fines, bribes, and the like, they would be encour-
aged to continue their illegal behavior. The deduction would 




There are important differences in the situation here. 
First, neither petr has been found to have violated 42 u.s.c. 
§1981, which may outlaw all racial discrimination in private -
schools, see Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Further-
more, unlike the case of a deduction for a fine, continued exemp-
tion from taxation after a judicial finding of illegal activity 
would not encourage the school to continue its illegal behavior. 
The remedy for a violation of §1981 at a minimum would be a court 
injunction. Whether the school continues to receive a tax exemp-
tion is irrelevant to whether it obeys the court's order. The 
tax exemption does not reduce the deterrent effect of the court's 
sanction. 
Judge Leventhal argued that the "public policy" limitation 
"applies a fortiori" to a "charitable deduction whose very pur-
pose is rooted in helping institutions because they serve the 
public good." 330 F. Supp. at 1162. I disagree. As Judge 
Leventhal himself went on to note, there is the countervailing 
consideration that with regard to private charities, "the promo- I 
tion of a healthy pluralism is often viewed as a prime social 
benefit of general significance." Id. In my view this interest 
strongly suggests that Congress would not have wanted to arm the 
IRS with a broad "public policy" weapon to employ against unor-
thodox but otherwise qualified charitable organizations. 
Coleman argues that fears of a broad application of the doc-
trine are unwarranted because the policy against racial discrimi-
nation is uniquely strong. Similarly, Judge Leventhal concluded 
that the pluralism value is outweighed by the very strong policy 
7 
- Jl(s9 ~a..- 22. 
against racial discrimination 
~~~ 
in education. Id. at 1163. But 
these policy determinations beg the very question whether the IRS 
should have authority to make these judgments. That the IRS 
likely will find few public policies strong enough to justify 
denial of an exemption provides no substantive limitation on the 
IRS' "public policy" jurisdiction. It is no answer to a criti-
cism of enormous power that the power probably will be exercised 
with restraint. 
For these reasons I am reluctant to endorse the IRS' theory 
The "public policy" theory is based not on specific 11 p~,... in general. 
~ congressional intent, ~ t on a judicial determination that cer-
~', tain results must be deemed contrary to Congress' overarching 
~~ at it is a judicial creation should make the courts 
esitant to apply it broadly. Critical questions of public poli-
~ · cy should be decided by Congress, not by agancies -- and in par-
ticular not by the IRS, whose expertise lies in tax policy, not 
race-discrimination law. It is inaccurate to suggest that the 
IRS may simply refer to preexisting national policy. The IRS 
makes public policy when it determines these tax exemption ques-
tions. ~ ~~~ ~--~lti'17-
. f. . ~ /.A.,LL-< tt:4/'Lk-' ~~~~~~~J.. d. Subsequent Rat1 1cat1on ~,~-~~. 
To sum up the analysis thus far, I have determined that the 
legislative history supports Coleman's view that the general pur-
pose of §50l(c) (3) was to exempt organizations that benefit the 
public. It would not be irrational to hold that the IRS has au-
.,....-
thor i ty to define "public pol icy" and withhold tax exemptions 






~ b- £)-c:__.. 
H<4-....y'C.-~~~c...., ~-~~ 
/J .. i--~-/-uA- a:.-<-4.~~. '~ \.' 
dication of specific legislative intent respect, and to 
invest the IRS with a judicially-created "public policy" excep-
tion would create enormous administrative discretion. 
I am convinced, however, that Congress has manifested suffi-
c~ ent s~ seq ue!) t approval of this particular IRS policy. The 
~ doctrine of "subsequent ratification" is an amorphous and easily 
manipulated "ao~ ne. Its invocation :Ormally should be disfa-
vored. But in this unusual case I think the doctrine should be ,>'JJ 
applied. 
First, there are certain events that do not demonstrate sub-
sequent approval. I do not agree with Coleman that ratification 
is demonstrated by the failure of eleven bills introduced to 
overturn Green and by the 1972 endorsement of the IRS' ruling by 
the Senate Select Committee on Equal Education Opportunity 
(chaired by Sen. Mondale). Mere refusal to overturn an adminis-
trative ruling is not ratification, and a select committee cannot &j,,-
~ 
"ratify" anything. These facts are consistent with congressional 
approval of the agency interpretation, but they do not suffice to 
prove it. 
Congress later acted, however, in a way manifesting agree----------- -
ment with the 1970 interpretation. Green held that under 
- - -------§501 (c) (3) racially-discriminatory private schools are not tax-
exempt. The next year another three-judge DC held that recogni-
tion of tax-exempt status for racially-discriminatory pr iv ate 
LI \ \ -
clubs did not violate §50l(c) (3). McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. S~ 
Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). In 1976 Congress enacted §50l(i), which ~ 
,:» 
denies tax-exempt status to any social club that discriminates on 
,J 
• the basis This 
. . ~--?~24. 
of race, color ,ror' religion. / (/,A" r-:M~ 
~ - l:..:J___ ~~ 
legislative response is strong evidence of agreement /A 
with Green's interpretation of §50l(c) (3). If Congress merely 
had not reversed the result in Green, little could be inferred 
from its inaction. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1851-52 (1982) (Powell, J., dis-
senting). But in expressly overturning McGlotten, Congress acted b 
in full accord with Green. ~.k..~ 
t,t,}; J,tlf/" tftVJ-is Coleman argues, it is difficult to find an explanation 
J3~hy Congress w~ d _have forbidden racial discrimination by ex- 7 
~ ~ oc~ •. yet ~anctioned the exclusion of blacks by 
j,..t,-~ ~ mpt schools themselves." Brief for Coleman at 51. In-
~ ~d, the result would have been bizarre given that racial dis- 7 -
crimination in private schools is unlawful, see Runyon, whereas 
racial discrimination in private clubs is not. Had Congress had 
any doubts as to the validity or desirability of the 1970 IRS 
ruling against exemptions for racially-discriminatory private 
schools, it is doubtful that § 501 ( i) would have been enacted 
~ -J,-r -µ,.._;.~ alone. Quite simply, the Congress that enacted §50l(i) could 
~ only have approved of the result in Green. ~~ 
• 
Further support is provided by 
§50l(i), which exempted "a club which 
- ---
..tW". -v 
the ~ amendment~ 
in good faith limits its ~ 
membership to the members of a particular religion in order to 1'130 
further the teachings and principles of that religion, and not to 
exclude individuals of a particular race or color." This is fur- ~ ·-
ther evidence that Congress intends d . '""" to eny tax exemption to 
racially-discriminatory organizatio1s. Perhaps more importanf ,~ ,..__ 
I 
~ 
- A~! -AA.$--- 25. 
AT~~ ----it is evidence that Congress has kept itself informed of develop-
ments under the existing law and is ready to revise the law where 
deemed appropriate. Congress' silence with respect to Green has 
not been based on ignorance or lack of attention. 
Of course one cannot say definitely that Congress previously 
would have voted or today would vote to enact the IRS ruling. 
But the purpose of inquiring into subsequent ratification is to 
see whether a possibly dubious administrative ruling has become 
sufficiently entrenched that Congress treats it as if it had been 
an express statutory provision. I think Congress' actions 
enacting and amending §S0l(i) comport with this rationale. 
Passage of the Dornan and Ashbrook Amendments in 1978 does _____.. 
not require a contrary conclusion. As noted earlier, in 1978 the 
IRS proposed regulations incorporating the substance of the re-
lief requested in Wright v. Regan: a rebuttable presumption of 
racial discrimination for schools with low minority enrollment 
that were created or expanded in response to public school deseg-
regation. Many congressmen were outraged. The result was the 
Dornan Amendment, prohibiting use of funds to carry out the pro-
posals, and the Ashbrook Amendment, providing that funds appro-
priated could not be used "to formulate or carry out any . 
procedure, guideline . or measure which would cause the loss 
of tax-exempt status to private, religious, or church-operated 
schools under [§S0l(c) (3)] unless in effect prior to August 22, 
1978." 
The House Report stated that the committee was "unsure" of 
the IRS' authority to implement the proposals. Congressman Ash-
- -
26. 
brook and Senator Helms, the sponsors, both indicated that they 
did not believe Congress ever had authorized the IRS to withhold 
tax exemptions on the basis of racial discrimination. But they 
acknowledged that the amendment permitted the IRS to enforce its 
current procedures. 
This amendment neither adds to nor detracts from the valid-
ity of employing the ratification theory. Clearly there is some 
disagreement within Congress over the scope and even existence of ----IRS authorization to withhold tax exemptions. But a significant 
number of congressmen across the political spectrum indicated 
~ approval of the IRS' pre-1978 exercise of authority. Moreover, a 
~ ! rnarkab~ ad c ~~ensu,,-___ emerged on the desirability of with-
holding tax exemptions from racially-discriminatory private 
schools, including support from the chief backers of the appro-
priations amendments. See, e.g., Brief for Lawyers' Committee at 
7. 
;:) I think weight must be attached to this latter point. ~ /]J 
President Reagan now supports the policy. He has introduced leg-
islation embodying the policy. He purports to be concerned only 
with providing "proper" authorization. But if the point of in-
validating the IRS' policy is only to negate a policy that every-
one concedes to be appropriate but about which there is some dis-
pute as to original legislative authorization, the need for this 
Court's intervention is questionable. The Court is not in busi-
ness to defend abstract principles. The ratification doctrine 
seems designed precisely for the situation in which there is lit-







6. Limits to the Ratification 
Two limits should be placed on this deference to Congress' 
subsequent ratification. The first concerns the scope of IRS 
authority to impose requirements on racially-discriminatory pri-
vate schools. The policy Congress has gone along with has been 
fairly straightforward, entailing a determination whether the 
school has a nondiscriminatory policy. This has not satisfied 
opponents of the schools. In Green and Wright the plaintiffs are 
seeking far-reaching relief that essentially would impose affir-
mative action requirements on many schools. The Green court has 
granted this relief with respect to Mississippi, and the CADC in 
Wright implied that the DC could order expanded relief nation-
wide. 
I would have difficulty finding that Congress' "authoriza-
tion" permits courts to order the IRS -- on the basis of statu-
tory authority -- to impose what amounts to a preclearance re-
quirement (cf. §5 of the Voting Rights Act) on all schools formed -- --
at a time corresponding to public school desegregation. To do so 
is a policy decision of important magnitude that should not be 
inferred from an already vague authorization. Since 1978 Con-
gress has blocked implementation of such a requirement. Normally 
appropriations riders do not amend an agency's authority, but 
.._ _......,_ --= - --- -- ______... --
here the authority itself is grounded on subsequent ratification 
of an administrative decision. The "authorization" should be 
construed narrowly. The Court cannot decide the Green and Wright 
cases now, of course, but the rationale under which Goldsboro and 
- - 28. 
Bob Jones are affirmed should be sufficiently narrow to leave 
open the possibility of a contrary holding in these other cases. 
The second limitation concerns the IRS' authority to use 
other "public policies" to deny tax exemptions. Only this par-
ticular IRS policy against racial discrimination in private 
schools should be upheld. The Court may suggest that there are 
considerable problems with the IRS's exercise of a broad "public 
policy" power, and that attempts to deny tax exemption on the 
basis of other public policies would be of questionable validity. 
The holding here need be only that Congress has made clear that 
it supports the view that under §50l(c)(3) racially-
discriminatory private schools may not be tax-exempt. 
Constitutionality of Withholdin 
-Discriminatory Reliqious Schools 
In this section I assume that Congress has authorized the 
IRS to deny tax exemptions to racially-discriminatory private 
schools. If Congress has not provided that authority, then the 
Court must address the equal-protection question rather than the 
First Amendment question. 8 IA,t- 5&·~ ~ ~~ 
JV""" 1. The Free Exercise Clause 
IJtA' ~ My analysis proceeds on the assumption that petrs' racial 
~ [ }'{ discrimination is based on sincere religious beliefs. I do not 
(1 ~~/rthink this can be questioned with respect to Bob Jones. Golds-
~l,-6 boro presents a more uncertain case, and sever al amici suggest 
that Goldsboro uses religion merely as a pretext for its dis-





based on the assumption that Goldsboro's rel iance on religious 
beliefs is sincere. 
a. Nature of the Burden on Religion 
There are two arguments why withholding a tax exemption im-
poses only a limited burden on petrs' exercise of religion. 
--------- •- ~ 
there is n~ direct re_9J!lp tion of their religious beliefs 
or conduct. The Government simply has determined to withhold its 
financial support for a constitutionally-protected activity. "A 
refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be 
equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." 
Harri~ v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980). 
1U-f ~ 
. ; b . ,, ~~ Withholding tax e xe_me_t ion lS n t as intrusive as a direct 
governmental prohibition. But it still may be a substantial bur-
---.-
den. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Seventh-Day 
Adventist had no entitlement to unemployment benefits, yet the 
Court held that the state could not deny her benefits for refus-
ing to work on Saturday. When government policies have a selec-
tive burden on certain religious practices, free exercise prob-
lems arise. Thus even if a decision to deny tax exemption to all 
churches would not raise a substantial free-exercise problem, 
since all religious practice would be equally affected, there 
would be a free-exercise problem with a denial of tax exemption 
for racially-discriminatory churches. 
~ it is argued that the burden on petrs is limited S-LL4 
because to obtain a tax exemption petrs are required not to give 
up their belief in segregation, but rather only to abstain from 
practicing it. Runyon used the same argument in dismissing the 
- -
30. 
private school's claim of associational freedom. Certainly it is 
true that the Government may not deny a tax exemption solely on 
the basis of a school's religious teachings. Yet th i s Co u r t ' s 
19th-century decisions outlawing polygamy demonstrate the inher-
ent problems in using a belief/practice dichotomy. It does lit-
tle good for Mormons merely to believe in polygamy, which inher-
ently is a practice. Similarly, Goldsboro wants to practice its 
belief that segregated living is required by God. 
There is no doubt that the Government may ban the practice 
of segregation in most facets of public life. At the other ex-
~~ 
treme, there is grave doubt that the Government could ban segre-
t\-
gation in churches themselves, or even deny tax exemption to seg--
regated churches. Such policies would strike at the heart of the 
right of religious association. The crucial question, 
~ e whether operation of a private religious school 
to the exercise of petrs' religious beliefs. 
b. Petrs as "Religious Organizations" 
therefore, l 
is central I 
There is an important difference between Bob Jones and 
Goldsboro. Goldsboro fairly may be described as providing secu-
lar education with religious overtones. Al though it has some 
affiliation with a local baptist church, Goldsboro cannot argue 
that its purpose intrinsically is religious. It is not a church, 
nor is it analogous to one. The school's purpose is not worship 
or religious study, but secular education. Although there is no 
doubt that such a school may assert free exercise claims, these 
are entitled to less weight than if raised by a church itself. 





gized Bob Jones to a church, stating that Bob Jones "composes its f) c. 
own religious order." Bob Jones Pet. at A45. Your opinion in 
Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 734, stated: "The 
University is devoted to the teaching and propagation of its fun-
damentalist religious beliefs." Bob Jones is as pervasively re-
l ~g ious as any school ot~ inary. ~ 
The issue thus seems to be whether a school ever may be 
deemed so fundamental to the exercise of religious beliefs that 
it cannot be treated as other than a religious organization it-
self. For seminaries and religious study schools the answer 
seems "yes." For schools providing secular instruction the issue 
is much harder. 
✓ 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court effec-
--
tively held that the Amish's ability to teach their chil dren in 
their own schools was fundamental t 6 their religion. Yet Yoder 
was an exceptional case. The Amish have "a long history as a 
successful and self-sufficient segment of American society." 
There is clear evidence of "the vital role that belief and daily 
conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish commu-
nities and their religious organization." 406 U.S. at 235. The 
Amish live as a separate religious cul ture. 
~, \' 
In contrast Bob Jones prepares its students for secular jobs 
and generally for life in the secular world. The school "offers 
to the public on a commercial basis educational services that 
compete with programs of instruction in other schools and col-
leges." Brief for United States at 46 n. 42. See Runyan, 4 27 










public than private). To obtain accreditation of its degree pro-
grams Bob Jones must accomodate many interests and requirements 
of secular society. 
These secular purposes demonstrate that the University does 'Ju,f 
not and indeed cannot function solely as a religious institutio~ 
However pervasive the religiou~ vironment at Bob Jones, ~ 
interaction with secular society limits its entitlement to nonin-
terference with religiously-motivated practices. I do not mean 
to belittle the importance of sectarian education. Parents le-
gitimately may desire to have their children educated in a reli-
g ious setting. But v;;unyon v. Mccrary found that these associa-
tional rights must bow to the Government's strong interest in 
opposing racial discrimination. The balance presumably should 
come out the same even when the associational rights have a reli-
gious basis. 
Furthermore, to equate Bob Jones with a church or seminary 
----Z might raise serious free exercise problems for other ins ti tu-
tions. Most private schools operating under religious principles -could not be deemed similar to churches, yet it is hard to iden-
tify a distinguishing principle. To inquire into the "impor-
tance" of religion to a particular school would be quite arbi-
trary and inevitably would raise the question of the sincerity of 
the religious beliefs. Two circuits have rejected First Amend-~ 
~ 
ment claims by schools similar to Goldsboro by finding that their ~ 
-~ 
racial discrimination was not based on sincere religious beliefs. ~~ 
See Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, 556 F.2d 310 (CA5 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian 
- ~ s-~ 
Pk-- ,;;_r ~ 33. 
School, 631 F.2d 1144 (CA4 1980). This approach is distasteful 
and at odds with the spirit of the Religion Clauses. 
My conclusion, therefore, is that petrs' free exercise 
claims cannot be equated with those of religious groups them-
selves. Whereas seminaries, Sunday schools, and the like may be 
-----deemed central to the exercise of religion, and thus entitled to 
maximum protection under the Free Exercise Clause, private 
schools offering the equivalent of secular education may not. 
This conclusion implies that Bob Jones' constitutional 
claims would be much stronger if it consisted solely of the In-
~ titute for Christian Service. The Institute offers no secular 
degrees, and it serves largely to prepare ministers and others 
• 
• 
for religious work. The state's interest in opposing racial dis-
crimination might be diminished, and certainly the Institute' s 
free-exercise interest would be much greater. If Bob Jones di-
vided itself into two separate entities, the First Amendment 
might require that the Institute receive §50l(c) (3) tax-exem 
status. 
c. Nature of th 
Coleman 102 S. Ct. 1055 
(1982), is dispositive. The Ami sh' s free-exercise claim -- a 
concededly good-faith claim that their religion prohibited their 
participation in insurance programs -- was rejected in favor of 
the Government's interest in mandatory social security participa-
tion. The argument is that a fortiori petrs' interest in prac-
ticing segregation must be overridden by the Government's great 







I do not think the issue is quite that simple. The Govern-
- ~ ff 
ment's interest in eliminating racial discrimination unquestion-
ably is strong • 
ll.. ,,. LJ _L 
It may be described as compelling. Yet as I t.,)LLT" 
,,,,,,.o-f-
have suggested earlier, I believe that the First Amendment pro-w/~ 
hibi ts the Government from outlawing racial discrimination ft ~ 
churches. The only cases supporting such a drastic prohibition 
of a religious practice are the polygamy cases, and those cor-
rectly are treated as unique and without doctrinal value. And 
prohibiting racial discrimination in churches would be even more 
instrusive than prohibiting polygamy since the effect would be to 
deny the right to gather and worship with those of similar reli-
gious beliefs. The Government's interest in racial integration 
cannot extend to such an intimate aspect of private religious 
affairs. Finally, I think this analysis would apply as well to a 
decision to withhold tax benefits to racially-discriminatory re-
ligions. 
The constitutional outcome 
~~ 
in this case diff~~ 
for the reasons given in the preceding section. Interference 
with petrs' racial segregation does not go to the heart of their ) 
free exercise of religion. Those who believe in segregation may 
gather to worship and study religious matters without being sub----- ----, --ject to governmental intervention. But the Government has an 
compelling interest in opposing racial discrimination in schools 
that provide the equivalent of secular education. The balance of 
the interests clearly favors the Government. 
2. The Establishment Clause 
The Establishment Clause issue is simple. Goldsboro does 
- -~~~ 35. 
~
not even raise it. Bob Jones does not deny that the IRS tax ex-
emption policy's purpose and primary effect are secular, but 
rather asserts that the policy leads to excessive entanglement 
between church and state. It relies on Walz v. Tax Commission, 
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), which noted that eliminating the tax 
exemption "would tend to expand the involvement of government by 
giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax 
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that 
follow in the train of those legal processes." 
Walz did not hold that any taxation of religion violates the 
Establishment Clause. Though there is "entanglement" when the ~ 
IRS inquires into school policies, there potentially would be far 
greater entanglement if the IRS were required to except sectarian 
schools from its policy. The Service would have to evaluate each 
school's claim that its discriminatory policies were based on 
sincere religious beliefs, a difficult and subjective task. Cf. 
Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. (Powell, J.) 
(determining "which words and activities fall within 'religious 
worship and religious teaching' could prove 'an impossible 
task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the constitu-
tional definition of religion.'"). 
As I argued in the free-exercise section, the constitutional 
question would be much different if the Government attempted to 
use its "public policy" to deny a tax exemption to churches or 
closely-tied religious organizations such as seminaries. This 
would have a much greater effect of investing certain religious 






C. The Constitutionality of Tax Exemri-
-;--D"" r• i,.., 1 1v-1115criminatorv Private Schools 
In this section I assume that Congress has not given the IRS 
authority to withhold tax exemptio9 s from racial l y-9 i ~criminatory ) 
(c:e . ~~o,,t./a-~ ~
private schools. If Congress has provided that authority, then 
- -the equal-protection issue need not be reached. 
There are three critical cases on this issue: Moose Lodge ---v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Norwood v. Harrison, 41 3 U.S. 455 
(1973); and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In the 
absence of Norwood resolution of the issue would be simple: 
there is no showing of discriminatory purpose (Davis) and there 
is insufficient Government involvement in pet rs' discriminatory 
policies (Moose Lodge). But Norwood swept broadly past either 
inquiry and held that a state may not "grant the type of tangible -financial aid here involved [loan of textbooks] if that aid has a 
~
significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support pri-
vate discrimination." 413 U.S. at 466. 
1. Discriminatory Intent 
The SG argues that Norwood has been limited by Davis' re-
quirement of discriminatory intent. The Chief Justice's opinion 
in Norwood stated: 
we need not assume that the State's textbook 
aid to private schools has been motivated by 
oThe'r th ~ e i terest 1 n l: l'i e ea uca-
tional welfare 1 Mississippi children. 
But good intentions as to one valid objective 
do not serve to negate the State's involvement 
in violation of a constitutional duty. "The 
existence of a permissible purpose cannot sus-
tain an action that has an impermissible ef-
fect." Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 
407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972). The Equal Protec-











state involvement in possible private activity 
could be shielded ·al together from cons ti tu-
tional scrutiny simply because its ultimate 
end was not discrimination but some higher 
goal. (413 U.S. at 466-67.) 
37 . 
This passage clashes with Davis, which limited and distinguished 
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia. 
2 29. (Norwood was not cited.) 
See Davis, 426 U.S. at ~ 
Coleman responds that Davis 
crimination of any kind," whereas 
did not involve "express dis- (Ju.J-
"here the existence of racial 4 ~ 
 
discrimination is clear; the only issue is whether these tax ~ 
benefits impermissibly aid 
Brief for Coleman at 58. 
the discriminatory institutions." 
This argument is persuasive. In Norwood, as here, the pri-
vate institutions ' i ntentionally discriminated"' on the basis of 
race. Direct financial aid to such institutions implicates the 
government in the discrimination. 1 Under this Court's "state 
action" doctrine the issue is the extent of the state's involve-
ment, not the state's motivation. For example, Moose Lodge stat-
ed that "the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not 
originate with the State if it is state action that enforces pri-
1A separate issue not directly raised in this case is 
whether a school may be found to engage in racial discrimination 
even if there is no direct policy of intentional discrimination. 
Under Davis there remains room for use of objective evidence of 
discriminatory purpose even where the policy nominally is 
nondiscriminatory. The plaintiffs in Green and Wright argue, for 
example, that a prima facie case of racial discrimination is 
established if a school has a low minority enrollment and was 
formed or expanded in response to public school desegregation. 
If this argument is accepted, and if granting tax exemption 
constitutes state action, then the Government would have to deny 







vately originated discrimination." 407 U.S. at 172. In making 
the state action determination, the Court may consider any evi-
dence of state intent to encourage or facilitate the racial dis-
crimination. But 
tive requirement. 
there is not an independent discriminatory mo-
Davis and Norwood are reconciliable. ~'~ 
2. State Action d:-~~ 
a. Moose Lodge and Norwood ~
Moose Lodge held that grant of a liquor license to a 
racially-discriminatory private club did not constitute state 
~ 
action. The Court's emphasis on the lack of any meaningful state 
participation in the 1lr,rivate discrimination\\ hould apply~ e as ~ 
well. Indeed, even the dissent in Moose Lodge supports a finding 
of no state action here. Justice Douglas would have found state 
action because of {l) the state's enforcement of the discrimina-
tion through a regulation requiring licensees to obey club by-
laws and { 2) the scarcity of 1 iquor 1 icenses. Neither factor 
exists here. If the IRS grants tax exemption to Bob Jones there 
is no IRS regulation requiring Bob Jones to enforce its discrimi-
natory policies. And there is no question of scarcity. There 
are not a 1 imi ted number of tax exempt ions. Exempting petrs 
would not prevent other nondiscriminatory organizations from ob-
taining tax-exempt status. 
It also is noteworthy that Moose Lodge likely was tax-
exempt. {The Court described Moose Lodge as "not publicly fund-
ed," 407 U.S. at 171, though the case did not present the issue 
whether granting a tax exemption is state action.) It would seem 





discrimination if it exempts the club from taxation, but not if 
it grants the club a liquor license. 
Norwood, decided after Moose Lodge, seemed to equate ~ 
financial support with state action and thus suggests a contrary 
result. In Norwood the Chief Justice sought to distinguish Moose 
Lodge by stating that textbooks "are to be distinguished from 
generalized services government might provide to schools in com-
mon with others. . The State has neither an absolute nor op-
erating monopoly on the procurement of school textbooks; anyone 
can purchase them on the open market." 413 U.S. at 465. This 
distinction is not convincing. Moose Lodge turned not on the 
government's monopoly over liquor, but on the lack of any signif-
icant state involvement in the private discrimination. And in my 
view the state's involvement in Moose Lodge arguably was greater 
than in Norwood. The grant of textbooks was less tangible than a 
liquor license, which is crucial to the existence of most private 
clubs. 
One way of reconciling Norwood and Moose Lodge is to focus I on the nature of the institution benefited. Norwood holds-;:;;-at 
for state action purposes state neutrality towards racial dis-
crimination in education is insufficient; the state must avoid 
any direct support for discriminatory schools. Moose Lodge holds 
that neutrality suffices toward racial discrimination in private 
clubs. A state may give a liquor license, a tax exemption, and 
the like to racially-discriminatory clubs, but not to racially-
discriminatory schools. 91-- w- f_ 




tant than private socializing, but that determination is not rel-
evant to the inquiry whether the state's involvement suffices to 
implicate it in the private discrimination. A tax exemption in- r/9-r>-b. 
volves the state in the affairs of an exempt club to the same ~ 
extent as in the affairs of an exempt school. 
A variant of this theory is proposed by amicus Independent 
Sector (represented by ~ ohn Pickering), which wants a narrow 
Court affirmance. Rather than looking at the nature of the in-
stitution benefited, Independent Sector focuses on the nature of 
the private discrimination. It suggests a "two-tier state action 
test," under which a less onerous test would be applied "in cases 
involving racial discrimination than in cases involving other 
constitutional claims." Brief for Independent Sector at 24-25. 
Independent Sector seems correct that this "test" describes 
past decisions. Courts have been more willing to find state ac-
tion in cases of racial discrimination than, for example, in 
those involving sex discrimination. See id. at 26 n.54 (citing 
several CA decisions). But as a doctrinal matter this theory has 
I/ 
the problems mentioned earlier. It is hard to see how a tax ex-
v, 
emption for a racially-discriminatory club might constitute state ---
action even though the same exemption for a male-only club does .....---::~-----------'-'""---------------------___;..-----
not. The differences between race and sex discrimination better 
are taken into account in making the initial determination wheth-
er the ~rivate organization is engaged in intentional and unlaw-
ful discrimination. But once it has been decided that the pri-
vate discrimination is unlawful, the state action inquiry should 











Norwood and Moose Lodge stand in consider-I conc1u7 hat 
able tension. Moose Lodge suggests that the Government is not 
implicated in the private discrimination of §S0l(c) (3) organiza-
tions. But Norwood seems the more directly relevant precedent. ~ 
I therefore turn to the question whether Norwood requires a find-
ing of state action in this case. ~ ~"Hi~ 
b. Walz and Norwood ~ 5~~ 
~ /Af.,,  /.A-f 
Norwood does not determine whether providing a tax ~xemP,tion c 
~ ~ ~
constitutes unconstitutional state aid t~ _raciall.x_-discrimin~} ~ t y 
~l  
private schools. As an economic matter a tax exemption is sig-~
.. 
nificant aid. But Walz v. Tax Commis·sion, 397 U.S. 664, 675 
(1970), stated that "[t]he grant of a tax exemption is not spon-
~ ip," that "[t]here is no genuine nexus between tax exemption ~ -and establishment of religion," and that "[t]he exemption creates 
only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state." 
As Justice Brennan argued, tax exemptions "c_onsti tute mere pas- Wp~ 
sive state involvement with religion and not the affirmative in- ~ 
volvement characteristic of outright governmental subsidy." Id.W~ 
at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
Coleman argues that Norwood rejected the relevance of Estab-
lishment Clause cases: "However narrow may be the channel of 
permissible state aid to sectarian schools, Nyquist, . it 
permits a greater degree of state assistance than may be given to 
private schools which engage in discriminatory practices." Nor-
wood, 413 U.S. at 470. Without question the Establishment Clause 





wood demands that the reasoning of these cases, particularly 
Walz, be ignored. 
First, it should be noted that Norwood did not discuss Walz. 
The Chief Justice addressed the Establishment Clause cases in 
order to distinguish Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968) , which upheld a textbook-loan program against an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge. A loan of textbooks unquestionably is 
a form of direct aid. The same cannot be said of a tax exemp-
tion. Norwood does not hold that Walz is irrelevant in the 
equal-protection context. 
Second, Coleman errs in claiming that the Chief Justice's 
cite to Nyquist is revealing because Nyquist held that tax bene-
fits constitute significant aid under the Establishment Clause. 
"Tax benefits" is too broad a term. Nyquist involved the equiva-
lent of a direct financial grant: a fixed tax deduction for par-
ents for every child in a private school. Walz involved only an 
exemption from taxation. 
The Nyquist/Walz distinction is crucial for state action l 
purposes. The proper analogue to Nyquist would be a statute pro-
viding tax deductions to all parents who sent children to 
racially-discriminatory private schools. That would be unconsti-
tutional. But §50l(c) (3) 's purpose does not differ from that of 
the general tax exemption upheld in Walz. The Walz Court reject-
ed the view that such a tax exemption carried with it the stamp 
of government approval. 
There is no logical reason for that rationale to differ in 
the equal-protection context. That the Walz decision was based 
- -
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in part on other considerations does not negate the force of its 
conclusion that tax exemption is not affirmative governmental 
support. The Government's decision to exempt a broad class of 
activity from taxation does not necessarily imply Government ap-
proval. The implications of a contrary holding are enormous. "A 
holding equating tax-exempt status with federal financial assis-
tance for constitutional purposes would imperil the very indepen-
dence of the independent sector." Brief for Independent Sector 
at 3. In effect application of the state action doctrine to tax 
exemptions would "constitutionalize" the Internal Revenue Code. 
This development would entail serious theoretical problems. 
If the government cannot grant a tax exemption to racially-
discriminatory private schools, then it must tax them. If the 
exemption is from property taxation, at what rate must the school 
be taxed -- the residential rate or the commercial rate? If a 
state determined to tax only the income of profitmaking organiza-
tions, must it nonetheless invent an analogous tax to impose on 
nonprofit racially-discriminatory private schools? If the state 
reduces or eliminates property taxation and chooses to rely pri-
marily on individual income taxes and sales taxes, is this an 
equal-protection violation because it helps schools like Bob 
Jones? 
I I 
These problems underscore the wisdom of treating tax exemp-
\\ 
tions differently from direct subsidies or tax deductions that 
have a specified policy goal {i.e., like those in Nyquist). A 
-----------~ ~ 
state decision not to tax certain types of activities does not 
inherently represent a stamp of approval. Furthermore, to hold 
- -
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that the state has an affirmative duty to avoid giving tax exemp-
tions to institutions (or even individuals?) that violate consti-
tutional norms would require the taxing authorities to undertake 
constant and comprehensive inquiries into these institutions' 
policies. This is not the IRS' function. I do not think that 
equal protection forbids the Government from determining that 
such inquiries are better made elsewhere. 
3. Effect of §170 
Having argued that tax exemption under §501 (c) (3) does not 
constitute state action, I must raise a qualification. My cen-
........_ ~ - -
tral point was that the act of "not taxing" differs from the act 
of granting direct aid in that a decision not to tax does not 
necessarily indicate a purpose to reward or approve the exempt 
organization. This explanation serves well for §S0l(c) (3) exemp- / 
tion, but runs into trouble for §170. 
In allowing individuals to take deductions for contributions { 
to §50l(c) (3) organizations, §170 may be viewed as more than a J 
~ vernmental device. One purpose of the deduction is to -
encourage individuals to give money to certain types of organiza-
tions. The ef feet of the deduction is to provide a "matching 
grant" of Government funds to the donee organization. Norwood 
would invalidate a direct grant. But as Nyquist shows, certain 
types of tax deductions are treated in the same fashion as a 
matching grant. Though the §50l(c) (3) exemption is analogous to 
Walz, the §170 deduction is closer to Nyquist. 
Perhaps this suggests that equal protection forbids the Gov-





taneously permitting the Government to exempt petrs from tax-
ation. But Congress intended the two provisions to be read to-
gether: the §170 deduction is permitted for any gift to a 
§50l(c) (3) organization. A single equal-protection answer seems 
required. 
Without going into the analysis, which would be similar to 
that which preceded, I would conclude that the combined effect of 
§50l(c)(3) and §170(c) is not sufficient to constitute state ac--
tion. This is a more difficult question than tax exemption _____, 
alone. Yet I think that the rather general purpose underlying 
the §170 deduction is distinguishable from the specific 





The CA4 should be affirmed: 
-
46. 
1. The IRS has authority to withhold tax exemptions from 
racially-discriminatory private schools. 
a. The statutory underpinnings for this authority are 
dubious. Congress originally manifested no specific intent to 
invest the IRS with a "public policy" tool for denying tax exemp-
tions to otherwise qualified organizations. 
b. Congress subsequently has manifested its approval of 
the IRS' exercise of authority by amending the statute to extend 
that authority to racial discrimination by private clubs. 
c. This ratification is limited to requiring schools to 
have nondiscriminatory policies, and does not extend to use of 
other "public policies" as a basis for denying exemptions. 
2. Withholding a tax exemption from petrs does not violate 
the First Amendment. 
a. Denial of an exemption does constitute a burden on 
petrs' free exercise of religion. 
b. Petrs' free-exercise claims are not entitled to as 
much weight, however, as would be given to the same claims of-
fered by a church or seminary. 
c. The Government's strong interest in outlawing racial 
discrimination in private schools outweighs petrs' free-exercise 
interest. 





- - 47. 
3. The Court need not reach the equal-protection issue. If 
the issue is reached, the Court should hold that granting tax 
exemption does not constitute state action. ~L~ Y-~ 
a. There is no requirement that ~~/r_~-:,..,,h~ 
discriminatory motivation before equal protection may be invoked. 
b. Moose Lodge suggests that the Government is not 
meaningfully implicated in petrs' racial discrimination. Norwood 
suggests that any direct aid implicates the Government in the 
private discrimination. 
c. Norwood's rationale should not be extended to encom-
pass tax exemption. Walz is correct that granting tax exemption -does not constitute governmental support for or approval of the 
~-----... --· 
activities of the exempt organizations. 
d. The issue is complicated by the fact that the §170 
deduction bears some relationship to the type of governmental 
encouragement that would constitute state action. I still con-
elude that §501 {c) (3) exemption and §170 deductability do not 
amount to state action. 
~?? 
~;f,-,r~. ~ M---r-x,-,, ~ (i)( >)1v1_s-f ~f!p;f-5 fa:401 ez6 Pi?C~ 
~~ 0 ~~ ,-rn ~ 
; , Y-r~~ ·1~J~ 
~~~~6 ~~-fo ·z, 
,.~hr~~ ~ c,1;{1 
~~-_s ~~~?/11 
c~~J-~-?;,04 
. ~~ ~c; ½~S.,.fc ·1 
d/-3 ~ ~ ~~ 1-.,~~-r"H ~ 
'¥~>•te.t-v~~--~ ~-~ ~~ 
:~-.. ~ ~ 
. ~ '+ . ' 
.If.;. 
. ... 
7-7,_~~ ~ _,,,, .... ~ ""7-P'l'H?H-7? ~ {e;(✓)/<7.f .s. 
;,...._,_..-_ ~ ~, ~ -f~ :'-62 
{!::. 9 J; a;r-;;; 1 ()_.s ; ~ -r-ry....,., . ~L~~---:-= _ _, . 
. . ·~-~-~~ .-· ~~ 
~~-~✓47(., 
.~· '9-!-v-)~111~ (£?(;,7f<7...>~~ 
~. I!". • • -t _ _ rr, , ~  /I -L ..,_ . .., ~~ c--L -,.,., ~ ~ -~,-~p 
, , • ~ ~ t-• ~~,-yw, l ·r>:, ~
(~(~IQ$' ~ /2--c,,~-,,,? & ~ , -~ ¥ (?}1 '1.5!°>!t7 
~J~,,-.u?f;' T?' ~ .,. . SJ~ 
(?) I P_'> ~ ~~ ---n'lj . ,.,.,.., f 
{iJ (;,) /'7...S f ~ ~ . \' . : ' /.~(; "'. 
' 7rf~P I, ~ ~ ~~ 
c: \~ '"': (i) {7]/0_<; ~ ...,.,,, ;_~ 
.. _· . ~~,~~?t'Yl ~-q~ 
-
81-1 GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS v . U.S. 





,,,,,,__y-;~~~  ~I 
-~~~~1-/-::? 
~-f?~~~~ 
~ ~~ ~ ~ 
~~ 1~~~9 ~ ~ 
ro/Jntth/,-v)~ 
, (~ ~.st1i -,,?-7,/ 'J'>?'{f) , ~ ~ 
.S.'9S~ ( £?LI~ h ~-11-f V 
(!~~~ ~, ~~-,t:"),i~ 
.. ~-p~ J~ -'v<-4~ ~ 
~--z,p . _fT/7 (;;71ol_r h 
½ 7 ~ k-,-,;~ pr'12/7)? I~~) 
-~"Y'n'i"f~~ 
'~ -,,~~p It 
~~ "'~' ~ 4f-t7~ 
 Z:./ bl "YV7  -rr 5 
-~-v7Yhr 
~~~&~~ 
~~~~~~-nu~ rVf 0 
(-9 5) ~---1-t;--:g 
-
~~ 
-r '7'Pr~ ~  1J 
• ~ ~--1(1 ~ -· (}L/ ( ""1.J~ 




men 10/14/82 ~ 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Mark 
Re: 81-1, 81-3 Goldsboro & Bob Jones 
You asked for an outline of the arguments supporting subse-
quent congressional ratification of the 1970 IRS Ruling. 
1. Eleven bills introduced to overturn Green have failed. Con-
gressional committees have expressed approval of the ruling. 
w-AA,/ ~d-<:.-k.d.,., ~ 4uL_ 
2. In 1976 §SOl(i) j overturned McGlotten,. which{upheld t ,ax-exempt 
. 1i~•-jillii--• 
status for racially-discriminatory social clubs. Green was left 
unaffected. 
3. In 1980 §S0l(i) was amended to permit membership restrictions 
based on religion so long as they were made in good faith. This 
confirms the intent not to permit racial discrimination in tax-
exempt groups, and shows that Congress has paid close attention 
---------- ---- - ---
to developments under §501 (c) (3) and is prepared to legislate 
changes when necessary. 
~/~ 
4. The 1978 amendments limited the IRS' ability to enforce more 
'\. 
stringent rules, but did not affect the preexisting authority. 
5. The IRS ruling has been highly publicized. Subsequent con-
gressional action therefore is more significant than normal. 
• - -
2. 
6. There is broad-based support for the policy at issue. Few 
opponents of the IRS policy will speak out against the policy 
itself. The ratification doctrine is designed for a situation 
where acceptance of an agency ruling is sufficient that there is 
little reason to require Congress to start over from scratch. 
I should state the chief argument against ratification. 
This is the SG' s point that al though these subsequent develop-
men ts may indicate congressional approval of the policy result, 
they do not indicate congressional ratification of the statutory 
interpretation. I do not think prior Court decisions have found 
ratification of a particular ruling but not an interpretation. 
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Motion of Petitioner for Leave to 
File a Supplemental Brief After 
.Argument 
SUMMARY: Petr, Bob Jones University, moves to file a supplemental brief 
----under RU.le 35.6. Petr contends that during oral arguments on October 12, 
1982, three questions were raised by the Justices. These ilTlfXJrtant issues 
were either not previously addressed or not addressed in enough detail: (1) 
Denial of tax-exerrpt status on grounds that the organization engages in 
practices of an unlawful or socially undesirable nature. (2) Whether the 
•charitable• category subsumes other categories in §50l(c) (3). (3). Whether 
religious entities are exempt as a species of common law charities under 
§50l(c)(3) • 
DISCUSSION: The brief should be helpful to Court and the motion should 
therefore be granted. 
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BOB JONES UNIVERSITY, PETITIONER 
V 
UNITED STATES 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[March-, 1983] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners, non-
profit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially dis-
criminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious 
doctrine, qualify as tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c) 
(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
I 
A 
Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-
exempt status to private schools, regardless of racial admis-
sions policies, under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3), 1 and granted charitable deduc-
1 Section 501(c)(3) lists the following organizations, which, pursuant to 
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tions for contributions to such schools under § 170 of the 
Code, 26 U. S. C. § 170. 2 
On January 12, 1970, however, a three-judge District 
Court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary in-
junction prohibiting the IRS from according tax-exempt sta-
tus to private schools in Mississippi that discriminated as to 
admissions on the basis of race. Green v. Kennedy, 309 
F. Supp. 1127 (D. D. C.), app. dismissed sub nom. Cannon 
v. Green, 398 U. S. 956 (1970). Thereafter, in July 1970, the 
IRS concluded that it could "no longer legally justify allowing 
tax-exempt status [under§ 501(c)(3)] to private schools which 
practice racial discrimination." IRS News Release (7/10/70), 
reprinted in App. in No. 81-3, p. A235. In addition, the IRS 
concluded that it could not "treat gifts to such schools as char-
itable deductions for income tax purposes [under § 170)." 
Ibid. By letter dated November 30, 1970, the IRS formally 
notified private schools, including those involved in this case, 
of this change in policy, "applicable to all private schools in 
the United States at all levels of education." See id., at 
A232. 
§ 501(a), are exempt from taxation unless denied tax exemptions under 
other specified sections of the Code: 
"Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or in-
ternational amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the preven-
tion of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual , no substan-
tial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherv.ise 
attempting, to influence legislation ... , and which does not participate in , 
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." (emphasis 
added). 
2 Section 170(a) allows deductions for certain "charitable contributions." 
Section 170(c)(2)(B) includes within the definition of "charitable contribu-
tion" a contribution or gift to or for the use of a corporation "organized and 
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On June 30, 1971, the three-judge District Court issued its 
opinion on the merits of the Mississippi challenge. Green v. 
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D. D. C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit 
v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971) (per curiam). That court 
approved the IRS' amended construction of the Tax Code. 
The court also held that racially discriminatory private 
schools were not entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) and 
that donors were not entitled to deductions for contributions 
to such schools under § 170. In addition, the court perma-
nently enjoined the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from 
approving tax-exempt status for any school in Mississippi 
that did not publicly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination. 
The IRS then formalized its nondiscrimination policy in 
Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230. In that 
Ruling, the IRS stated: 
"Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have 
long recognized that the statutory requirement of being 
'organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, ... or educational purposes' was intended to ex-
press the basic common law concept [of 'charity'] .... 
All charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, are sub-
ject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may 
not be illegal or contrary to public policy." Id., at 230. 
Noting the existence of "a national policy to discourage racial 
discrimination in education," the IRS ruled that "a private 
school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to 
students is not 'charitable' within the common law concepts 
reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code." / d., at 
231. 3 
operated exclusively for religious , charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes .. . . " 
3 Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230, defined "racially non-
discriminatory policy as to students" as meaning that: 
"[T]he school admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, 
programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students 
' 
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The application of the IRS construction of these provisions 
to petitioners, two private schools with racially discrimina-
tory admissions policies, is now before us. 
B 
No. 81-3, Bob Jones University v. United States 
Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation located in 
Greenville, South Carolina. 4 Its purpose is "to conduct an 
institution of learning ... , giving special emphasis to the 
Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scrip-
tures." Certificate of Incorporation, Bob Jones University, 
Inc., of Greenville, S. C., reprinted in App. in No. 81-3, pp. 
A118-A119. The corporation operates a school with an en-
rollment of approximately 5,000 students, from kindergarten 
through college and graduate school. Bob Jones University 
is not affiliated with any religious denomination, but is dedi-
cated to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist 
Christian religious beliefs. It is both a religious and educa-
tional institution. All courses at the University are taught 
according to the Bible; its teachers are required to be devout 
Christians. Students are screened as to their religious be-
liefs, and their public and private conduct is strictly regu-
lated by standards promulgated by University authorities. 
The sponsors of the University genuinely believe that the 
Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. To effectuate 
these views, Negroes were completely excluded until 1971. 
From 1971 to May 1975, the University accepted no applica-
tions from unmarried Negroes,5 but did accept applications 
from Negroes married within their race. 
at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race 
in administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship 
and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs." 
• Bob Jones University was founded in Florida in 1927. It moved to 
Greenville, South Carolina, in 1940, and has been incorporated as an 
eleemosynary institution in South Carolina since 1952. 
5 Beginning in 1973, Bob Jones University instituted an exception to 
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Following the decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in M cCrary v. Runyon, 515 
F. 2d 1082 (CA4 1975), aff'd 427 U. S. 160 (1976), prohibiting 
racial exclusion from private schools, the University revised 
its policy. Since May 29, 1975, the University has permitted 
unmarried Negroes to enroll; but a disciplinary rule prohibits 
interracial dating and marriage. That rule reads: 
There is to be no interracial dating 
1. Students who are partners in an interracial mar-
riage will be expelled. 
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any 
group or organization which holds as one of its goals or 
advocates interracial marriage will be expelled. 
3. Students who date outside their own race will be 
expelled. 
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage oth-
ers to violate the University's dating rules and regula-
tions will be expelled. App. in No. 81-3, p. A197. 
The University continues to deny admission to applicants en-
gaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate inter-
racial marriage or dating. Id., at A277. 
Until 1970, the IRS extended tax-exempt status to Bob 
Jones University under§ 501(c)(3). By the letter of Novem-
ber 30, 1970, that followed the injunction issued in Green v. 
Kennedy, supra, the IRS formally notified the University of 
the change in IRS policy, and announced its intention to chal-
lenge the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing ra-
cial discrimination in their admissions policies. 
After failing to obtain an assurance of tax exemption 
through administrative means, the University instituted an 
action in 1971 seeking to enjoin the IRS from revoking the 
school's tax-exempt status. That suit culminated in Bob 
this rule, allowing applications from unmarried Negroes who had been 
members of the University staff for four years or more. 
' 
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Jones University v. Sinion, 416 U. S. 725 (1974), in which 
this Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), prohibited the Univer-
sity from obtaining judicial review by way of injunctive ac-
tion before the assessment or collection of any tax. 
Thereafter, on April 16, 1975, the IRS notified the Univer-
sity of the proposed revocation of its tax-exempt status. On 
January 19, 1976, the IRS officially revoked the University's 
tax-exempt status, effective as of December 1, 1970, the day 
after the University was formally notified of the change 
in IRS policy. The University subsequently filed returns 
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act for the period 
from December 1, 1970, to December 31, 1975, and paid a tax 
totalling $21. 00 on one employee for the calendar year of 
1975. After its request for a refund was denied, the Univer-
sity instituted the present action, seeking to recover the 
$21.00 it had paid to the IRS. The Government counter-
claimed for unpaid federal unemployment taxes for the tax-
able years 1971 through 1975, in the amount of $489,675.59, 
plus interest. 
The United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina held that revocation of the University's tax-exempt 
status exceeded the delegated powers of the IRS, was im-
proper under the IRS rulings and procedures, and violated 
the University's rights under the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment. 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D. S. C. 1978). 
The court accordingly ordered the IRS to pay the Univer-
sity the $21.00 refund it claimed and rejected the IRS coun-
terclaim. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, 
reversed. 639 F. 2d 147 (CA4 1980). Citing Green v. Con-
nally, supra, with approval, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that § 501(c)(3) must be read against the background of chari-
table trust law. To be eligible for an exemption under that 
section, an institution must be "charitable" in the common 
law sense, and therefore must not be contrary to public pol-
81-1 & 81-3-0PINION 
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icy. In the court's view, Bob Jones University did not meet 
this requirement, since its "racial policies violated the clearly 
defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, condemning 
racial discrimination and, more specifically, the government 
policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in education, 
public or private." Id., at 151. The court held that the IRS 
acted within its statutory authority in revoking the Universi-
ty's tax-exempt status. Finally, the Court of Appeals re-
jected petitioner's arguments that the revocation of the tax 
exemption violated the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment. The case was remanded 
to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the Univer-
sity's claim for a refund and to reinstate the Government's 
counterclaim. 
C 
No. 81-1, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States 
Goldsboro Christian Schools is a nonprofit corporation lo-
cated in Goldsboro, North Carolina. Like Bob Jones Uni-
versity, it was established "to conduct an institution of learn-
ing ... , giving special emphasis to the Christian religion 
and the ethics revealed in the Holy scriptures." Articles of 
Incorporation, ~ 3(a); see Complaint, ~ 6, reprinted in App. in 
No. 81-1 , pp. 5--6. The school offers classes from kindergar-
ten through high school, and since at least 1969 has satisfied 
the State of North Carolina's requirements for secular educa-
tion in private schools. The school requires its high school 
students to take Bible-related courses, and begins each class 
with prayer. 
Since its incorporation in 1963, Goldsboro Christian 
Schools has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions 
policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible. 6 Golds-
6 According to the interpretation espoused by Goldsboro, race is deter-
mined by descendance from one of Noah's three sons-Ham, Shem and 
Japheth. Based on this interpretation, Orientals and Negroes are 
Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Caucasians are Japhethitic. Cultural 
81-1 & 81-3-OPINION 
8 GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS v. UNITED STATES 
boro has for the most part accepted only Caucasians. On 
occasion, however, the school has accepted children from 
racially mixed marriages in which one of the parents is 
Caucasian. 
Goldsboro never received a determination by the IRS that 
it was an organization entitled to tax exemption under 
§ 501(c)(3). Upon audit of Goldsboro's records for the years 
1969 through 1972, the IRS determined that Goldsboro was 
not an organization described in § 501(c)(3), and therefore 
was required to pay taxes under the Federal Insurance Con-
tribution Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. 
Goldsboro paid the IRS $3,459.93 in withholding, social se-
curity, and unemployment taxes with respect to one em-
ployee for the years 1969 through 1972. Thereafter, Golds-
boro filed a suit seeking refund of that payment, claiming 
that the school had been improperly denied § 501(c)(3) ex-
empt status.; The IRS counterclaimed for $160,073.96 in 
unpaid social security and unemployment taxes for the years 
1969 through 1972, including interest and penalties. 8 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of North Carolina decided the action on cross-motions for 
summary judgment. 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E. D. N. C. 1977). 
In addressing the motions for summary judgment, the court 
assumed that Goldsboro's racially discriminatory admissions 
policy was based upon a sincerely held religious belief. The 
court nevertheless rejected Goldsboro's claim to tax-exempt 
or biological mixing of the races is regarded as a violation of God's com-
mand. App. in No. 81-1, pp. 40-41. 
'Goldsboro also asserted that it was not obliged to pay taxes on lodging 
furnished to its teachers. Petitioner does not ask this Court to review the 
rejection of that claim. 
8 By stipulation, the IRS agreed to abate its assessment for 1969 and 
most of 1970 to reflect the fact that the IRS did not begin enforcing its pol-
icy of denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools 
until November 30, 1970. As a result, the amount of the counterclaim was 
reduced to $116,190.99. App. in No. 81-1, pp. 104, 110. 
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status under § 501(c)(3), finding that "private schools main-
taining racially discriminatory admissions policies violate 
clearly declared federal policy and, therefore, must be denied 
the federal tax benefits flowing from qualification under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3)." Id., at 1318. The court also rejected Golds-
boro's arguments that denial of tax-exempt status violated 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, the court entered summary 
judgment for the Government on its counterclaim. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed, No. 80-1473 (CA4 Feb. 24, 1981) (per curiam). 
That court found an "identity for present purposes" between 
the Goldsboro case and the Bob Jones University case, which 
had been decided shortly before by another panel of that 
Court of Appeals, and affirmed for the reasons set forth in 
the Bob Jones University opinion. 
We granted certiorari in both cases, 454 U. S. 892 (1981), 9 
and we affirm in each. 
II 
A 
In Revenue Ruling 71-447, the 1971 ruling formalizing the 
policy first announced in 1970, the IRS stated that § 501(c)(3) 
9 After the Court granted certiorari , the Government filed a motion to 
dismiss , informing the Court that the Department of Treasury intended to 
revoke Revenue Ruling 71-447 and other pertinent rulings and to recog-
nize § 50l(c)(3) exemptions for petitioners. The Government suggested 
that these actions were therefore moot. Before this Court ruled on that 
motion, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit enjoined the Government from granting ~ 50l(c)(3) tax-
exempt status to any school that discriminates on the basis of race. 
Wright v. Regan , No. 80-1124 (CADC Feb. 18, 1982) (per curiam order). 
Thereafter, the Government informed the Court that it would not revoke 
the revenue rulings and withdrew its request that the actions be dismissed 
as moot. The Government continues to assert that the IRS lacked author-
ity to promulgate Revenue Ruling 71-447, and does not defend that aspect 
of the rulings below. 
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embraces the common law "charity" concept. Under that 
view, to qualify for a tax exemption pursuant to § 501(c)(3), 
an institution must show, first, that it falls within one of the 
eight categories expressly set forth in that section, and sec-
ond, that its activity is not contrary to settled public policy. 
Section 501(c)(3) provides that "[c]orporations ... orga-
nized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable ... or 
educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. Peti-
tioners argue that the plain language of the statute guaran-
tees them tax-exempt status. They emphasize the absence 
of any language in the statute expressly requiring all exempt 
organizations to be "charitable" in the common law sense, 
and they contend that the disjunctive "or" separating the cat-
egories in § 501(c)(3) precludes such a reading. Instead, 
they argue that if an institution falls within one or more of 
the specified categories it is automatically entitled to exemp-
tion, without regard to whether it also qualifies as "chari-
table." The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that peti-
tioners' interpretation of the statute "tears section 501(c)(3) 
from its roots." United States v. Bob Jones University, 
supra, 639 F. 2d, at 151. 
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction 
that, where the legislative purpose is discernible, a court 
should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance 
on that language would def eat the plain purpose of the 
statute: 
"The general words used in the clause . . . , taken by 
themselves, and literally construed, without regard to 
the object in view, would seem to sanction the claim of 
the plaintiff. But this mode of expounding a statute has 
never been adopted by any enlightened tribunal-be-
cause it is evident that in many cases it would defeat the 
object which the Legislature intended to accomplish. 
And it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the 
court will not look merely to a particular clause in which 
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general words may be used, but will take in connection 
with it the whole statute ... and the objects and policy of 
the law . ... " Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 
(1857) (emphasis added). 
Thus, § 501(c)(3) must be analyzed and construed within 
the framework of the Tax Code and against the background 
of the Congressional purposes. Such an examination reveals 
unmistakable evidence that underlying all relevant parts of 
the Code is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption de-
pends on meeting certain common law standards of charity-
namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must 
serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established 
public policy. 
This "charitable" concept appears explicitly in § 170 of the 
Code. 10 That section provides deductions for "charitable 
contributions" (emphasis added), a term defined by reference 
to a list of organizations virtually identical to that contained 
in § 501(c)(3). On its face, therefore, § 170 discloses a clear 
Congressional intention to grant the benefit of tax exemption 
'
0 The predecessor of§ 170 originally was enacted in 1917, as part of the 
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917), 
whereas the predecessor of § 501(c)(3) dates back to the income tax law of 
1894, Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, see note 13 i11fra. 
There are minor differences between the lists of organizations in the two 
sections, see generally Liles & Blum, Development of the Federal Ta.r 
Treatm ent of Charities, 39 L. & Contemp. Prob. 6, 24-25 (No. 4, 1975). 
Nevertheless, the two sections are closely related; both seek to achieve the 
same basic goal of encouraging the development of certain organizations 
through the grant of tax benefits. The language of the two sections is in 
most respects identical, and the Commissioner and the courts consistently 
have applied many of the same standards in interpreting those sections. 
See 5 J. Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation§ 31.12 (1980); 6 id. 
§§34.01-34.13 (1975); B. Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income Taxation 
220-222 (5th ed. 1980). To the extent that § 170 "aids in ascertaining the 
meaning" of § 501(c)(3), therefore, it is "entitled to great weight," United 
States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 64-65 (1940). See Harris v. Commis-
sioner, 340 U. S. 106, 107 (1950). 
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to organizations serving "charitable" purposes. The form of 
§ 170 simply makes plain what common sense and history tell 
us: in enacting both § 170 and § 50l(c)(3), Congress sought to 
provide tax benefits to "charitable" organizations, to encour-
age the development of private institutions that serve a use-
ful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public 
institutions of the same kind. 
Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought beneficial 
to the social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular 
community, are deeply rooted in our history, as in that of En-
gland. The origins of such exemptions lie in the special priv-
ileges that have long been extended to charitable trusts. 11 
More than a century ago, this Court announced the caveat 
that is critical in this case: 
"[I]t has now become an established principle of Ameri-
can law, that courts of chancery will sustain and protect 
. . . a gift . . . to public charitable uses, provided 
the same is consistent with local laws and public pol-
icy . ... " Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465, 501 (1861) (em-
phasis added). 
Soon after that, in 1878, the Court commented: 
"A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy 
forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to 
11 The form and history of the charitable exemption and deduction sec-
tions of the various income tax acts reveal that Congress was guided by the 
common law of charitable trusts. See Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of 
Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 Tax L. ReY. 477, 485-489 
(1981). Congress acknowledged as much in 1969. The House Report on 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, stated that the 
§ 501(c)(3) exemption was available only to institutions that served "the 
specified charitable purposes," H. R. Rep. No. 413 (Part 1), 91st Cong. , 
1st Sess. 35 (1969), and described "charitable" as "a term that has been 
used in the law of trusts for hundreds of years. " Id., at 43. We need not 
consider whether Congress intended to incorporate into the Tax Code any 
aspects of charitable trust law other than the requirements of public bene-
fit and a valid public purpose. 
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promote the well-doing and well-being of social man." 
Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U. S. 
303, 311 (1878) (emphasis added). See also, e. g., Jack-
son v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867). 
In 1891, in a restatement of the English law of charity 12 
which has long been recognized as a leading authority in this 
country, Lord MacNaghten stated: 
"'Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divi-
sions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the ad-
vancement of education; trusts for the advancement of 
religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the 
community, not falling under any of the preceding 
heads." Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A. C. 531, 
583 (emphasis added). See, e. g., 4 A. Scott, The Law 
of Trusts § 368, at 2853-2854 (3d ed. 1967). 
These statements clearly reveal the legal background against 
which Congress enacted the first charitable exemption stat-
ute in 1894: 13 charities were to be given preferential treat-
ment because they provide a benefit to society. 
What little floor debate occurred on the charitable exemp-
12 The draftsmen of the 1894 income tax law, which included the first 
charitable exemption provision, relied heavily on English concepts of tax-
ation; and the list of exempt organizations appears to have been patterned 
upon English income tax statutes. See 26 Cong. Rec. 584-588, 6612-6615 
(1894). 
13 Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 55&--557 (1894). 
The income tax system contained in the 1894 Act was declared unconstitu-
tional, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895), for 
reasons unrelated to the charitable exemption provision. The terms of 
that exemption were in substance included in the corporate income tax con-
tained in the Payne Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 
(1909). A similar exemption has been included in every income tax act 
since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment , beginning with the Reve-
nue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § Il(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). See generally 
Reiling, Federal Taxation : What ls a Charitable Organization?, 44 ABA 
J. 525 (1958); Liles & Blum, supra note 10. 
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tion provision of the 1894 Act and similar sections of later 
statutes leaves no doubt that Congress deemed the specified 
organizations entitled to tax benefits because they served de-
sirable public purposes. See, e. g., 26 Cong. Rec. 585-586 
(1894); id., at 1727. In floor debate on a similar provision in 
1917, for example, Senator Hollis stated: 
"For every dollar that a man contributes to these public 
charities, educational, scientific, or otherwise, the public 
gets 100 percent." 55 id., at 6728 (1917). See also, 
e.g., 44 id., at 4150 (1909); 50 id., at 1305-1306 (1913). 
In 1924, this Court restated the common understanding of 
the charitable exemption provision: 
"Evidently the exemption is made in recognition of the 
benefit which the public derives from corporate activities 
of the class named, and is intended to aid them when 
not conducted for private gain." Trinidad v. Sagrada 
Orden, 263 U. S. 578, 581 (1924). 14 
In enacting the Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447 
(1938), Congress expressly reconfirmed this view with re-
spect to the charitable deduction provision: 
"The exemption from taxation of money and property de-
voted to charitable and other purposes is based on the 
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss 
of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which 
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from 
other public funds, and by the benefits resulting from 
"That same year, the Bureau of Internal Revenue expressed a similar 
view of the charitable deduction section of the estate tax contained in the 
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (1919). The 
Solicitor of Internal Revenue looked to the common law of charitable trusts 
in construing that provision, and noted that "generally bequests for the 
benefit and advantage of the general public are valid as charities." Sol. 
Op. 159, III-I C. B. 480 (1924). 
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the promotion of the general welfare." H. R. Rep. No. 
1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). 10 
A corollary to the public benefit principle is the require-
ment, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the purpose of 
a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established 
public policy. In 1861, this Court stated that a public chari-
table use must be "consistent with local laws and public pol-
icy," Perin v. Carey, supra, 24 How., at 501. Modern com-
mentators and courts have echoed that view. See, e. g., 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 377, comment c (1959); 4 
A. Scott, supra, at § 377, and cases cited therein; G. Bogert 
& G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 378, at 
191-192 (rev. 2d ed. 1977). 16 
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deduc-
tions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemp-
tion or deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers 
can be said to be indirect "donors." Charitable exemptions 
are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a 
benefit on the whole of society or the immediate commu-
nity-a benefit which the society or the community may not 
itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and 
"The common law requirement of public benefit is universally recog-
nized by commentators on the law of trusts. For example, Bogert states: 
"In return for the favorable treatment accorded charitable gifts which 
imply some disadvantage to the community, the courts must find in the 
trust which is to be deemed 'charitable' some real advantages to the public 
which more than offset the disadvantages arising out of special privileges 
accorded charitable trusts." G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts 
and Trustees § 361, at 3 (rev. 2d ed. 1977). 
For other statements of this principle, see, e.g., 4 A. Scott, The Law of 
Trusts, § 348, at 2770 (3d ed. 1967); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368, 
comment b (1959); E. Fisch, D. Freed & E. Schachter, Charities and Char-
itable Foundations § 256 (1974). 
16 Cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U. S. 30, 35 
(1958), in which this Court referred to "the presumption against congres-
sional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy" in upholding 
the Commissioner's disallowance of deductions claimed by a trucking com-
pany for fines it paid for violations of state maximum weight Jaws. 
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advances the work of public institutions already supported by 
tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear that, 
to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must 
fall within a category specified in that section and must de-
monstrably serve and be in harmony with the public inter-
est. I i The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with 
the common community conscience as to undermine any pub-
lic benefit that might otherwise be conferred. 
B 
Determinations of public benefit and public policy are sen-
sitive matters with serious implications for the institutions 
affected; and a declaration that a given institution is not 
"charitable" should be made only where there can be no 
doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental 
public policy. There can no longer be any doubt, however, 
that racial discrimination in education violates deeply and 
widely accepted views of elementary justice. Prior to 1954, 
public education in many places still was conducted under the 
pall of Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U. S. 537 (1896); racial seg-
regation in primary and secondary education prevailed in 
many parts of the country. See, e. g., Segregation and the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the States (B. Reams & P. Wil-
son, eds. 1975). 18 This Court's decision in Brown v. Board of 
"Petitioners focus considerable attention on the term "charitable" that 
appears in the list of exempt organizations in § 50l(c)(3). They argue that 
that term must be construed narrowly, in the sense of "relief of the poor. " 
See Brief for Petitioner Bob Jones University 14-16. But see, e.g., 
Treas. Reg. § l.50l (c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959). In view of our conclusion that the 
requirement of a valid "charitable" purpose and effect is implicit in 
§ 50l(c)(3), and not dependent on any particular language of that section, 
we need express no opinion on this issue. 
" In 1894, when the first charitable exemption provision was enacted , 
racially segregated educational institutions would not have been regarded 
as against public policy. Yet contemporary standards must be considered 
-
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Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), signalled an end to that era. 
Over the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of 
this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Or-
ders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial segrega-
tion and discrimination in public education and to discourage 
such practices in nonpublic education. 
An unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of 
Education establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that 
racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental 
national public policy. Soon after Brown a unanimous Court 
stated: 
"The right of a student not to be segregated on racial 
grounds in schools ... is indeed so fundamental and per-
vasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process 
of law." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 19 (1958). 
In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 468-469 (1973), we 
stated: 
"[A] private school-even one that discriminates-fulfills 
an important educational function; however, . . . [ that} 
legitimate educational function cannot be isolated from 
discriminatory practices ... [D}iscriminatory treat-
ment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educa-
tional process." (emphasis added). See also Runyon v. 
in determining whether given activities provide a public benefit and are en-
titled to the charitable tax exemption. In Walz v. Tax Cornm'n, 397 U. S. 
664, 672-673 (1970), we observed: 
"Qualification for tax exemption is not perpetual or immutable; some tax-
exempt groups lose that status when their activities take them outside the 
classification and new entities can come into being and qualify for the 
exemption." 
Charitable trust law also makes clear that the definition of "charity" de-
pends upon contemporary standards. See, e. g. , Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, § 374, comment a (1959); G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra, note 15, 
§ 369, at 65--67; 4 A. Scott, supra note 15, § 368, at 2851>-2856. 
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McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976); Griffin v. County School 
Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964). 
In short, decisions of this Court firmly establish that racially 
discriminatory private schools are contrary to a most deeply 
held public policy. 
Congress, in Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. 88--352, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000c, 
2000c-6, 2000-d, clearly expressed its agreement that racial 
discrimination in education violates a fundamental public pol-
icy. Other sections of that Act, and numerous enactments 
since then, testify to the public policy against racial dis-
crimination in all areas of American society. See, e. g., the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 8~110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 
U. S. C. §§ 1971 et seq.; Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3601 et seq.; 
the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92--318, 86 
Stat. 354 (repealed effective Sept. 30, 1979; replaced by simi-
lar provisions in the Emergency School Aid Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2252, 20 U. S. C. §§ 3191-3207 (1980 
Supp.)). 
The Executive Branch has consistently placed its support 
behind eradication of racial discrimination in American soci-
ety. Several years before this Court's decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, supra, President Truman issued Execu-
tive Orders prohibiting racial discrimination in federal 
employment decisions, Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 CFR 720 
(1943-1948 Comp.), and in classifications for the Selective 
Service, Exec. Order No. 9988, id. 726, 729. In 1957, Presi-
dent Eisenhower employed military forces to insure compli-
ance with federal standards in school desegregation pro-
grams. Exec. Order No. 10730, 3 CFR 389 (1954-1958 
Comp.). And in 1962, President Kennedy announced: 
"[T]he granting of federal assistance for ... housing and 
related facilities from which Americans are excluded be-
cause of their race, color, creed, or national origin is 
unfair, unjust, and inconsistent with the public policy of 
81-1 & 81-3-0PINION 
GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS v. UNITED STATES 19 
the United States as manifested in its Constitution and 
laws." Exec. Order No. 11063, 3 CFR 652 (1959-1963 
Comp.). 
These are but a few of numerous Executive Orders over the 
past three decades demonstrating the commitment of the Ex-
ecutive Branch to the fundamental policy of eliminating the 
blight of racial discrimination from our society. See, e. g., 
Exec. Order No. 11197, 3 CFR 278 (1964-1965 Comp.); Exec. 
Order No. 11478, 3 CFR 803 (1966-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order 
No. 11764, 3 CFR 849 (1971-1975 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 
12250, 3 CFR 298 (1981). 
Few social or political issues in our history have been more 
vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the 
issue of racial discrimination, particularly in education. 
Given the stress and anguish of the history of efforts to es-
cape from the shackles of the "separate but equal" doctrine of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, it cannot be said that educational 
institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial dis-
crimination, are institutions exercising "beneficial and sta-
bilizing influences in community life," Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 
397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970), or should be encouraged by having 
all taxpayers share in their support by way of special tax 
status. 
There can thus be no question that the interpretation of 
§ 501(c)(3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was correct. It 
would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying 
tax exemption to grant tax-exempt status to racially discrimi-
natory educational entities, which "exer[t] a pervasive influ-
ence on the entire educational process." Norwood v. Harri-
son, supra, 413 U. S., at 469. Whatever may be the 
rationale for such private schools' policies, racial discrimina-
tion in education is contrary to public policy. Racially dis-
criminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as con-
ferring a public benefit within the "charitable" concept 
discussed earlier, or within the Congressional intent underly-
ing § 501(c)(3). 19 
19 In view of our conclusion that racially discriminatory private schools 
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C 
Petitioners contend that, regardless of whether the IRS 
properly concluded that racially discriminatory private 
schools violate public policy, only Congress can alter the 
scope of§ 501(c)(3). Petitioners accordingly argue that the 
IRS overstepped its lawful bounds in issuing its 1970 and 
1971 rulings. 
Yet ever since the inception of the Tax Code, Congress has 
seen fit to vest in those administering the tax laws very 
broad authority to interpret that Code. In an area as com-
plex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with the 
responsibility to administer the Code must be able to exer-
cise its authority to meet changing conditions and new prob-
lems arising in our complex society. Indeed as early as 1918, 
Congress expressly authorized the Commissioner "to make 
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the 
Tax Code. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1309, 40 Stat. 
1057, 1143 (1919). The same provision, so essential to effi-
cient and fair administration of the tax laws, has appeared in 
Tax Codes ever since, see 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a) (1976); and 
this Court has long recognized the primary authority of the 
IRS and its predecessors in construing the Tax Code, see, 
e.g., Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U. S. 156, 
169 (1981); United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 306-307 
(1967); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 469-470 (1900). 
Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rul-
ings it rejects; and courts exercise review over IRS actions. 
In the first instance, however, the responsibility for constru-
ing the Tax Code falls to the IRS. Since Congress cannot be 
expected to anticipate every conceivable problem that can 
arise, it relies on the administrators and on the courts to im-
violate fundamental public policy and cannot be deemed to confer a benefit 
on the public, we need not decide whether an organization providing a pub-
lic benefit and otherwise meeting the requirements of§ 501(c)(3) could nev-
ertheless be denied tax-exempt status if certain of its activities violated a 
law or public policy. 
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plement the legislative will. Administrators, like judges, 
are under oath to do so. 
In §§ 170 and 501(c)(3), Congress has provided a list of cat-
egories of traditionally exempt institutions and has specified 
certain additional requirements for tax exemption. Yet the 
need for continuing interpretation of those statutes is un-
avoidable. For more than 60 years, the IRS and its prede-
cessors have constantly been called upon to interpret these 
and comparable provisions. In Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517(1) 
(1921), for example, the IRS denied charitable exemptions on 
the basis of proscribed political activity before the Congress 
itself added such conduct as a disqualifying element. In 
other instances, the IRS has denied charitable exemptions to 
otherwise qualified entities because they served too limited a 
class of people and thus did not provide a truly "public" bene-
fit under the common law test. See, e. g., Crellin v. Com-
missioner, 46 B. T. A. 1152, 1155-1156 (1942); James Sprunt 
Benevolent Trust v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 19, 24-25 
(1930). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3}-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959). 
Some years before the issuance of the rulings challenged in 
these cases, the IRS also ruled that contributions to commu-
nity recreational facilities would not be deductible and that 
the facilities themselves would not be entitled to tax-exempt 
status, unless those facilities were open to all on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis. See Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 
Cum. Bull. 113. These rulings reflect the Commissioner's 
continuing duty to interpret and apply the Tax Code. See 
also Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 
u. s. 326, 337-338 (1941). 
Guided, of course, by the Code, the IRS has the respon-
sibility in the first instance to determine whether a particular 
entity is "charitable" for purposes of § 501(c)(3). 20 This in 
turn may necessitate future determinations of whether given 
l".I In the present case, the IRS issued its rulings denying exemptions to 
racially discriminatory schools only after a three-judge District Court had 
issued a preliminary injunction. See pp. 2-3, supra. 
-
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activities so violate public policy that the entities involved 
cannot be deemed to provide a public benefit worthy of "char-
itable" status. We reiterate, however, that these sensitive 
determinations should be made only where there is no doubt 
that the organization's purpose violates fundamental public 
policy. 
On the record before us, there can be no doubt on this 
score. In 1970, when the IRS first issued the ruling chal-
lenged here, the position of all three branches of the Federal 
Government was unmistakably clear. The soundness of the 
Commissioner's conclusion that a racially discriminatory pri-
vate school "is not 'charitable' within the common law con-
cepts reflected in ... the Code" is wholly consistent with 
what Congress, the Executive and the courts had repeatedly 
declared. Clearly an educational institution engaging in 
practices affirmatively at odds with this declared position of 
the whole government cannot be seen as exercising a "benefi-
cial and stabilizing influenc[e] in community life," Walz v. 
Tax Comm'n, supra, 397 U. S., at 673, and is not "chari-
table," within the meaning of §501(c)(3). 21 
We therefore hold that the IRS did not exceed its authority 
when it announced its interpretation of§ 501(c)(3) in 1970 and 
1971. 
D 
The actions of Congress since 1970 leave no doubt that the 
IRS properly exercised its authority. It is, of course, not 
unknown for independent agencies or the Executive Branch 
to misconstrue the intent of a statute; Congress can and often 
does correct such misconceptions, if the courts have not done 
so. Yet for a dozen years Congress has been made aware--
21 Many of the amici curiae, including Amicus William T. Coleman, Jr. 
(appointed by the Court), argue that denial of tax-exempt status to racially 
discriminatory schools is independently required by the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment. In light of our resolution of this case, 
we do not reach this issue. 
-
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acutely aware-of the IRS rulings of 1970 and 1971. As we 
noted earlier, few issues have been the subject of more vigor-
ous and widespread debate and discussion in and out of Con-
gress than those related to racial segregation in education. 
Sincere adherents advocating contrary views have ventilated 
the subject for well over three decades. Failure of Congress 
to modify the IRS rulings of 1970 and 1971, of which Con-
gress was, by its own studies and by public discourse, con-
stantly reminded; and Congress' awareness of the denial of 
tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when 
enacting other and related legislation make out an unusually 
strong case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by 
implication of the 1970 and 1971 rulings. 
Ordinarily, and quite appropriately, courts are slow to 
attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on par-
ticular legislation. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 
694 n. 11 (1980). As we have observed, "unsuccessful at-
tempts at legislation are not the best of guides to legislative 
intent," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 
381-382 n. 11 (1969). Here, however, we do not have an or-
dinary claim of legislative acquiescence. Only one month 
after the IRS announced its position in 1970, Congress held 
its first hearings on this precise issue. Equal Educational 
Opportunity: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on 
Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1991 
(1970). Exhaustive hearings have been held on the issue at 
various times since then. These include hearings in Febru-
ary 1982, after we granted review in this case. Administra-
tion's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of 
Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before 
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1982). Furthermore, during the past 12 years there have 
been no fewer than 11 bills introduced to overturn the IRS 
interpretation of § 501(c)(3). 22 Not one of these bills has 
22 H. R. 802, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H. R. 332, 97th Cong. , 1st 
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emerged from any committee, although Congress has en-
acted numerous other amendments to § 501 during this same 
period, including an amendment to § 501(c)(3) itself. Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 
1730 (1976). It is hardly conceivable that Congress-and in 
this case every Member of Congress-was not abundantly 
aware of what was going on. 
In view of its prolonged and acute awareness of the issue, 
Congress' failure efto act on the bills proposed on this sub-
ject provides overwhelming support for a finding of Congres-
sional acquiescence in the IRS rulings of 1970 and 1971. 
See, e. g. , Merrill , Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Curran, -- U. S.--, -- (1982); Herman & MacLean 
v. Huddleston , -- U.S.--, -- (1983); United States v. 
R utherford, 442 U. S. 544, 554 n. 10 (1979). Moreover, the 
evidence of Congressional approval of the policy embodied in 
Revenue Ruling 71-447 goes well beyond the failure of Con-
gress to act on legislative proposals. Congress affirmatively 
manifested its acquiescence in the IRS policy when it enacted 
the present § 501(i) of the Code, Act of October 20, 1976, Pub. 
L. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976). That provision denies tax-
exempt status to social clubs whose charters or policy state-
ments provide for "discrimination against any person on the 
basis of race, color, or religion. " 23 Both the House and Sen-
ate committee reports on that bill articulate the national pol-
Sess. (1981); H. R. 95, 97th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1981); S. 995, 96th Cong. , 1st 
Sess. (1979); H. R. 1905, 96th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 96, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 3225, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H. R. 
1394, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H. R. 5350, 92d Cong. , 1st Sess. (1971); 
H. R. 2352, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. 68, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1971). 
23 Prior to the introduction of this legislation, a three-judge district court 
had held that segregated social clubs were entitled to tax exemptions. 
McGlotten v. Connally , 338 F. Supp. 448 (D. D. C. 1972). Section 501(i) 
was enacted primarily in response to that decision. See S. Rep. No. 1318, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 1353, 94th Cong. , 2d Sess. 
8 (1976). 
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icy against granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory 
private clubs. S. Rep. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 
(1976); H. R. Rep. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976). 
Even more significant is the fact that both reports focus on 
this Court's affirmance of Green v. Connally, supra, as hav-
ing established that "discrimination on account of race is in-
consistent with an educational institution's tax exempt sta-
tus." S. Rep. No. 1318, supra, at 7-8 and n. 5; H. R. Rep. 
No. 1353, supra, at 8 and n. 5 (emphasis added). These ref-
erences, in the context of Congressional committee reports 
on an enactment denying tax exemptions to racially discrimi-
natory private social clubs, cannot be read other than as indi-
cating acquiescence in the standards then being applied to ra-
cially discriminatory private schools by the IRS, and 
specifically of Revenue Ruling 71-447. 24 
III 
Petitioners contend that, even if the Commissioner's policy 
24 Petitioners argue that the Ashbrook and Dornan Amendments to the 
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 
1980; Pub. L. 96-74; §§ 103, 614 , 615; 93 Stat. 559, 562, 576-577 (1979), re-
flect congressional opposition to the IRS policy formalized in Revenue Rul-
ing 71-447. Those amendments, however, are directly concerned only 
with limiting more aggressive enforcement procedures proposed by the 
IRS in 1978 and 1979 and preventing the adoption of more stringent sub-
stantive standards. The Ashbrook Amendment , § 103 of the Act, applies 
only to procedures, guidelines or measures adopted after August 22, 1978, 
and thus in no way affects the status of Revenue Ruling 71-447. In fact, 
both Congressman Dornan and Congressman Ashbrook explicitly stated 
that their amendments would have no effect on prior IRS policy, including 
Revenue Ruling 71-447, see 125 Cong. Rec. H5982 (daily ed. July 16, 1979) 
(Cong. Dornan: "[M]y amendment will not affect existing IRS rules which 
IRS has used to revoke tax exemptions of white segregated academies 
under Revenue Ruling 71-447 .... "); 125 Cong. Rec. H5882 (daily ed. July 
13, 1979) (Cong. Ashbrook: "My amendment very clearly indicates on its 
face that all the regulations in existence as of August 22, 1978, would not 
be touched."). These amendments therefore do not indicate Congres-
sional rejection of Revenue Ruling 71-447 and the standards contained 
therein. 
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is valid as to nonreligious private schools, that policy cannot 
constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial 
discrimination when that discrimination rests on the basis of 
sincerely held religious beliefs. 25 Petitioners argue that the 
IRS construction of § 501(c)(3) violates their free exercise 
rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 
This contention presents claims not heretofore considered in 
precisely this context. 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is an 
absolute prohibition against all governmental regulation of 
religious beliefs, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 219 
(1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 402 (1963); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). As inter-
preted by this Court, moreover, the Free Exercise Clause 
provides substantial protection for lawful conduct grounded 
in religious belief, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U. S., 
at 220; Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Emp. Secu-
rity Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 
374 U. S., at 402-403. We have long recognized, however, 
that "[n]ot all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. ... 
The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by 
showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding gov-
ernmental interest." United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 
257-258 (1982) (citations omitted). See, e. g., McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 628 and n. 8 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
supra, 406 U. S., at 215; Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 
437 (1971). 
On occasion this Court has found certain governmental in-
terests so compelling as to allow even regulations directly 
25 The District Court found , on the basis of a full evidentiary record, that 
the challenged practices of petitioner Bob Jones University were based on 
a genuine belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. 
468 F. Supp. , at 894. We assume, as did the District Court, that the same 
is true with respect to petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools. See 436 
F. Supp., at 1317. 
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prohibiting religiously based conduct. In Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), for example, the Court held 
that neutrally cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of printed 
materials on public streets could be applied to prohibit chil-
dren from dispensing religious literature. The Court found 
no constitutional infirmity in "excluding [Jehovah's Witness 
children] from doing there what no other children may do." 
Id., at 170. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 
(1878); United States v. Lee, supra; Gillette v. United States, 
supra. 
Here, no such direct burden on beliefs is involved. Of 
course, denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substan-
tial impact on the operation of private religious schools. Yet 
denial of tax-exempt status does not prevent those schools 
from observing their religious tenets. See Braunf eld v. 
Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 605-606 (1961). 
The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. 
As discussed in Part ll(B), supra, the Government has a 
fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial dis-
crimination in education 26--discrimination that prevailed, 
with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation's 
history. The interests asserted by petitioners cannot be ac-
26 We deal here only with religious schools-not with churches or other 
purely religious institutions. The governmental interest in eliminating ra-
cial discrimination is at its greatest in the area of education. On the other 
hand, free exercise concerns increase substantially when purely religious 
activity is involved. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 
21~220 (1972); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, lOS-110 (1943). 
Moreover, as we noted in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 673 
(1970), churches have long been considered "beneficial and stabilizing influ-
ences in community life[,) . .. useful, desirable, and in the public interest," 
whatever their beliefs. See also, e. g., Zollman, Tax Exemptions of 
American Church Property, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 646 (1916). In contrast, we 
have previously recognized that racially discriminatory schools "exer[t) a 
pervasive influence on the entire educational process," outweighing any 
public benefit that they might otherwise provide, Norwood v. Harrison, 
413 U. S. 455, 469 (1973). See Simon, supra, note 11 , at 495-496. 
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commodated with this compelling governmental interest. 
See United States v. Lee, supra, 455 U. S., at 259-260. 
Here, the governmental interest substantially outweighs 
whatever incidental burden denial of tax benefits may have 
on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. 27 
IV 
The remaining issue is whether the IRS properly applied 
its policy to these petitioners. Petitioner Goldsboro Chris-
tian Schools admits that it "maintain[s] racially discrimina-
tory policies," Brief of Petitioner, Goldsboro Christian 
Schools, No. 81-1, at 10, but seeks to justify those policies on 
grounds we have fully discussed. The IRS properly denied 
tax-exempt status to Goldsboro Christian Schools. 
Petitioner Bob Jones University, however, contends that it 
is not racially discriminatory. It emphasizes that it now al-
lows all races to enroll, subject only to its restrictions on the 
conduct of all students, including its prohibitions of associa-
tion between men and women of different races, and of inter-
27 Bob Jones University also contends that denial of tax exemption vio-
lates the Establishment Clause by preferring religions whose tenets do not 
require racial discrimination over those which believe racial intermixing is 
forbidden. It is well settled that neither a State nor the Federal Govern-
ment may pass laws which "prefer one religion over another," Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947), but "[i]t is equally true" that a 
regulation does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it 
"happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,442 (1961). See Harris v. McRae, 
448 U. S. 297, 319-320 (1980). The IRS policy at issue here is founded on 
a "neutral, secular basis," Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 452 
(1971), and does not violate the Establishment Clause. As the Court of 
Appeals noted, moreover, "the uniform application of the rule to all reli-
giously operated schools avoids the necessity for a potentially entangling 
inquiry into whether a racially restrictive practice is the result of sincere 
religious belief." United States v. Bob JoMs Univ., 639 F . 2d 147, 155 
(CA4 1980) (emphasis in original). But see generally Note, 90 Yale L. J. 
350 (1980). 
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racial marriage. 28 Although a ban on intermarriage or inter-
racial dating applies to all races, decisions of this Court firmly 
establish that discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation 
and association is a form of racial discrimination, see, e.g., 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recrea-
tion Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431 (1973). We therefore find that the 
IRS properly applied Revenue Ruling 71-447 to Bob Jones 
University. 29 
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are accordingly 
Affirmed. 
28 This argument would in any event apply only to the final eight months 
of the five tax years at issue in this case. Prior to May 1975, Bob Jones 
University's admissions policy was racially discriminatory on its face, since 
the University excluded unmarried Negro students while admitting un-
married Caucasians. 
29 Bob Jones University also argues that the IRS policy should not apply 
to it because it is entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) as a "religious" 
organization, rather than as an "educational" institution. The record in 
this case leaves no doubt, however, that Bob Jones University is both an 
educational institution and a religious institution. As discussed previ-
ously, the IRS policy properly extends to all private schools, including reli-
gious schools. See note 26 supra. The IRS policy thus was properly ap-
plied to Bob Jones University. 
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Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
?A.. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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men 03/08/83 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Mark 
Re: Goldsboro and Bob Jones, Nos. 81-1 and 81-3 
I have reviewed the Chief's opinion in these cases. In gen-
eral, I think it is a good job. Nothing unexpected appears, as 
it follows William Coleman's (and Judge Leventhal's} argument 
closely. 
The following is an outline of the Chief's analysis, with my 
comments: 
Part II A -- Here the Chief argues that §501 (c} (3) incorporates 
the "public benefit" principle of trust law: a trust must serve 
a public benefit, and it may not violate law or public policy. 
The Chief's crucial passage is as follows: 
"Charitable exemptions are justified on the 
basis that the exempt entity confers a benefit 
on the ~!Jgle of socie t y 9-..r the immediate 
community--a bene f it which the society or the 
c'ommu n ity may not itself choose or be able to 
provide, or which supplements and advances the 
work of public institutions already supported 
by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to 
make clear that, to warrant exemption under 
§50l(c} (3), an institution must fall within a 
category specified in that section and must 
demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the 
ptio.ti c 1nl:e re s c . Tb~ ins titution's p urpose 
must not be so at odds with the common commu-
nity conscience as to undermine any public 
benefit that might otherwise be conferred." 
(pp. 15-16 } • 
~~? 
COMMENTS: First, this passage seems to have some internal ten-
sion. On the one hand, the exempt institution must "demonstrably 
r 
2. 
serve and be in harmony with the public interest." That seems a 
severe standard. On the other hand, the next sentence has lan-
guage -- the "purpose must not be so at odds with the common com-
munity conscience" -- that suggests a less stringent test. 
Second, I wonder exactly what "common community conscience" 
means. The Chief places strong emphasis on "public benefit." 
Yet a major purpose of tax exemptions for charitable organiza-
tions is to promote diversity, to ensure that no single standard 
of "community conscience" is enforced. I wish the Chief would 
give some recognition to this pluralism interest; certainly it is 
hard to say that every group in that huge volume of exempt orga-
nizations "demonstrably serves" the public interest. 
Part II B -- In this section the Chief is shooting fish in a bar-
rel. It takes him four full pages to demonstrate that racial 
discrimination in education is contrary to national policy. The 
crucial part comes at the end, where the Chief declares: 
J d 1 
"[I]t cannot be said that educational institu-
tions that, for whatever reasons, practice 
racial discrimination, are institutions exer-
cising 'beneficial and stabilizing influences 
in co~ nTTy li fe ,• ot §nouia be encouraged by 
having all taxpayers share in their support by 
way of special tax status •.•• There thus can 
be no question that the interpretation of 
§501 (c) (3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was 





First, I do not think the Chief needs to conclude so 0-' U 
that these schools are, in effect, totally disreputa- ~ 
It suffices to say that existing public policy condemns ~ 
racial discrimination. ~ elated point is that the Chief strong-
ly implies, perhaps unintentionally, that the result is as much 
3. 
dictated by the Court's equal protection cases (e.g., the Chief's 
Norwood opinion, which is cited several times) as by the statute. 
I have difficulty with the state action problem in the equal pro-
tection analysis, and thus would not want to imply anything on 
this issue. But the Chief refers several times to the fact that 
taxpayers subsidize these schools, in language that might later 
be cited as showing that this constitutes state action. 
Part II C -- The Chief here says that the IRS had discretion to 
make this determination, though he cautions "that these sensitive 
determinations should be made only where there is no doubt that 
the organization's purpose violates fundamental public policy." 
{p. 22) He then repeats his conclusion from the prior section: 
because in 1970 "the position of all three branches of the Feder-
al Government was unmistakably clear" as to racial discrimina-
tion, no one could say that these schools exercise a "'beneficial 
and stabilizing influence in community life.'" (Id.) 
I don't know why this section is here. Having concluded in 
II B that the IRS' statutory construction was correct, there is 
no sense in asking whether the IRS had authority to make the con-
struction. This section could be eliminated entirely. 
Part II D -- This is the Chief's ratification/acquiescence sec-
tion. It makes the same arguments I have discussed with you. 
There is one passage, however, you may not like. The Chief 
states: "In view of its prolonged and acute awareness of the 
issue, Congress' failure to act on the bills proposed on this 
4. 
subject provides overwhelming support for a finding of Congres-
sional acquiescence in the IRS rulings on 1970 and 1971." (p. 
24) I would not make this the centerpiece of the argument, at 
least not in terms of "overwhelming support." This sentence 
could come back to haunt the Court, for it effectively places 
Congress under a duty to overturn an agency ruling or be deemed 
to have ratified it by silence. 
Part III -- Here the Chief disposes, with dispatch, of the First 
Amendment issue. I find nothing particularly objectionable, and 
approve of fn. 26, which points out that churches would present a 
different case. Perhaps he might add that the case of a seminary 
might also be different. 
In sum, I can find flaws in the Chief's opinion, but many 
are picky. The basis analysis is as expected, and the Chief has 
done a reasonable job of limiting the statutory construction to 
the case of racial discrimination. 
You voted to affirm. Your analysis rested heavily on rati-
fication, however, as opposed to the original statutory construc-
tion. As you may recall, I set out to draft a concurring opinion 
for you on this position. After substantial work it became clear 
to me that there was a flaw in my original analysis. I had sug-
gested that you could say that the original statutory construc-
tion was wrong, but that subsequently it had been ratified. This 
overlooked the fact that Congress cannot ratify a totally lawless 
agency ruling. There must be at least some colorable basis for 
,rvu 
5. 
an agency interpretation before Congress can ratify it. 
That does not mean your position is wrong. You may reason 
as follows: 
-Under the statute, there must be some leeway for the IRS to 
decide which organizations are charitable. Some purposes would 
be so clearly illegal that a tax exemption would have to be de-
nied. 
-It is at least plausible that there are some fundamental 
policies that are so clear that a group violating them must be 
denied a tax exempt ion. 
such one. 
Race is such a one, perhaps the only 
-In the years following 1970, Congress has agreed with this 
view with respect to racial discrimination in admissions. The 
Congress that passed §50l{i) {discrimination in social clubs 
leads to denial of exemption) could not have meant to permit dis-
crimination in private schools. 
-This is a very limited rationale. Any other policy {e.g., 
sex discrimination) would present different considerations; one 
must construe this "public policy" exemption narrowly, for other-
wise the IRS -- a tax collector -- decides important questions of 
policy. These policy decisions should be made by Congress. In-
deed, Congress should act now to codify this decision, if deemed r 
desirable, or to overturn it. 
With this background in mind, I suggest the following op-
tions: 
{i) JOIN -- The Chief's opinion is not bad, and you might ~ 
make suggestions that would narrow it even though he is sure 
6. 
to get a Court, he probably would like a big one and thus would 
be willing to entertain suggestions. (Indeed, his memo accompa-
nying the opinion practically invited suggestions.) The basis 
for simply joining is that this is a unique case, the Chief's 
opinion is limited to race, and thus any separate opinion will 
probably have little effect any subsequent IRS rulings. 
One thing to note is that Justice O'Connor, who expressly 
agreed with your views at Conference, has quickly joined. If vou 
write separately, you will probably write alone. 
(ii) ~ TE -- Under this option, you would ex-
press general agreement with the Chief's opinion but emphasize 
two points. ~ that the decision is very limited: it re-
lates only to race (this is because the "public policy" must be 
fundamental, and because the subsequent ratification here con-
cerned only race); and it concerns only the question whether a 
tax exemption can be denied to a school that has an overtly dis-
criminatory policy (i.e., this case does not hold that the IRS 
can actually adjudicate whether a school has discriminated 
against particular individuals or that the IRS can impose strin-
gent requirements such as affirmative action). ~ you might 
express the view that this case should never have arisen in this 
posture, that Congress should have made itself clear, and that it 
now should do so by enacting legislation. This is something 
missing from the Chief's opinion: any suggestion that the pos-
ture of this case, or the method of interpreting this statute, is 
unusual and to be disfavored. 
r--
(iii) NO JOIN, CONCUR SEPARATELY -- This may be difficult, for ~ 
7. 
as I have said above, you necessarily need to concede at least 
the plausibility of the administrative interpretation. If that 
is true, there is no particular reason not to rely on the Chief's 
analysis on that question. If vou write a normal concurring 
opinion, you can indicate at which points you may differ somewhat 
from the Chief. 
~~ 
(iv) JOIN DISSENT -- I still believe affirmance is the cor-
rect result, because of the subsequent ratification material. If 
you simply cannot agree that it is reasonable to construe 
§50l(c) (3) as having any public policy element, then you might 
consider waiting for WHR. 
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No. 81-1 Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. 
v. United States 
No. 81-3 Bob Jones University v. United State s 
De ar Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
s~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
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March 8, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1--Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States 
No. 81-3--Bob Jones University v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
Your opinion is on the whole persuasive and powerful. 
I am, however, concerned that your free exercise d i scussion 
in Part III, although absolutely correct in its thrust, 
might carry some unfortunate and unnecessary implications . 
The following represent a few relatively minor revisions 
that would go a long way toward a l leviating those concerns, 
and that, I think, would actually strengthen the analysis. 
(1) I fear that the opinion places undue focus on the 
fact that the IRS regu l ation imposes only an "indirect" 
burden on the schools. The direct/indirect distinction was 
largely repudiated in Sherbert v. Verner, and we have no 
need to rely upon it here. I would suggest (a) eliminating 
the two paragraphs beginning with "On occasion this Court" 
at the bottom of p.26, and (b) changing the last sentence 
of Part III, on p. 28, to read: "Here, the governmental 
interest substantially outweighs the burden imposed on 
- -2- -
petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs by the 
denial of tax benefits." If citation to Prince and 
Reynolds is thought necessary, it might be accomplished, 
for example, by adding a "cf." to the string-cite at the 
end of the previous paragraph. 
(2) Footnote 26 on p. 27 correctly points out that the 
government interest may be more compelling in the case of 
religous schools than in the case of churches, etc. I 
think it is incorrect, however, in suggesting that the 
religious interest is any less, or that churches are more 
"purely religous" than schools~ I would therefore suggest 
revising footnote 26 to read roughly as follows: 
We deal here only with religous schools--not 
with other religious institutions such as churches. 
The governmental interest in eliminating rac i al 
discrimination is at its greatest in the area of 
education. Indeed, we have previously recognized 
that racially discriminatory schools "exer[t] a 
pervasive influence on the entire educational 
process," outweighing any public benefit that they 
might otherwise provide. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 
U.S. 455, 469 (1973). See Simon, supra, note 11, at 
495-496. 
(3) The opinion somewhat neglects the "less 
restrictive means" prong of Free Exercise Clause analysis. 
I would suggest revising the last paragraph of Part III, on 
pp. 27-28, to read roughly as follows: 
The governmental interest at stake here is 
compelling. As discussed in Part II(B), supra, the 
- -3- -
Government has a fundamental overriding interest in 
eradicating racial discrimination in education--
discrimination that prevailed, with official 
approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation's 
history. That governmental interest substantially 
outweighs the burden imposed on petitioners' exercise 
of their religious beliefs by the denial of tax 
benefits. Moreover, the interests asserted by 
petitioners cannot be accommodated with this 
compelling governmental interest. See United States 
v. Lee, supra, at 259-260. In particular no "less 
restrictive means," see Thomas v. Review Board, 
supra, at 718, could suffice to achieve the 
governmental interest; suits under 42 u.s.c. § 1981, 
for example, require an individual complainant, and 
cannot vindicate the Government's interest in 
eliminating the broader social harms created by 
racially discriminatory schools. 
I am, of course, not wedded to any particular 
language, but I do hope you will find these suggestions 
acceptable. Like you, I think it is very important that we 
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Copies to the Conference 
r -
March 8, 1983 
81-1 and 81-3 Goldsboro Christian/Bob ~Jones Cases 
Dea.r Chief: 
I will join the judgment in these cases, and prob-
ably will join some but not all of your opinion . 
You may recall the views I expressed at Confer-
ence . I do not think the IRS has any general policy making 
authority, ano I am afraid portions of your opinion will 
encourage it to make decisions that surely Congress itself 
should make. Perhaps I can agree that arguably §501(3} 
could have been construed as it was, but it would have been 
far more Prudent - and consistent with its proper role - if 
the IRS had allowed Congress to make the decision. 
I also have reservations as to the view that 
S50l(c) (3) embraces the common law co11cept of "charity". If 
one looks at the enormous list of entities and organizations 
that have been accorded tax exempt S'tatus, it is not easy to 
view all of them - or indeed perhaps even most of them - as 
coming within any such common law concept. r-1or, indeed, is 
it true by any means that all of the exempt organizations 
promote the publi.c good as distinguished from some extemely 
narrow perception of it - a perception that hardly would 
measure up to the standard articulated in your opinion. 
I am able to join the judgment only because of the 
strong case you make in II-D for full acceptance of the IRS 
ruling. Whether one calls it ratification or acquiescence, 
I do think it clear - certainly as of now - that Congress 
has accepted the original ruling that racially discrimina-
tory schools no not qualify for tax exemptions . 
Despite these negative comments, I add that cer-
tainly you have written a most thoughtful opinion , and de-
spite reservations as to the IRS ' s authority (particularly 
at the time and i.n the circumstances of this case), you have 
persuaded roe to join your judgment . I have not decided def-
initely whether to write, although my present inclination is 
to explain why I do not join all of your opinion . 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
C H A M BERS O F' 
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March 8, 1983 
Re: 81-1 - Goldsboro Christian Schools v. 
United States; 81-3 - Bob Jones 
University v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
✓ 
Although I have no objection to the second and 
third suggestions that Bill Brennan made in his letter 
of March 8, 1983, it does seem to me that the two 
paragraphs beginning at the bottom of page 26 and 
continuing onto page 27 should be retained. It does 
not seem to me that either Prince or Reynolds was 
overruled by Sherbert v. Verner and I think both of 
those cases support the result here . Perhaps you could 
eliminate the word "direct" by revising the first 
sentence of the second paragraph to read something like 
this: "Here, no such substantial burden on beliefs is 
i nvolved." 
Respectfully, 
1A I . , ......._ 
The Chief Justice 
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BOB JONES UNIVERSITY, PETITIONER . 
v. 
UNITED STATES 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
. [March -, 1983] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners, non-
profit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially dis-
criminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious 
doctrine, qualify as tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c) 
(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
I 
A 
Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-
exempt status to private schools, without regard to their ra-
cial admissions policies, under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3), 1 and granted charitable 
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deductions for contributions to such schools under § 170 of the 
Code, 26 U. S. C. § 170.2 
On January 12, 1970, a three-judge District Court for the 
District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing the IRS from according tax-exempt status to private 
schools in Mississippi that discriminated as to admissions on 
the basis of race. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D. 
D. C.), app. dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U. S. 
956 (1970). Thereafter, in July 1970, the IRS concluded that 
it could "no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status 
[under§ 501(c)(3)] to private schools which practice racial dis-
crimination." IRS News Release (7/10/70), reprinted in 
App. in No. 81-3, p. A235. At the same time, the IRS an-
nounced that it could not "treat gifts to such schools as chari-
table deductions for income tax purposes [under § 170]." 
Ibid. By letter dated November 30, 1970, the IRS formally 
notified private schools, including those involved in this case, 
of this change in policy, "applicable to all private schools in 
the United States at all levels of education." See id., at 
A232. 
§ 501(a), are exempt from taxation unless denied tax exemptions under 
other specified sections of the Code: 
"Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or in-
ternational amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the preven-
tion of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substan-
tial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation .. . , and which does not participate in, 
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." (emphasis 
added). 
2 Section 170(a) allows deductions for certain "charitable contributions." 
Section 170(c)(2)(B) includes within the definition of "charitable contribu-
tion" a contribution or gift to or for the use of a corporation "organized and 
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On June 30, 1971, the three-judge District Court issued its 
opinion on the merits of the Mississippi challenge. Green v. 
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D. D. C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit 
v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971) (per curiam). That court 
approved the IRS' amended construction of the Tax Code. 
The court also held that racially discriminatory private 
schools were not entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) and 
that donors were not entitled to deductions for contributions 
to such schools under § 170. The court permanently enjoined 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from approving tax-
exempt status for any school in Mississippi that did not pub-
licly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination. 
The revised policy on discrimination was formalized in 
Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230: 
"Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have 
long recognized that the statutory requirement of being 
'organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, ... or educational purposes' was intended to ex-
press the basic common law concept [of 'charity'] .... 
All charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, are sub-
ject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may 
not be illegal or contrary to public policy." Id., at 230. 
Based on the "national policy to discourage racial discrimina-
tion in education," the IRS ruled that "a private school not 
having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is 
not 'charitable' within the common law concepts reflected in 
sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code." Id., at 231. 3 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes. . . . " 
3 Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230, defined "racially non-
discriminatory policy as to students" as meaning that: 
"[T]he school admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, 
programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students 
at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race 
in administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship 
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The application of the IRS construction of these provisions 
to petitioners, two private schools with racially discrimina-
tory admissions policies, is now before us. 
B 
No. 81-3, Bob Jones University v. United States 
Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation located in 
Greenville, South Carolina. 4 Its purpose is "to conduct an 
institution of learning ... , giving special emphasis to the 
Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scrip-
tures." Certificate of Incorporation, Bob Jones University, 
Inc., of Greenville, S. C. , reprinted in App. in No. 81-3, pp. 
A118--A119. The corporation operates a school with an en-
rollment of approximately 5,000 students, from kindergarten 
through college and graduate school. Bob Jones University 
is not affiliated with any religious denomination, but is dedi-
cated to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist 
Christian religious beliefs. It is both a religious and educa-
tional institution. Its teachers are required to be devout 
Christians, and all courses at the University are taught ac-
cording to the Bible. Entering students are screened as to 
their religious beliefs, and their public and private conduct is 
strictly regulated by standards promulgated by University 
authorities. 
The sponsors of the University genuinely believe that the 
Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. To effectuate 
these views, Negroes were completely excluded until 1971. 
From 1971 to May 1975, the University accepted no applica-
tions from unmarried Negroes ,5 but did accept applications 
from Negroes married within their race. 
and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs." 
'Bob Jones University was founded in Florida in 1927. It moved to 
Greenville, South Carolina, in 1940, and has been incorporated as an 
eleemosynary institution in South Carolina since 1952. 
5 Beginning in 1973, Bob Jones University instituted an exception to 
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Following the decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in M cCrary v. Runyon, 515 
F. 2d 1082 (CA4 1975), aff'd 427 U. S. 160 (1976), prohibiting 
racial exclusion from private schools, the University revised 
its policy. Since May 29, 1975, the University has permitted 
unmarried Negroes to enroll; but a disciplinary rule prohibits 
interracial dating and marriage. That rule reads: 
There is to be no interracial dating 
1. Students who are partners in an interracial mar-
riage will be expelled. 
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any 
group or organization which holds as one of its goals or 
advocates interracial marriage will be expelled. 
3. Students who date outside their own race will be 
expelled. 
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage oth-
ers to violate the University's dating rules and regula-
tions will be expelled. App. in No. 81-3, p. A197. 
The University continues to deny admission to applicants en-
gaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate inter-
racial marriage or dating. Id., at A277. 
Until 1970, the IRS extended tax-exempt status to Bob 
Jones University under§ 501(c)(3). By the letter of Novem-
ber 30, 1970, that followed the injunction issued in Green v. 
Kennedy, supra, the IRS formally notified the University of 
the change in IRS policy, and announced its intention to chal-
lenge the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing ra-
cial discrimination in their admissions policies. 
After failing to obtain an assurance of tax exemption 
through administrative means, the University instituted an 
action in 1971 seeking to enjoin the IRS from revoking the 
school's tax-exempt status. That suit culminated in Bob 
this rule, allowing applications from unmarried Negroes who had been 
members of the University staff for four years or more. 
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Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725 (1974), in which 
this Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), prohibited the Univer-
sity from obtaining judicial review by way of injunctive ac-
tion before the assessment or collection of any tax. 
Thereafter, on April 16, 1975, the IRS notified the Univer-
sity of the proposed revocation of its tax-exempt status. On 
January 19, 1976, the IRS officially revoked the University's 
tax-exempt status, effective as of December 1, 1970, the day 
after the University was formally notified of the change 
in IRS policy. The University subsequently filed returns 
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act for the period 
from December 1, 1970, to December 31, 1975, and paid a tax 
totalling $21. 00 on one employee for the calendar year of 
1975. After its request for a refund was denied, the Univer-
sity instituted the present action, seeking to recover the 
$21. 00 it had paid to the IRS. The Government counter-
claimed for unpaid federal unemployment taxes for the tax-
able years 1971 through 1975, in the amount of $489,675.59, 
plus interest. 
The United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina held that revocation of the University's tax-exempt 
status exceeded the delegated powers of the IRS, was im-
proper under the IRS rulings and procedures, and violated 
the University's rights under the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment. 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D. S. C. 1978). 
The court accordingly ordered the IRS to p~y the Univer-
sity the $21.00 refund it claimed and rejected the IRS coun-
terclaim. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a divided 
opinion, reversed. 639 F. 2d 147 (CA4 1980). Citing Green 
v. Connally, supra, with approval, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that § 501(c)(3) must be read against the background 
of charitable trust law. To be eligible for an exemption 
under that section, an institution must be "charitable" in the 
common law sense, and therefore must not be contrary to 
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public policy. In the court's view, Bob Jones University did 
not meet this requirement, since its "racial policies violated 
the clearly defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, 
condemning racial discrimination and, more specifically, the 
government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in 
education, public or private." Id., at 151. The court held 
that the IRS acted within its statutory authority in revoking 
the University's tax-exempt status. Finally, the Court of 
Appeals rejected petitioner's arguments that the revocation 
of the tax exemption violated the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The case was re-
manded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the 
University's claim for a refund and to reinstate the Govern-
ment's counterdaim. 
C 
No. 81-1, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States 
Goldsboro Christian Schools is a nonprofit corporation lo-
cated in Goldsboro, North Carolina. Like Bob Jones Uni-
versity, it was established "to conduct an institution of learn-
ing ... , giving special emphasis to the Christian religion 
and the ethics revealed in the Holy scriptures." Articles of 
Incorporation, 13{a); see Complaint, 16, reprinted in App. in 
No. 81-1, pp. 5-6. The school offers classes from kindergar-
ten through high school, and since at least 1969 has satisfied 
the State of North Carolina's requirements for secular educa-
tion in private schools. The school requires its high school 
students to take Bible-related courses, and begins each class 
with prayer. 
Since its incorporation in 1963, Goldsboro Christian 
Schools has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions 
policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible. 6 Golds-
• According to the -interpretation espoused by Goldsboro, race is deter-
mined by descendance from one of Noah's three sons-Ham, Shem and 
J apheth. Based on this interpretation, Orientals and Negroes are 
Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Caucasians are J aphethitic. Cultural 
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boro has for the most part accepted only Caucasians. On 
occasion, however, the school has accepted children from 
racially mixed marriages in which one of the parents is 
Caucasian. 
Goldsboro never received a determination by the IRS that 
it was an organization entitled to tax exemption under 
§ 501(c)(3). Upon audit of Goldsboro's records for the years 
1969 through 1972, the IRS determined that Goldsboro was 
not an organization described in § 501(c)(3), and therefore 
was required to pay taxes under the Federal Insurance Con-
tribution Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. 
Goldsboro paid the IRS $3,459.93 in withholding, social se-
curity, and unemployment taxes with respect to one em-
ployee for the years 1969 through 1972. Thereafter, Golds-
boro filed a suit seeking refund of that payment, claiming 
that the school had been improperly denied § 501(c)(3) ex-
empt status. 7 The IRS counterclaimed for $160,073.96 in 
unpaid social security and unemployment taxes for the years 
1969 through 1972, including interest and penalties. 8 
The District Court for the Eastern District of North Caro-
lina decided the action on cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E. D. N. C. 1977). In addressing 
the motions for summary judgment, the court assumed that 
Goldsboro's racially discriminatory admissions policy was 
based upon a sincerely held religious belief. The court 
or biological mixing of the races is regarded as a violation of God's com-
mand. App. in No. 81-1, pp. 40-41. 
7 Goldsboro also asserted that it was not obliged to pay taxes on lodging 
furnished to its teachers. Petitioner does not ask this Court to review the 
rejection of that claim. 
8 By stipulation, tlre IRS agreed to abate its assessment for 1969 and 
most of 1970 to reflect the fact that the IRS did not begin enforcing its pol-
icy of denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools 
until November 30, 1970. As a result, the amount of the counterclaim was 
reduced to $116,190.99. App. in No. 81-1, pp. 104, 110. 
81-1 & 81---3-OPINION 
GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS v. UNITED STATES 9 
nevertheless rejected Goldsboro's claim to tax-exempt status 
under § 501(c)(3), finding that "private schools maintaining 
racially discriminatory admissions policies violate clearly de-
clared federal policy and, therefore, must be denied the fed-
eral tax benefits flowing from qualification under Section 
501(c)(3)." Id., at 1318. The court also rejected Golds-
boro's arguments that denial of tax-exempt status violated 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, the court entered summary 
judgment for the Government on its counterclaim. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, No. 
80-1473 (CA4 Feb. 24, 1981) (per curiam). That court found 
an "identity for present purposes" between the Goldsboro 
case and the Bob Jones University case, which had been de-
cided shortly before by another panel of that court, and af-
firmed for the reasons set forth in Bob Jones University. 
We granted certiorari in both cases, 454 U. S. 892 (1981), 9 
and we affirm in each. 
II 
A 
In Revenue Ruling 71-447, the IRS formalized the policy 
• After the Court granted certiorari, the Government filed a motion to 
dismiss, infonning the Court that the Department of Treasury intended to 
revoke Revenue Ruling 71-447 and other pertinent rulings and to recog-
nize § 501(c)(3) exemptions for petitioners. The Government suggested 
that these actions were therefore moot. Before this Court ruled on that 
motion, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit enjoined the Government from granting § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status to any school that discriminates on the basis of race. 
Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (CADC Feb. 18, 1982) (per curiam order). 
Thereafter, the Government informed the Court that it would not revoke 
the revenue rulings and withdrew its request that the actions be dismissed 
as moot. The Government continues to assert that the IRS lacked author-
ity to promulgate Revenue Ruling 71-447, and does not defend that aspect 
of the rulings below. 
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first announced in 1970, that § 501(c)(3) embraces the com-
mon law "charity" concept. Under that view, to qualify for a 
tax exemption pursuant to § 501(c)(3), an institution must 
show, first, that it falls within one of the eight categories ex-
pressly set forth in that section, and second, that its activity 
is not contrary to settled public policy. 
Section 501(c)(3) provides that "[c]orporations ... orga-
nized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or 
educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. Peti-
tioners argue that the plain language of the statute guaran-
tees them tax-exempt status. They emphasize the absence 
of any language in the statute expressly requiring all exempt 
organizations to be "charitable" in the common law sense, 
and they contend that the disjunctive "or" separating the cat-
egories in § 501(c)(3) precludes such a reading. Instead, 
they argue that if an institution falls within one or more of 
the specified categories it is automatically entitled to exemp-
tion, without regard to whether it also qualifies as "chari-
table." The Court of Appeals rejected that contention and 
concluded that petitioners' interpretation of the statute 
"tears section 501(c)(3) from its roots." United States v. Bob 
Jones University, supra, 639 F. 2d, at 151. 
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that 
a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if 
reliance on that language would clef eat the plain purpose of 
the statute: 
"The general words used in the clause ... , taken by 
themselves, and literally construed, without regard to 
the object in view, would seem to sanction the claim of 
the plaintiff. But this mode of expounding a statute has 
never been adopted by any enlightened tribunal-be-
cause it is evident that in many cases it would defeat the 
object which the Legislature intended to accomplish. 
And it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the 
court will not look merely to a particular clause in which 
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general words may be used, but will take in connection 
with it the whole statute . .. and the objects and policy of 
the law . ... " Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 
(1857) (emphasis added). 
Section 501(c)(3) therefore must be analyzed and construed 
within the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and 
against the background of the Congressional purposes. 
Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, un-
derlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that enti-
tlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain com-
mon law standards of charity-namely, that an institution 
seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and 
not be contrary to established public policy. 
This "charitable" concept appears explicitly in § 170 of the 
Code. 10 That section provides deductions for "charitable 
contributions," a term defined by reference to a list of orga-
nizations virtually identical to that contained in § 501(c)(3). 
On. its face, therefore, § 170 discloses a clear Congressional 
10 The predecessor of § 170 originally was enacted in 1917, as part of the 
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917), 
whereas the predecessor of§ 501(c)(3) dates back to the income tax law of 
1894, Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, see note 13 infra. 
There are minor differences between the lists of organizations in the two 
sections, see generally Liles & Blum, Development of the Federal Tax 
Treatment of Charities, 39 L. & Contemp. Prob. 6, 24-25 (No. 4, 1975) 
(hereinafter Liles & Blum). Nevertheless, the two sections are closely re-
lated; both seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the develop-
ment of certain organizations through the grant of tax benefits. The lan-
guage of the two sections is in most respects identical, and the 
Commissioner and the courts consistently have applied many of the same 
standards in interpreting those sections. See 5 J. Mertens, The Law of 
Federal Income Taxation § 31.12 (1980); 6 id. §§ 34.01-34.13 (1975); B. 
Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income Taxation 220- 222 (5th ed. 1980). To 
the extent that § 170 "aids in ascertaining the meaning" of § 501(c)(3), 
therefore, it is "entitled to great weight," United States v. Stewart, 311 
U. S. 60, 64-65 (1940). See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U. S. 106, 107 
(1950). 
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intention to grant the benefit of tax exemption to organiza-
tions serving charitable purposes. The form of § 170 simply 
makes plain what common sense and history tell us: in enact-
ing both§ 170 and§ 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax 
benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the devel-
opment of private institutions that serve a useful public pur-
pose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of 
the same kind. 
Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought beneficial 
to the social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular 
community, are deeply rooted in our history, as in that of En-
gland. The origins of such exemptions lie in the special priv-
ileges that have long been extended to charitable trusts. 11 
More than a century ago, this Court announced the caveat 
that is critical in this case: 
"[I]t has now become an established principle of Ameri-
can law, that courts of chancery will sustain and protect 
. . . a gift . . . to public charitable uses, provided 
the same is consistent with local laws and public pol-
icy . ... " Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465, 501 (1861) (em-
phasis added) . 
Soon after that, in 1878, the Court commented: 
"A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy 
11 The form and history of the charitable exemption and deduction sec-
tions of the various income tax acts reveal that Congress was guided by the 
common law of charitable trusts. See Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of 
Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 Tax L. Rev. 477, 485-489 
(1981) (hereinafter Simon). Congress acknowledged as mt1ch in 1969. 
The House Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 
487, stated that the§ 501(c)(3) exemption was available only to institutions 
that served "the specified charitable purposes," H. R. Rep. No. 413 (Part 
1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1969), and described "charitable" as "a term 
that has been used in the law of trusts for hundreds of years." Id., at 43. 
We need not consider whether Congress intended to incorporate into the 
Tax Code any aspects of charitable trust law other than the requirements 
of public benefit and a valid public purpose. 
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forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to 
promote the well-doing and well-being of social man." 
Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U. S. 
303, 311 (1878) (emphasis added). See also, e. g., Jack-
son v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867). 
In 1891, in a restatement of the English law of charity 12 
which has long been recognized as a leading authority in this 
country, Lord MacNaghten stated: 
"'Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divi-
sions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the ad-
vancement of education; trusts for the advancement of 
religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the 
community, not falling under any of the preceding 
heads." Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A. C. 531, 
583 (emphasis added). See, e. g., 4 A. Scott, The Law 
of Trusts § 368, at 2853-2854 (3d ed. 1967) (hereinafter 
Scott). 
These statements clearly reveal the legal background against 
which Congress enacted the first charitable exemption stat-
ute in 1894: 13 charities were to be given preferential treat-
ment because they provide a benefit to society. 
12 The draftsmen of the 1894 income tax law, which included the first 
charitable exemption provision, relied heavily on English concepts of tax-
ation; and the list of exempt organizations appears to have been patterned 
upon English income tax statutes. See 26 Cong. Rec. 584-588, 6612-6615 
(1894). 
13 Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556-557 (1894). 
The income tax system contained in the 1894 Act was declared unconstitu-
tional, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895), for 
reasons unrelated to the charitable exemption provision. The terms of 
that exemption were in substance included in the corporate income tax con-
tained in the Payne Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 
(1909). A similar exemption has been included in every income tax act 
since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, beginning with the Reve-
nue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). See generally 
Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 ABA J. 
525 (1958); Liles & Blum. 
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What little floor debate occurred on the charitable exemp-
tion provision of the 1894 Act and similar sections of later 
statutes leaves no doubt that Congress deemed the specified 
organizations entitled to tax benefits because they served de-
sirable public purposes. See, e. g., 26 Cong. Rec. 585-586 
(1894); id., at 1727. In floor debate on a similar provision in 
1917, for example, Senator Hollis articulated the rationale: 
"For every dollar that a man contributes to these public 
charities, educational, scientific, or otherwise, the public 
gets 100 percent." 55 id., at 6728 (1917). See also, 
e.g., 44 id., at 4150 (1909); 50 id., at 1305--1306 (1913). 
In 1924, this Court restated the common understanding of 
the charitable exemption provision: 
"Evidently the exemption is made in recognition of the 
benefit which the public derives from corporate activities 
of the class named, and is intended to aid them when 
not conducted for private gain." Trinidad v. Sagrada 
Orden, 263 U. S. 578, 581 (1924). 14 
In enacting the Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447 
(1938), Congress expressly reconfirmed this view with re-
spect to the charitable deduction provision: 
"The exemption from taxation of money and property de-
voted to charitable and other purposes is based on the 
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss 
of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which 
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from 
other public funds, and by the benefits resulting from 
the promotion of the general welfare." H. R. Rep. No. 
"That same year, the Bureau of Internal Revenue expressed a similar 
view of the charitable deduction section of the estate tax contained in the 
Revenue Act of 1918;- ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (1919). The 
Solicitor of Internal Revenue looked to the common law of charitable trusts 
in construing that provision, and noted that "generally bequests for the 
benefit and advantage of the general public are valid as charities." Sol. 
Op. 159, III-1 C. B. 480 (1924). 
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1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). 15 
A corollary to the public benefit principle is the require-
ment, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the purpose of 
a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established 
public policy. In 1861, this Court stated that a public chari-
table use must be "consistent with local laws and public pol-
icy," Perin v. Carey, supra, 24 How., at 501. Modern com-
mentators and courts have echoed that view. See, e. g., 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 377, comment c (1959); 4 
Scott § 377, and cases cited therein; Bogert § 378, at 
191-192. 16 
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deduc-
tions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemp-
tion or deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers 
can be said to be indirect and vicarious "donors." Charitable 
exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity 
confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the 
community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or 
which supplements and advances the work of public institu-
tions already supported by tax revenues. History but-
tresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemption under 
15 The common law requirement of public benefit is universally recog-
nized by commentators on the law of trusts. For example, Bogert states: 
"In return for the favorable treatment accorded charitable gifts which 
imply some disadvantage to the community, the courts must find in the 
trust which is to be deemed 'charitable' some real advantages to the public 
which more than offset the disadvantages arising out of special privileges 
accorded charitable trusts." G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts 
and Trustees § 361, at 3 (rev. 2d ed. 1977) (hereinafter Bogert). 
For other statements of this principle, see, e. g., 4 Scott § 348, at 2770; Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts § 368, comment b (1959); E. Fisch, D. Freed 
& E. Schachter, Charities and Charitable Foundations § 256 (1974). 
1•Cf. Tank Truck R entals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 
(1958), in which this Court referred to "the presumption against congres-
sional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy" in upholding 
the Commissioner's disallowance of deductions claimed by a trucking com-
pany for fines it paid for violations of state maximum weight laws. 
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§ 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified 
in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in har-
mony with the public interest. 11 The institution's purpose 
must not be so at odds with the common community con-
science as to undermine any public benefit that might other-
wise be conferred. 
B 
We are bound to approach these questions with full aware- , 
ness that determinations of public benefit and public policy 
are sensitive matters with serious implications for the institu-
tions affected; a declaration that a given institution is not 
"charitable" should be made only where there can be no 
doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental 
public policy. But there can no longer be any doubt that ra-
cial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely ac-
cepted views of elementary justice. Prior to 1954, public 
education in many places still was conducted under the pall of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896); racial segregation 
in primary and secondary education prevailed in many parts 
of the country. See, e.g., Segregation and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the States (B. Reams & P. Wilson, eds. 
1975). 18 This Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
11 Petitioners focus considerable attention on the term "charitable" that 
appears in the list of exempt organizations in § 501(c)(3). They argue that 
that term must be construed narrowly, in the sense of "relief of the poor." 
See Brief for Petitioner Bob Jones University 14-16. But see, e.g., 
Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959). In view of our conclusion that the 
requirement of a valid "charitable" purpose and effect is implicit in 
§ 501(c)(3), and not dependent on any particular language of that section, 
we need express no opinion on this issue. 
18 In 1894, when the first charitable exemption provision was enacted, 
racially segregated educational institutions would not have been regarded 
as against public policy. Yet contemporary standards must be considered 
in determining whether given activities provide a public benefit and are en-
titled to the charitable tax exemption. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 
664, 672--673 (1970), we observed: 
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tion, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), signalled an end to that era. Over 
the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this 
Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders at-
test a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and J . . 
d. . . . . bl" d t· wm,s.s-, o-n_ 1scrmunat1on m pu 1c e uca 10n. 
An unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of 
Education established beyond doubt this Court's view that 
racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental I 
national public policy, as well as rights of individuals. 
"The right of a student not to be segregated on racial 
grounds in schools ... is indeed so fundamental and per-
vasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process 
of law." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 19 (1958). 
In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 468-469 (1973), we ' 
dealt with a non-public institution: 
"[A] private school-even one that discriminates-fulfills 
an important educational function; however, ... [that] 
legitimate educational function cannot be isolated from 
discriminatory practices ... [D]iscriminatory treat-
ment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educa-
tional process." (emphasis added). See also Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976); Griffin v. County School \ 
Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964). O'MtJiilJrt 
Congress, in Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000c, 
2000c-6, 2000-d, clearly expressed its agreement that racial 
"Qualification for tax exemption is not perpetual or immutable; some tax-
exempt groups lose that status when their activities take them outside the 
classification and new entities can come into being and qualify for the 
exemption." 
Charitable trust law also makes clear that the definition of "charity" de-
pends upon contemporary standards. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, § 374, comment a (1959); Bogert § 369, at 65-67; 4 Scott § 368, at 
2855-2856. 
.I '• 
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discrimination in education violates a fundamental public pol-
icy. Other sections of that Act, and numerous enactments 
since then, testify to the public policy against racial dis- . _ 
crimination. See, e.g., the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. I 0 ""'js,0rv 
L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1971 et seq.; Title VIII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 
42 U.S. C. §§3601 et seq.; the Emergency School Aid Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 354 (repealed effective Sept. 
30, 1979; replaced by similar provisions in the Emergency 
School Aid Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95--561, 92 Stat. 2252, 20 
U. S. C. §§ 3191-3207 (1980 Supp.)). 
The Executive Branch has consistently placed its support 
behind eradication of racial discrimination. Several years J tJ,,.,'s.si~ 
before this Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
supra, President Truman issued Executive Orders prohibit-
ing racial discrimination in federal employment decisions; 
Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 CFR 720 (194~1948 Comp.), and in 
classifications for the Selective Service, Exec. Order No. 
9988, id. 726, 729. In 1957, President Eisenhower employed 
military forces to insure compliance with federal standards in 
school desegregation programs. Exec. Order No. 10730, 3 
CFR 389 (1954-1958 Comp.). And in 1962, President Ken-
nedy announced: 
"[T]he granting of federal assistance for ... housing and 
related facilities from which Americans are excluded be-
cause of their race, color, creed, or national origin is 
unfair, unjust, and inconsistent with the public policy of 
the United States as manifested in its Constitution and 
laws." Exec. Order No. 11063, 3 CFR 652 (1959-1963 
Comp.). 
These are but a few of numerous Executive Orders over the 
past three decades demonstrating the commitment of the Ex-
ecutive Branch to the fundamental policy of eliminating racial I rJr,clsH~ 
discrimination. ;,ee, e. g., Exec. Order No. 11197, 3 CFR 
278 (1964-1965 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 CFR 803 
(196&-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 11764, 3 CFR 849 
.,1 
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(1971-1975 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 12250, 3 CFR 298 
(1981). 
Few social or political issues in our history have been more 
vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the 
issue of racial discrimination, particularly in education. 
Given the stress and anguish of the history of efforts to es-
cape from the shackles of the "separate but equal" doctrine of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, it cannot be said that educational 
institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial dis-
crimination, are institutions exercising "beneficial and sta-
bilizing influences in community life," Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 
397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970), or should be encouraged by having 
all taxpayers share in their support by way of special tax 
status. 
There can thus be no question that the interpretation of 
§ 501(c)(3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was correct. That \ 
it may be seen as belated does not undermine its soundness. 
It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying 
tax exemption to grant the benefit of tax-exempt status to ra-
cially discriminatory educational entities, which "exer[t] a 
pervasive influence on the entire educational process." Nor-
wood v. Harrison, supra, 413 U. S., at 469. Whatever may 
be the rationale for such private schools' policies, and how-
ever sincere the rationale may be, racial discrimination in 
education is contrary to public policy. Racially discrimina-
tory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a 
public benefit within the "charitable" concept discussed ear-
lier, or within the Congressional intent underlying 
§ 501(c)(3). 19 
C 
Petitioners contend that, regardless of whether the IRS 
19 In view of our conclusion that racially discriminatory private schools 
violate fundamental public policy and cannot be deemed to confer a benefit 
on the public, we need not decide whether an organization providing a pub-
lic benefit and otherwise meeting the requirements of§ 501(c)(3) could nev-
ertheless be denied tax-exempt status if certain of its activities violated a 
law or public policy. 
.• 
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properly concluded that racially discriminatory private 
schools violate public policy, only Congress can alter the 
scope of § 501(c)(3). Petitioners accordingly argue that the 
IRS overstepped its lawful bounds in issuing its 1970 and 
1971 rulings. 
Yet ever since the inception of the tax code, Congress has 
seen fit to vest in those administering the tax laws very 
broad authority to interpret that code. In an area as com-
plex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with the 
responsibility to administer the tax laws must be able to ex-
ercise its authority to meet changing conditions and new 
problems. Indeed as early as 1918, Congress expressly au-
thorized the Commissioner "to make all needful rules and 
regulations for the enforcement" of the tax laws. Revenue 
Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1309, 40 Stat. 1057, 1143 (1919). The 
same provision, so essential to efficient and fair administra-
tion of the tax laws, has appeared in tax codes ever since, see 
26 U. S. C. § 7805(a) (1976); and this Court has long recog-
nized the primary authority of the IRS and its predecessors 
in construing the Internal Revenue Code, see, e. g., Com-
missioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U. S. 156, 169 (1981); 
United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 306-307 (1967); 
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 469-470 (1900). 
Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rul-
ings it considers improper; and courts exercise review over 
IRS actions. In the first instance, however, the responsibil-
ity for construing the Code falls to the IRS. Since Congress 
cannot be expected to anticipate every conceivable problem 
that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight, it relies 
on the administrators and on the courts to implement the leg-
islative will. Administrators, like judges, are under oath to 
do so. 
In §§ 170 and 501(c)(3), Congress has identified categories 
of traditionally exempt institutions and has specified certain 
additional requirements for tax exemption. Yet the need for 
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continuing interpretation of those statutes is unavoidable. 
For more than 60 years, the IRS and its predecessors have 
constantly been called upon to interpret these and compara-
ble provisions. In Treas. Reg. 45, art. 517(1) (1921), for ex-
ample, the IRS denied charitable exemptions on the basis of 
proscribed political activity before the Congress itself added 
such conduct as a disqualifying element. In other in-
stances, the IRS has denied charitable exemptions to other-
wise qualified entities because they served too limited a class 
of people and thus did not provide a truly "public" benefit 
under the common law test. See, e.g., Crellin v. Commis-
sioner, 46 B. T. A. 1152, 1155-1156 (1942); James Sprunt 
Benevolent Trust v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 19, 24-25 
(1930). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959). 
Some years before the issuance of the rulings challenged in 
these cases, the IRS also ruled that contributions to commu-
nity recreational facilities would not be deductible and that 
the facilities themselves would not be entitled to tax-exempt 
status, unless those facilities were open to all on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis. See Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 
Cum. Bull. 113. These rulings reflect the Commissioner's 
continuing duty to interpret and apply the Internal Revenue 
Code. See also Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 314 U. S. 326, 337-338 (1941). 
Guided, of course, by the Code, the IRS has the respon-
sibility, in the first instance, to determine whether a particu-
lar entity is "charitable" for purposes of§ 501(c)(3). 20 This in 
turn may necessitate later determinations of whether given 
activities so violate public policy that the entities involved 
cannot be deemed to provide a public benefit worthy of "char-
itable" status. We emphasize, however, that these sensitive 
determinations should be made only where there is no doubt 
20 In the present case, the IRS issued its rulings denying exemptions to 
racially discriminatory schools only after a three-judge District Court had 
issued a preliminary injunction. See pp. 2--3, supra. 
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that the organization's activities violate fundamental public 
policy. 
On the record before us, there can be no doubt as to the l 
national policy. In 1970, when the IRS first issued the rul- t 
ing challenged here, the position of all three branches of the 
Federal Government was unmistakably clear. The correct- } 
ness of the Commissioner's conclusion that a racially discrimi-
natory private school "is not 'charitable' within the common 
law concepts reflected in ... the Code," Rev. Rul. 71-447, 
1972-2 Cum. Bull., at 231 , is wholly consistent with what 
Congress, the Executive and the courts had repeatedly de-
clared before 1970. Clearly an educational institution engag-
ing in practices affirmatively at odds with this declared posi-
tion of the whole government cannot be seen as exercising a 
"beneficial and stabilizing influenc[e] in community life," 
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, 397 U. S. , at 673, and is not 
"charitable," within the meaning of § 501(c)(3). 21 
We therefore hold that the IRS did not exceed its authority 
when it announced its interpretation of§ 501(c)(3) in 1970 and 
1971. 
D 
The actions of Congress since 1970 leave no doubt that the I 
IRS reached the correct conclusion in exercising its author-
ity. It is, of course, not unknown for independent agencies 
or the Executive Branch to misconstrue the intent of a stat-
ute; Congress can and often does correct such misconcep-
tions, if the courts have not done so. Yet for a dozen years 
Congress has been made aware-acutely aware-of the IRS 
21 Many of the amici curiae, including Amicus William T. Coleman, Jr. 
(appointed by the Court), argue that denial ~f tax-exempt status to racially 
discriminatory schools is independently required by the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment. In light of our resolution of this case, 
we do not reach this constitutional issue. See, e. g., United States v. 
Clark , 445 U. S. 23, 27 (1980); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago , 440 
u. s. 490, 504 (1979). 
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rulings of 1970 and 1971. As we noted earlier, few issues 
have been the subject of more vigorous and widespread de-
bate and discussion in and out of Congress than those related 
to racial segregation in education. Sincere adherents ad-
vocating contrary views have ventilated the subject for well 
over three decades. Failure of Congress to modify the IRS 
rulings of 1970 and 1971, of which Congress was, by its own 
studies and by public discourse, constantly reminded; and 
Congress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for 
racially discriminatory schools when enacting other and re-
lated legislation make out an unusually strong case of legisla-
tive acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 
and 1971 rulings. 
Ordinarily, and quite appropriately, courts are slow to 
attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on par-
ticular legislation. See, e. g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 
694 n. 11 (1980). We have observed that "unsuccessful at-
tempts at legislation are not the best of guides to legislative 
intent," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 
381-382 n. 11 (1969). Here, however, we do not have an or-
dinary claim of legislative acquiescence. Only one month 
after the IRS announced its position in 1970, Congress held 
its first hearings on this precise issue. Equal Educational 
Opportunity: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on 
Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1991 
(1970). Exhaustive hearings have been held on the issue at 
various times since then. These include hearings in Febru-
ary 1982, after we granted review in this case. Administra-
tion's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of 
Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before 
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1982). 
Furthermore, during the past 12 years there have been no 
fewer than 11 bills introduced to overturn the IRS interpre-
tation of § 501(c)(3). 22 Not one of these bills has emerged 
22 H. R. 802, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H. R. 332, 97th Cong., 1st 
81-1 & 81--3-OPINION 
24 GOLDSBORO CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS v. UNITED STATES 
from any committee, although Congress has enacted numer-
ous other amendments to § 501 during this same period, in-
cluding an amendment to § 501(c)(3) itself. Tax Reform Act 
of 1976, Pub. L. 94--455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1730 (1976). 
It is hardly conceivable that Congress-and in this case 
every Member of Congress-was not abundantly aware of 
what was going on. In view of its prolonged and acute 
awareness of the issue, Congress' failure to act on the bills 
proposed on this subject provides overwhelming support for 
concluding that Congress acquiesced in the IRS rulings of 
1970 and 1971. See, e. g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, --U. S. --, -- (1982); Herman 
& MacLean v. Huddleston, -- U.S. --, -- (1983); 
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 554 n. 10 (1979). 
The evidence of Congressional approval of the policy em-
bodied in Revenue Ruling 71-447 goes well beyond the fail-
ure of Congress to act on legislative proposals. Congress af-
firmatively manifested its acquiescence in the IRS policy 
when it enacted the present § 501(i) of the Code, Act of Octo-
ber 20, 1976, Pub. L. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976). That pro-
vision denies tax-exempt status to social clubs whose char-
ters or policy statements provide for "discrimination against 
any person on the basis of race, color, or religion." 23 Both 
the House and Senate committee reports on that bill articu-
lated the national policy against granting tax exemptions to 
Sess. (1981); H. R. 95, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 995, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979); H. R. 1905, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 96, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 3225, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H. R. 
1394, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H. R. 5350, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); 
H. R. 2352, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. 68, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1971). 
23 Prior to the introduction of this legislation, a three-judge district court 
had held that segregated social clubs were entitled to tax exemptions. 
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D. D. C. 1972). Section 501(i) 
was enacted primarily in response to that decision. See S. Rep. No. 1318, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7--8 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
8 (1976). . 
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racially discriminatory private clubs. S. Rep. No. 1318, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 8 (1976). 
Even more significant is the fact that both reports focus on 
this Court's affirmance of Green v. Connally, supra, as hav-
ing established that "discrimination on account of race is in-
consistent with an educational institution's tax exempt sta-
tus." S. Rep. No. 1318, supra, at 7-8 and n. 5; H. R. Rep. 
No. 1353, supra, at 8 and n. 5 (emphasis added). These ref-
erences in Congressional committee reports on an enactment 
denying tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private so-
cial clubs cannot be read other than as indicating approval of I 
the standards applied to racially discriminatory private 
schools by the IRS subsequent to 1970, and specifically of 
Revenue Ruling 71-447. 24 
III 
Petitioners contend that, even if the Commissioner's policy 
24 Petitioners argue that the Ashbrook and Dornan Amendments to the 
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 
1980; Pub. L. 96-74; §§ 103, 614, 615; 93 Stat. 559, 562, 576-577 (1979), re-
flect congressional opposition to the IRS policy formalized in Revenue Rul-
ing 71-447. Those amendments, however, are directly concerned only 
with limiting more aggressive enforcement procedures proposed by the 
IRS in 1978 and 1979 and preventing the adoption of more stringent sub-
stantive standards. The Ashbrook Amendment, § 103 of the Act, applies 
only to procedures, guidelines or measures adopted after August 22, 1978, 
and thus in no way affects the status of Revenue Ruling 71-447. In fact, 
both Congressman Dornan and Congressman Ashbrook explicitly stated 
that their amendments would have no effect on prior IRS policy, including 
Revenue Ruling 71-447, see 125 Cong. Rec. H5982 (daily ed. July 16, 1979) 
(Cong. Dornan: "[M]y amendment will not affect existing IRS rules which 
IRS has used to revoke tax exemptions of white segregated academies 
under Revenue Ruling 71-447 .... "); 125 Cong. Rec. H5882 (daily ed. July 
13, 1979) (Cong. Ashbrook: "My amendment very clearly indicates on its 
face that all the regulations in existence as of August 22, 1978, would not 
be touched."). These amendments therefore do not indicate Congres-
sional rejection of Revenue Ruling 71-447 and the standards contained 
therein. 
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is valid as to nonreligious private schools, that policy cannot 
constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial 
discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. z.s 
As to such schools, it is argued that the IRS construction of 
§ 501(c)(3) violates their free exercise rights under the Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment. This contention 
presents claims not heretofore considered by this Court in f 
precisely this context. 
This Court has long held the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment an absolute prohibition against govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U. S. 205, 219 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 
402 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 
(1940). As interpreted by this Court, moreover, the Free 
Exercise Clause provides substantial protection for lawful 
conduct grounded in religious belief, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
supra, 406 U. S., at 220; Thomas v. Review Board of the In-
diana Emp. Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. 
Verner, supra, 374 U. S., at 402-403. However, "[n]ot all 
burdens on religion are unconstitutional. . .• . The state may 
justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is 
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." 
United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 257- 258 (1982) (citations 
omitted). See, e. g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 628 
and n. 8 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U. S., at 215; 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971). 
On occasion this Court has found certain governmental in-
terests so compelling as to allow even regulations prohibiting l 
religiously based conduct. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
25 The District Court found, on the basis of a full evidentiary record, that 
the challenged practices of petitioner Bob Jones University were based on 
a genuine belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. 
468 F. Supp., at 894. -we assume, as did the District Court, that the same 
is true with respect to petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools. See 436 
F. Supp., at 1317. 
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U. S. 158 (1944), for example, the Court held that neutrally 
cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of printed materials on 
public streets could be applied to prohibit children from dis-
pensing religious literature. The Court found no constitu-
tional infirmity in "excluding (Jehovah's Witness children] 
from doing there what no other children may do." Id., at 
170. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 
_ (1878); United States v. Lee, supra; Gillette v. United States, 
supra. Denial of ta..x benefits will inevitably have a substan-
tial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but 
will not prevent those schools from observing their religious 
tenets. 
The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. 
As discussed in Part II(B), supra, the Government has a 
fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial dis-
crimination in education 26-discrimination that prevailed, 
with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation's 
history. That governmental interest substantially out-1 
weighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on peti~ 
tioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests as-
serted by petitioners cannot be accommodated v,ith that 
compelling governmental interest, see United States v. Lee, \ 
supra, 455 U. S., at 259-260; and no ''less restrictive means," 
see Thom,as v. Review Board, supra, 450 U. S., at 718, are 
available to achieve the governmental interest. 27 
~ We deal here only v.ith religious schools-not with churches or other 
purely religious institutions; here, the governmental interest is in denying 
public support to racial discrimination in of education. As noted earlier, 
racially discriminatory schools "exer[t] a pervasive influence on the entire 
educational process," outweighing any public benefit that they might oth-
erv.ise provide, Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 469 (1973). See gen-
erally Simon 495--496. 
"' Bob Jones University also contends that denial of tax exemption vio-
lates the E stablishment Clause by preferring religions whose tenets do not 
require racial discrimination over those which believe racial intermixing is 
forbidden. It is well settled that neither a State nor the Federal Govern-
~ 
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IV 
The remaining issue is whether the IRS properly applied 
its policy to these petitioners. Petitioner Goldsboro Chris-
tian Schools admits that it "maintain[s] racially discrimina-
tory policies," Brief of Petitioner, Goldsboro Christian 
Schools, No. 81-1, at 10, but seeks to justify those policies on 
grounds we have fully discussed. The IRS properly denied 
tax-exempt status to Goldsboro Christian Schools. 
Petitioner Bob Jones University, however, contends that it 
is not racially discriminatory. It emphasizes that it now al-
lows all races to enroll, subject only to its restrictions on the 
conduct of all students, including its prohibitions of associa-
tion between men and women of different races, and of inter-
racial marriage. 28 Although a ban on intermarriage or inter-
ment may pass laws which "prefer one religion over another," Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947), but "[i]t is equally true" that a 
regulation does not ,iolate the Establishment Clause merely because it 
"happens to coincide or harmonize \\ith the tenets of some or all religions." 
1'v!cGowan v. Man1land, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961). See Harris v. McRae, 
448 U. S. 297, 319-320 (1980). The IRS policy at issue here is founded on 
a "neutral, secular basis," Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 452 
(1971), and does not violate the Establishment Clause. See generally I 
U. S. Comm'n on Ci,iJ Rights, DisCriminatory Religious Schools and Tax 
Exempt Status 10-17 (1982). In addition, as the Court of Appeals noted, 
"the uniform applic,ation of the rule to all religiously operated schools 
avoids the necessity for a potentially entangling inquiry into whether a ra-
cially restrictive practice is the remit of sincere religious belief." United 
States v. Bob Jones Univ., 639 F. 2d 147, 155 (CA4 1980) (emphasis in orig-
inal). Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979). 
But see generally Note; 90 Yale L. J. 350 (1980). 
'" This argument would in any event apply only to the final eight months 
of the five tax years at issue in this case. Prior to May 1975, Bob Jones 
University's admissions policy was racially discriminatory on its face, since 
the University excluded unmarried Negro students while admitting un-
married Caucasians. 
• 
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racial dating applies to all races, decisions of this Court firmly 
establish that discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation 
and association is a form of racial discrimination, see, e. g., 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recrea-
tion Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431 (1973). We therefore find that the 
IRS properly applied Revenue Ruling 71-447 to Bob Jones 
University. 29 
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, accordingly, 
Affirmed. 
29 Bob Jones University also argues that the IRS policy should not apply 
to it because it is entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) as a "religious" 
organization, rather than as an "educational" institution. The record in 
this case leaves no doubt, however, that Bob Jones University is both an 
educational institution and a religious institution. As discussed previ-
ously, the IRS policy properly extends to all private schools, including reli-
gious schools. See note 26 supra. The IRS policy thus was properly ap-
plied to Bob Jones University. 
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BOB JONES UNIVERSITY, PETITIONER 
81-3 V. 
UNITED STATES 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[April - , 1983) 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
The Court points out that there is a strong national policy 
in this country against racial discrimination. To the extent 
that the Court states that Congress in furtherance of this pol-
icy could deny tax-exempt status to educational institutions 
that promote racial discrimination, I readily agree. But, un-
like the Court, I am convinced that Congress simply has 
failed to take this action and, as this Court has said over and 
over again, regardless of our view on the propriety of Con-
gress' failure to legislate we are not constitutionally empow-
ered to act for them. 
In approaching this statutory construction question the 
Court quite adeptly avoids the statute it is construing. This 
I am sure is no accident, for there is nothing in the language 
of§ 501(c)(3) that supports the result obtained by the Court. 
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"Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foun-
dation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, 
or educational purposes, or to foster national or interna-
tional amateur sports competition (but only if no part of 
its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or 
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to 
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no 
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legis-
lation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), 
and which does not participate in, or intervene in (includ-
ing the publishing or distributing of statements), any po-
litical campaign on behalf of any candidate for public of-
fice." 26 U. S. C. §501(c)(3). 
With undeniable clarity, Congress has explicitly defined the 
requirements for § 501(c)(3) status. An entity must be (1) a 
corporation, or community chest, fund, or foundation, (2) or-
ganized for one of the eight enumerated purposes, (3) oper-
ated on a nonprofit basis, and (4) free from involvement in 
lobbying activities and political campaigns. Nowhere is 
there to be found some additional, undefined public policy 
requirement. 
The Court first seeks refuge from the obvious reading of 
§ 501(c)(3) by turning to § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code 
which provides a tax deduction for contributions made to 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations. In setting forth the general rule, 
§ 170 states: 
"There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable 
contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of 
which is made within the taxable year. A charitable 
contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if ver-
ified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary." 
26 U. S. C. § 170(a)(l). 
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The Court seizes the words "charitable contribution" and 
with little discussion concludes that "[o]n its face, therefore, 
§ 170 discloses a clear Congressional intention to grant the 
benefit of tax exemption to organizations serving charitable 
purposes," intimating that this implies some unspecified com-
mon law charitable trust requirement. Ante, at 11-12. 
The Court would have been well advised to look to subsec-
tion (c) where, as§ 170(a)(l) indicates, Congress has defined a 
"charitable contribution": 
"For purposes of this section, the term 'charitable con-
tribution' means a contribution or gift to or for the use of 
... [a] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or 
foundation . . . organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational 
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur 
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities in-
volve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or 
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; . . . 
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit 
of any private shareholder or individual; and ... which 
is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 
501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, 
and which does not participate in, or intervene in (includ-
ing the publishing or distributing of statements), any po-
litical campaign on behalf of any candidate for public of-
fice." 26 U.S. C. §170(c). 
Plainly, § 170(c) simply tracks the requirements set forth in 
§ 501(c)(3). Since § 170 is no more than a mirror of§ 501(c)(3) 
and, as the Court points out, § 170 followed § 50l(c)(3) by 
more than two decades, ante, at 11, n. 10, it is at best of little 
usefulness in finding the meaning of§ 501(c)(3). 
Making a more fruitful inquiry, the Court next turns to the I 
legislative history of § 501(c)(3) and finds that Congress in-
tended in that statute to offer a tax benefit to organizations 
that Congress believed were providing a public benefit. I 
~ 
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certainly agree. But then the Court leaps to the conclusion I 
that this history is proof Congress intended that an organiza-
tion seeking § 501(c)(3) status "must fall within a category 
• specified in that section and must demonstrably serve and be 
in harmony with the public interest." Ante, at 16 (emphasis 
added). To the contrary, I think that the legislative history 
of§ 501(c)(3) unmistakably makes clear that Congress has de-
cided what organizations are serving a public purpose and 
providing a public benefit within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) 
and has clearly set forth in § 501(c)(3) the characteristics of 
such organizations. In fact, there are few examples which 
better illustrate Congress' effort to define and redefine the 
requirements of a legislative act. 
The first general income tax law was passed by Congress 
in the form of the Tariff Act of 1894. A provision of that Act 
provided an exemption for "corporations, companies, or asso-
ciations organized and conducted solely for charitable, reli-
gious, or educational purposes." Ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 
556 (1894). The income tax portion of the 1894 Act was held 
unconstitutional by this Court, see Pollock v. Farmers' Loan 
& Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895), but a similar exemption 
appeared in the Tariff Act of 1909 which imposed a tax on 
corporate income. The 1909 Act provided an exemption for 
"any corporation or association organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, no 
part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any 
private stockholder or individual." Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 
113 (1909). 
With the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Con-
gress again turned its attention to an individual income tax 
with the Tariff Act of 1913. And again, in the direct prede-
cessor of§ 501(c)(3), a tax exemption was provided for "any 
corporation or association organized and operated exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, 
no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any 
private stockholder or individual." Ch. 16, § Il(G)(a) , 38 
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Stat. 114, 172 (1913). In subsequent acts Congress contin-
ued to broaden the list of exempt purposes. The Revenue 
Act of 1918 added an exemption for corporations or associa-
tions organized "for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals." Ch. 18, § 231(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1076 (1918). The 
Revenue Act of 1921 expanded the groups to which the ex-
emption applied to include "any community chest, fund, or 
foundation" and added "literary" endeavors to the list of ex-
empt purposes. Ch. 136, § 231(6), 42 Stat. 227, 253 (1921). 
The exemption remained unchanged in the Revenue Acts of 
1924, 1926, 1928, and 1932. 1 In the Revenue Act of 1934 
Congress added the requirement that no substantial part of 
the activities of any exempt organization can involve the car-
rying on of "propaganda" or "attempting to influence legisla-
tion." Ch. 277, § 101(6), 48 Stat. 680, 700 (1934). Again, 
the exemption was left unchanged by the Revenue Acts of 
1936 and 1938.2 
The tax laws were overhauled by the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939, but this exemption was left unchanged. Ch. 1, 
§ 101(6), 53 Stat. 1, 33 (1939). When the 1939 Code was re-
placed with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the exemp-
tion was adopted in full in the present § 501(c)(3) with the ad-
dition of "testing for public safety" as an exempt purpose and 
an additional restriction that tax-exempt organizations could 
not "participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing 
or distributing of statements), any political campaign on be-
half of any candidate for public office." Ch. 1, § 501(c)(3), 
68A Stat. 1, 163 (1954). Then in 1976 the statute was again 
amended adding to the purposes for which an exemption 
1 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 231(6), 43 Stat. 253, 282; Revenue 
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 231(6), 44 Stat. 9, 40; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, 
§ 103(6), 45 Stat. 791, 813; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 103(6), 47 Stat. 
169, 193. 
2 See Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 101(6), 49 Stat. 1648, 1674; Reve-
nue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 101(6), 52 Stat. 447, 481. 
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would be authorized, "to foster national or international ama-
teur sports competition," provided the activities did not in-
volve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment. Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94--455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 
1520, 1730 (1976). 
One way to read the opinion handed down by the Court to-
day leads to the conclusion that this long and arduous refining 
process of§ 501(c)(3) was certainly a waste of time, for when 
enacting the orginal 1894 statute Congress intended to adopt 
a common law term of art, and intended that this term of art 
carry with it all of the common law baggage which defines it. 
Such a view, however, leads also to the unsupportable idea 
that Congress has spent almost a century adding illustrations 
simply to clarify an already defined common law term. 
Another way to read the Court's opinion leads to the con-
clusion that even though Congress has set forth some of the 
requirements of a § 501(c)(3) organization, it intended that 
the IRS additionally require that organizations meet a higher 
standard of public interest, not stated by Congress, but to be 
determined and defined by the IRS and the courts. This 
view I find equally unsupportable. Almost a century of stat-
utory history proves that Congress itself intended to decide 
what § 501(c)(3) requires. Congress has expressed its deci-
sion in the plainest of terms in § 501(c)(3) by providing that 
tax-exempt status is to be given to any corporation, or com-
munity chest, fund, or foundation that is organized for one of 
the eight enumerated purposes, operated on a nonprofit 
basis, and uninvolved in lobbying activities or political cam-
paigns. The IRS certainly is empowered to adopt regula-
tions for the enforcement of these specified requirements, 
and the courts have authority to resolve challenges to the 
IRS's exercise of this power, but Congress has left it to nei-
ther the IRS nor the courts to select or add to the require-
ments of § 501(c)(3). 
Prior to 1970, when the charted course was abruptly 
changed, the IRS had continuously interpreted § 501(c)(3) 
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and its predecessors in accordance with the view I have ex-
pressed above. This, of course, is of considerable signifi-
cance in determining the intended meaning of the statute. 
NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67, 75 (1973); Power Reactor 
Development Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408 (1961). 
In 1970 the IRS was sued by parents of black public school 
children seeking to enjoin the IRS from according tax-ex-
empt status under§ 501(c)(3) to private schools in Mississippi 
that discriminated against blacks. The IRS answered, con-
sistent with its long standing position, by maintaining a lack 
of authority to deny the tax-exemption if the schools met the 
specified requirements of§ 501(c)(3). Then "[i]n the midst of 
this litigation", Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 
(D.D.C.), affd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 
997 (1971), and in the face of a preliminary injunction, the 
IRS changed its position and adopted the view of the 
plaintiffs. 
Following the close of the litigation, the IRS published its 
new position in Revenue Ruling 71-447, stating that "a school 
asserting a right to the benefits provided for in section 
501(c)(3) of the Code as being organized and operated exclu-
sively for educational purposes must be a common law char-
ity in order to be exempt under that section." Rev. Rul. 
71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230. The IRS then concluded 
that a school that promotes racial discrimination violates pub-
lic policy and therefore cannot qualify as a common law char-
ity. The circumstances under which this change in interpre-
tation was made suggest that it is entitled to very little 
deference. But even if the circumstances were different, the 
latter-day wisdom of the IRS has no basis in § 501(c)(3). 
Perhaps recognizing the lack of support in the statute it-
self, or in its history, for the 1970 IRS change in interpreta-
tion, the Court finds that "[t]he actions of Congress since 
1970 leave no doubt that the IRS reached the correct conclu-
sion in exercising its authority," concluding that there is "an 
unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in and rati-
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fl.cation by implication of the 1970 and 1971 rulings." Ante, 
at 22-23. The Court relies first on several bills introduced to 
overturn the IRS interpretation of § 501(c)(3). Ante, at 
23-24 and n. 22. But we have said before, and it is equally 
applicable here, that this type of congressional inaction is of 
virtually no weight in determining legislative intent. See 
United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962); Waterman 
Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U. S. 252, 269 (1965). 
These bills and related hearings indicate little more than that 
a vigorous debate has existed in Congress concerning the 
new IRS position. 
The Court next asserts that "Congress affirmatively mani-
fested its acquiescence in the IRS policy when it enacted the 
present§ 501(i) of the Code," a provision that "denies tax ex-
empt status to social clubs whose charters or policy state-
ments provide for" racial discrimination. Ante, at 24. 
Quite to the contrary, it seems to me that in§ 501(i) Congress 
showed that when it wants to add a requirement prohibiting 
racial discrimination to one of the tax-benefit provisions, it is 
fully aware of how to do it. Cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 
383 U. S. 687, 693 n. 10 (1966). 
The Court intimates that the Ashbrook and Dornan 
Amendments also reflect an intent by Congress to acquiesce 
in the new IRS position. Ante, at 25 n. 24. The amend-
ments were passed to limit certain enforcement procedures 
proposed by the IRS in 1978 and 1979 for determining 
whether a school operated in a racially nondiscriminatory 
fashion. The Court points out that in proposing his amend-
ment, Congressman Ashbrook stated: " 'My amendment very 
clearly indicates on its face that all the regulations in exist-
ence as of August 22, 1978, would not be touched.'" Ante, at 
25 n. 24. The Court fails to note that Congressman Ash-
brook also said: 
"The IRS has no authority to create public policy .... 
So long as the Congress has not acted to set forth a na-
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tional policy respecting denial of tax exemptions to pri-
vate schools, it is improper for the IRS or any other 
branch of the Federal Government to seek denial of tax-
exempt status. . . . There exists but a single respon-
sibility which is proper for the Internal Revenue Service: 
To serve as tax collector." 125 Cong. Rec. H5879-80 
(daily ed. July 13, 1979). 
In the same debate, Congressman Grassley asserted: "No-
body argues that racial discrimination should receive pre-
ferred tax status in the United States. However, the IRS 
should not be making these decision on the agency's own dis-
cretion. Congress should make these decisions." Id., at 
5884. The same debates are filled with other similar state-
ments. While on the whole these debates do not show con-
clusively that Congress believed the IRS had exceeded its 
authority with the 1970 change in position, they likewise are 
far less than a showing of acquiescence in and ratification of 
the new position. 
This Court continuously has been hesitant to find ratifica-
tion through inaction. See United States v. Wise, supra. 
This is especially true where such a finding "would result in a 
construction of the statute which not only is at odds with the 
language of the section in question and the pattern of the 
statute taken as a whole, but also is extremely far reaching in 
terms of the virtually untrammeled and unreviewable power 
it would vest in a regulatory agency." SEC v. Sloan, 436 
U. S. 103, 121 (1978). Few cases would call for more caution 
in finding ratification by acquiscence than the present one. 
The new IRS interpretation is not only far less than a long 
standing administrative policy, it is at odds with a position 
maintained by the IRS, and unquestioned by Congress, for 
several decades prior to 1970. The interpretation is unsup-
ported by the statutory language, it is unsupported by legis-
lative history, the interpretation has lead to considerable con-
troversy in and out of Congress, and the interpretation gives 
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to the IRS a broad power which until now Congress had kept 
for itself. Where in addition to these circumstances Con-
gress has shown time and time again that it is ready to enact 
positive legislation to change the tax code when it desires, 
this Court has no business finding that Congress has adopted 
the new IRS position by failing to enact legislation to reverse 
it. 
I have no disagreement with the Court's finding that there 
is a strong national policy in this country opposed to racial 
discrimination. I agree with the Court that Congress has 
the power to further this policy by denying § 501(c)(3) status 
to organizations that practice racial discrimination. 3 But as 
of yet Congre_ss has failed to do so. Whatever the reasons 
for the failure, this Court should not legislate for 
Congress. 4 
Petitioners are each organized for the "instruction or train-
ing of the individual for the purpose of improving or develop-
ing his capabilities," 26 CFR § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3), and thus 
are organized for "educational purposes" within the meaning 
of § 501(c)(3). Petitioners nonprofit status is uncontested. 
There is no indication that either petitioner has been involved 
in lobbying activities or political campaigns. Therefore, it is 
my view that unless and until Congress affirmatively amends 
§ 501(c)(3) to require more, the IRS is without authority to 
deny petitioners § 501(c)(3) status. For this reason, I would 
reverse the Court of Appeals. 
3 I agree with the Court that such a requirement would not infringe on 
petitioners' First Amendment rights. 
• Because of its holding, the Court does not have to decide whether it 
would violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment for 
Congress to grant § 501(c)(3) status to organizations that practice racial 
discrimination. A nte, at 22 n. 21. I would decide that it does not. The 
statute is facially neutral; absent a showing of a discriminatory purpose, no 
equal protection violation is established. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 
229, 241-244 (1976). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in 
the result. 
I join the Court's judgment and part III of its 
opinion holding that the denial of tax exemptions to 
petitioners does not violate the First Amendment. I write 
separately because I am troubled by the broader 
implications of the Court's construction of §§170(c) and 
§S0l(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Federal taxes are not imposed on organizations 
"operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
2. 
educational purposes " 26 u.s.c. §50l(c} (3). The 
Code also permits a tax deduction for contributions made 
to these organizations. 26 u.s.c. §170(c}. It is clear 
that petitioners, organizations incorporated for 
educational purposes, fall within the language of the 
statute. It also is clear that this language itself does 
not mandate refusal of tax-exempt status to any private 
school that maintains a racially-discriminatory admissions 
policy. Accordingly, there is force in JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST's argument that §§170(c} and 50l(c}(3} should be 
,;::------s-M 
construed /in a straightforward manner] as settinq fo~th the 
only criteria Congress has established for qualification 
as a tax-exempt organization. See post, at 1-4 
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting}. Indeed, were we writing on a 
3. 
clean slate, this might well be the construction that I 
would adopt. 
I 
The slate is not clean, however, and I am persuaded 
that there are now sufficient reasons for construing the 
Code to proscribe tax exemptions for schools such as 
petitioners that discriminate openly on the basis of race. 
This construction of the Code, adopted by the Internal 
l,t,(., It::, 1 0 
Revenue Service (IRS) ~and upheld by the Court of Appeals 
below, is not without logical support. The statutory 
terms are not self-defining, and it is plausible that in 
some instances an organization seeking a tax exemption 
might act in a manner so clearly contrary to law that it 
could not be deemed to serve the enumerated statutory 
purposes. 1 And, as the Court notes, if any national 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
4. 
policy is sufficiently fundamental to constitute such an 
overriding limitation on the availability of tax-exempt 
status under §50l(c} (3), it is the policy against racial 
discrimination in education. See ante, at 19. Finally, 
and of critical importance for me, the subsequent actions 
of Congress present "an unusually strong case of 
legislative acquiescence in and ratification by 
implication of the [IRS'] 1970 and 1971 rulings" with 
respect to racially discriminatory schools. Id., at 23. 
In particular, Congress' enactment of §50l(i} in 1976 is 
e~ strong evidence of agreement with these 
particular IRS rulings. 2 
1 I note that the Court has construed other 
prov1s1ons of the Code as containing narrowly defined 
public policy exceptions. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 
383 u.s. 687 (1966); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. 
Footnote continued on next page. 




I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that tax-
exempt status under § § 170 ( c} and 5 01 ( c} ( 3} is not 
available to racially discriminatory private schools. I 
~~ 
~ agree, however, with the Court's more general 
explanation of the justifications for the tax exemptions 
provided for charitable organizations. The Court states: 
"Charitable exemptions are justified on the 
basis that the exempt entity confers a public 
benefit--a benefit which the society or the 
community may not itself choose or be able to 
provide, or which supplements and advances the 
Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958}. ~ 
2The District Court f of he District of Columbia 
~ in Green v. Connally, 30 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.} 
·u (three-judge court}, aff'd s nom. Coit v. Green, 404 
U.S. 997 (1971} (per curiam}, that racially discriminatory 
private schools were not entitled to tax-exempt status. 
The same District Court, however, later ruled that 
racially segregated social clubs could receive tax 
exemptions under §50l(c} (7) of the Code. See McGlotten v. 
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972} (three-Judge 
court}. Faced with these two important three-judge court 
rulings, Congress expressly overturned the relevant 
portion of McGlotten by enacting §50l(i} and thus 
conforming the policy with respect to social clubs to the 
prevailing policy with respect to private schools. This 
affirmative step is a strong indication that Congress has 
more than passively acquiesced in the result of Green. 
work of public institutions already supported by 
tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make 
clear that, to warrant exemption under 
§50l(c} (3), an institution must fall within a 
category specified in that section and must 
demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the 
public interest. The institution's purpose must 
not be so at odds with the common community 
conscience as to undermine any public benefit 
that might otherwise be conferred." Id., at 15-
16. -
Applying this test to petitioners, the Court concludes 
that "[c]learly an educational institution engaging in 
practices affirmatively at odds with [the] declared 
position of the whole government cannot be seen as 
exercising a 'beneficial and stabilizing influenc[e] in 
community life' ••• and is not 'charitable,' within the 
meaning of §50l(c} (3) ." Id., at 19 (quoting Walz v. Tax - --
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970}}. 
6. 
With all respect, I am unconvinced that the critical 






~ ~ ~ 
~~~ 
7. 
individual organizati~ pr.avides .a cJ9ar. "puelie benef:i:t." 
Over 82,000 organizations filed §50l{c) (3) returns in 
1975. See Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income 
. Bulletin, Fall 1981, at 6 (1981). I find it impossible to 
believe that all or even most of those organizations could 
prove that they "demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony 
,x-.... 
with the public interest." Nor I am prepared to say that 
petitioners, because of their racially discriminatory 
policies, necessarily contribute nothing of benefit to the 
~11- ~ ~ 1<&1 ~ ~ ~. 
community./~~~~41~.<~ -~ · ·1 
,1 Cu~.u..,~'9~~~~~ 
'-L.I~ Even more troubling to me is the element of 
~-
conformity that seems to inform the Court's analysis. The 
Court asserts that an exempt organization must 
"demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public 
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common community conscience," and must not act in a manner 
"affirmatively at odds with [the] declared position of the 
whole government." Taken together, these passages suggest 
ft...t_ ~ 
that exempt organizations p re little mo re tbao arms at the 
that .car C¥-- ~nt goverRmeRtal~oved 
polici~ In my opinion, such a view of §50l(c) (3) 
a,_ 
ignores .t.!ilre central role played by tax exemptions in 
encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, 
activities and viewpoints. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, 
JUSTICE BRENNAN properly observed that private, nonprofit 
groups receive tax exemptions because "each group 
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, 
and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic 
society." 397 u.s., at 688 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
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"common community conscience," the provision of tax 
exemptions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means 
of limiting the influence of governmental orthodoxy on 
important areas of community life. 3 Given the importance 
of our tradition of pluralism, 4 "[t]he interest in 
3The 1100-page list of exempt organizations 
includes such organizations as the American Friends 
Service Committee, Inc., the Committee on the Present 
Danger, the National Right to Life Educational Foundation, 
and various branches of Planned Parenthood. See Internal 
Revenue Service, Cumulative List of Organizations 
Described in Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954, at 31, 221, 694, 795-796 (Rev'd Oct. 1981). It 
would be difficult indeed to argue that each of these 
organizations reflects the views of the "common community 
conscience" or "demons tr ably • • • [is] in harmony with the 
public interest." 
411A distinctive feature of American's tradition has 
been respect for diversity. This has been characteristic 
of the peoples from numerous lands who have built our 11..~~ .J 
country. It is the essence of our democratic system." 7~ 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, U.S. ,~ 
(1982) (POWELL, J., dissenting). Sectarian schools .J~ 
make an important contribution to this tradition, for they ~ 
"have provided an educational alternative for millions of ~ 
young Americans" and "often afford wholesome competition a..., 
with our public schools." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, ~ 
262 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). ~~"' 
~,;, 'l, ~ '.~:r~) 
l wr~ ~; p ~/ . 
:rrt µ ~,,._ r 
~ vv,~~~ti~  
10. 
preserving an area of untrammeled choice for private 
philanthropy is very great." Jackson v. Statler 
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 639 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting from denial of reconsideration en bane). 
I do not suggest that these considerations always are 
or should be dispositive. In this case, I agree with the 
Court that Congress has determined that the policy against 
racial discrimination in education should override the 
countervailing interest in permitting unorthodox private 
behavior. I emphasize, however, that the balancing of 
these substantial interests is for Congress to perform. I 
am unwilling to join any suggestion that the Internal 
Revenue Service is invested with authority to decide which 
public policies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require 
denial of tax exemptions. Nor do I believe that the 
11. 
agency is authorized to conduct detailed inquiries into an 
organization's operations to determine if it violates any 
of those policies1/,The business of the IRS is to 
administer laws designed to produce revenue for the 
Government, not to promote "public policy." As former IRS 
Commissioner Kurtz has noted, questions concerning 
religion and civil rights "are far afield from the more 
typical tasks of tax administrators -- determining taxable 
income." Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems in Tax 
Administration: Religion and Race, 23 Catholic Lawyer 
301, 301 (1978) (hereinafter Kurtz). This Court often has 
expressed concern that the scope of an agency's 
authorization be limited to those areas in which the 
agency fairly may be said to have expertise, 5 and this 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
concern applies with special force when the asserted 
administrative power is one to determine the scope of 
public policy. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN has noted, 
"where the philanthropic organization is 
concerned, there appears to be little to 
circumscribe the almost unfettered power of the 
Commissioner. This may be very well so long as 
one subscribes to the particular brand of social 
policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating 
at the time ••• , but application of our tax 
laws should not operate in so fickle a fashion. 
Surely, social policy in the first instance is a 
matter for legislative concern." Commissioner 
v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 u.s. 752, 774-
775 (1974) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
12. 
5see, e.g., Community Television of Southern 
California v. Gottfried, U.S. , (1983) ("[A]n 
agency's general duty to enforce the public interest does 
not require it to assume responsibility for enforcing 
legislation that is not directed at the agency"); Hampton 
v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114 (1976) ("It is the 
business of the Civil Service Commission to adopt and 
enforce regulations which will best promote the efficiency 
of the federal civil service. That agency has no 
responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty 
negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or 
conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies"); 
NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976) ("The use of the 
words 'public interest' in the Gas and Power Acts is not a 
directive to the [Federal Power] Commission to seek to 
eradicate discrimination, but, rather, is a charge to 
promote the orderly production of supplies of electric 
energy and natural gas at just and reasonable rates") 
13. 
The Court's decision upholds the IRS' Revenue Ruling 
71-447, and thus resolves the question whether tax-exempt 
status is available to private schools that openly 
maintain racially discriminatory admissions policies. 
There no longer is any justification for Congress to 
- U,A- L-f-~½ ~-
hesitate in articulating and codifying its desired policy 
~ 1-o 
~ 
-err tax exemptions for discriminatory organizations. 
'\ 
Many 
questions remain, such as whether more stringent standards 
of proof of nondiscrimination in private schools should be 
imposed, see ante, at 25 n. 24, or whether organizations 
that violate other public policies should receive tax-
exempt status under §50l(c} (3). These should be 
legislative policy choices. It is not appropriate to 
leave the IRS "on the cutting edge of developing national 
policy." Kurtz 308. The contours of public policy should 
14. 
be determined by Congress, not by judges or revenue 
agents. 
.... :-:"'% - · 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the 
result. 
I join the Court's judgment, along with part III of its opin- > 
· n holding that the denial of tax exemptions to petitioners 
( .._ ,. ~~e not violate the First Amendment. I write separately 
~, _... ecau I am troubled by the broader implications of the 
yJ,,., Court's onstruction of§§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
~ ~ Revenue Code. 
Federal taxes are not impo:ed on organizations "operated 
_.if_ /,1,,A,. exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
f.T r_ . _ ~~ public safety, literary, or educational purposes .... " 26 
p--~ U. S. C. § 501(c)(3). The Code also permits a tax deduction 
/J.1~• for contributions made to these organizations. 26 U. S. C. 
I~ -~ > § 170(c). It is clear that petitioners, organizations incorpo-
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statute. It also is clear that the language itself does not 
mandate refusal of tax-exempt status to any private school 
that maintains a racially-discriminatory admissions policy. 
Accordingly, there is force in JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S argu-
ment that §§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) should be construed as set-
ting fo_rth the only criteria Congress has established for quali-
fication as a tax-exempt organization. See post, at 1--4 
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Indeed, were we writing on a 
clean slate, this might well be the construction I would adopt. 
But the slate is not clean, and I am persuaded that there are 
now sufficient reasons for construing the Code to proscribe 
tax exemptions for schools that discriminate ~y on the 
basis of racr. 
I cannot say that this construction of the Code, adopted by 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1970 and upheld by 
the Court of Appeals below, is without logical support. The 
statutory terms are not self-defining, and it is plausible that 
in some instances an organization seeking a tax exemption 
might act in a manner so clearly contrary toljiiW that 1£ coula 
not be deemed to serve the enumerated statutory purposes. 1 
And, as the Court notes, if any national policy is sufficiently 
fundamental to constitute such an overriding limitation on 
the availability of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), it is 
the policy against racial discrimination in education. See 
ante, at 19. Finally, and of critical importance for me, the 
subsequent actions of Congress present "an unusually strong 
case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implica-
tion of the [IRS'] 1970 and 1971 rulings" with respect to ra-
cially discriminatory schools. Ante, at 23. In particular, 
Congress' enactment of§ 501(i) in 1976 is strong evidence of 
1 I note that the Court has construed other provisions of the Code as con-
taining narrowly defined public policy exceptions. See Commissioner v. 
Tellier, 383 U. S. 687, 693-694 (1966); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Com-
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agreement with these particular IRS rulings. 2 --
II 
I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that tax-exempt 
status under§§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) is not available to,tsolalf; 
discriminatory prh•atQ seHaals. I do not agree, however, 
with the Court's more general explanation of the justifica-
tions for the tax exemptions provided for charitable organiza-
tions. The Court states: 
"Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that 
the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit 
which the society or the community may not itself choose 
or be able to provide, or which supplements and ad-
vances the work of public institutions already supported 
by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear 
that, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institu-
tion must fall within a category specified in that section 
and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with 
the public interest. The institution's purpose must not 
be so at odds with the common community conscience as 
to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be 
2 The District Court for the District of Columbia in Green v. Connally, 
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. 
Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971) (per curiam), held that racially discriminatory 
private schools were not entitled to tax-exempt status. The same District 
Court, however, later ruled that racially segregated social clubs could re-
ceive tax exemptions under § 501(c)(7) of the Code. See McGlotten v. 
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D. C. 1972) (three-judge court). Faced 
with these two important three-judge court rulings, Congress expressly 
overturned the relevant portion of McGlotten by enacting § 501(i), thus 
conforming the policy with respect to social clubs to the prevailing policy 
with respect to private schools. This affirmative step is a persuasive indi-
cation that Congress has not merely acquiesced in the result of Green. Cf. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, -- U. S. --, --
(1982) (POWELL, J., dissenting) (rejecting theory "that congressional intent 
can be inferred from silence, and that legislative inaction should achieve 
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conferred." Ante, at 15-16 (footnote omitted). 
Applying this test to petitioners, the Court concludes that 
"[c]learly an educational institution engaging in practices af-
firmatively at odds with [the] declared position of the whole 
government cannot be seen as exercising a 'beneficial and 
stabilizing influenc[e] in community life' ... and is not 'chari-
table,' within the meaning of§ 501(c)(3)." Ante, at 22 (quot-
ing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970)). 
With all respect, I am unconvinced that the critical ques-
tion in determining tax-exempt status is whether an individ-
ual organization provides a clear "public benefit" as defined 
by the Court. Over 82,000 organizations filed § 501(c)(3) re-
turns in 1975. See Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of 
Income Bulletin, Fall 1981, at 6 (1981). I find it impossible 
to believe that all or even most of those organizations could 
prove that they "demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony 
with the public interest" or that they are "beneficial and sta-
bilizing influences in community life." Nor I am prepared to 
say that petitioners, because of their racially discriminatory . 
policies, necessarily contribute nothing of benefit to the com-
munity. It is clear from the substantially secular character 
of the curricula and degrees offered that petitioners provide 
~ e educational benefits. 
Even more troubling to me is the element of·conformity 
that appears to inform the Court's analysis. The Court as-
serts that an exempt organization must "demonstrably serve 
and be in harmony with the public interest," must have a pur-
pose that comports with "the common community con-
science," and must not act in a manner "affirmatively at odds 
with [the] declared position of the whole government." 
Taken together, these passages suggest that the only orga-
nizations entitled to exempt status are those whose purposes 
are consistent with some established consensus as to what 
constitutes the public interest as defined by the Government. 
In my opinion, such a view of § 501(c)(3) ignores the impor-
tant role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, 
~ ' 
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indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints. 
In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, JUSTICE BRENNAN ob-
served-properly I believe-that private, nonprofit groups 
receive tax exemptions because "each group contributes to 
the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essen-
tial to a vigorous, pluralistic society." 397 U. S., at 689 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring). Far from representing an effort 
to reinforce any perceived "common community conscience," 
the provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is one in-
dispensable means of limiting the influence of governmental 
orthodoxy on important areas of community life. 3 Given the 
importance of our tradition of pluralism,4 "[t]he interest in 
preserving an area of untrammeled choice for private philan-
thropy is very great." Jackson v. Statler Foundation , 496 
F. 2d 623, 639 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J. , dissenting from de-
nial of reconsideration en bane). - -I do not suggest that these considerations always are or ~ 
3 The 1100-page list of exempt organizations includesJuch organizations  
as American Friends Service Committee, Inc., Committee on the Present 
Danger, Jehovahs Witnesses in the United States, Moral Majority Founda-
tion, Inc. , Mountain States Legal Foundation, National Right to Life Edu-
cational Foundation, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Union of 
Concerned Scientists Fund, Inc., and Wilderness Society. See Internal 
Revenue Service, Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 
170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, at 31, 221, 518, 670, 677, 694, 
795, 1001, 1073 (Rev'd Oct. 1981). It would be difficult indeed to argue 
that each of these organizations reflects the views of the "common commu-
nity conscience" or "demonstrably . . . [is] in harmony with the public 
interest." A 
• "A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for di-
versity. This has been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands 
who have built our country. It is the essence of our democratic system." 
Mississiw i University for Women v. Hogan, -- U. S. --, -- (1982) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). Sectarian schools make an important contribu-
tion to this tradition, for they "have provided an educational alternative for 
millions of young Americans" and "often afford wholesome competition 
with our public schools." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) 
(POWELL, J. , concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
~.,. ... 4'.r, --
~4 
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should be dispositive. Congress of course may find that 
some organizations do not warrant tax-exempt status, and in 
this case I agree with the Court that Congress has deter-
mined that the policy against racial discrimination in educa-
tion should override the countervailing interest in permitting 
unorthodox private behavior. 
I would emphasize, however, that the balancing of these 
substantial interests is for Congress to perform. I am un-
willing to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue 
Service is invested with authority to decide which public poli-
cies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require denial of tax ex-
emptions. Nor do I believe that the agency is authorized to 
conduct detailed inquiries into an organization's operations to 
determine if it violates any of those policies. 
The business of the IRS is to administer laws designed to 
produce revenue for the Government, not to promote "public 
policy." As former IRS Commissioner Kurtz has noted, 
questions concerning religion and civil rights "are far afield 
from the more typical tasks of tax administrators-determin-
ing taxable income." Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems 
in Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 Catholic Law-
yer 301, 301 (1978) (hereinafter Kurtz). This Court often 
has expressed concern that the scope of an agency's authori-
zation be limited to those areas in which the agency fairly 
may be said to have expertise, 5 and this concern applies with 
5 See, e. g. , Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 
-- U. S. --, --, n. 17 (1983) ("[A]n agency's general duty to enforce 
the public interest does not require it to assume responsibility for enforcing 
legislation that is not directed at the agency''); Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 114 (1976) ("It is the business of the Civil Service 
Commission to adopt and enforce regulations which will best promote the 
efficiency of the federal civil service. That agency has no responsibility 
for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration 
quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies"); NAACP v. 
FPC, 425 U. S. 662, 670 (1976) ("The use of the words 'public interest' in 
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special force when the asserted administrative power is one 
to determine the scope of public policy. As JUSTICE BLACK-
MUN has noted, 
"where the philanthropic organization is concerned, 
there appears to be little to circumscribe the almost un-
fettered power of the Commissioner. This may be very 
well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of 
social policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating 
at the time ... , but application of our tax laws should 
not operate in so fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in 
the first instance is a matter for legislative concern." 
Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U. S. 
752, 774-775 (1974) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
III 
The Court's decision upholds IRS Revenue Ruling 71-447, 
and thus resolves the question whether tax-exempt status is 
available to private schools that openly maintain racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies. There no longer is any jus-
tification for Congress to hesitate-as it apparently has-in 
articulating and codifying its desired policy as to tax exemp-
~ or discriminatory organizations. Many questions re-
s wb0th0:i: mo;re strm~0:Rt sia:Pdaras of preof of -,--
' _ a~,~-B,~ whether organizations that violate other...,--
p~ policies should receive tax-exempt status under 
§ 501(c)(3). These should be legislative policy choices. It is 
not appropriate to leave the IRS "on the cutting edge of 
developing national policy." Kurtz 308. The contours of 
public policy should be determined by Congress, not by 
judges or revenue agents. 
sion to seek to eradicate discrimination, but, rather, is a charge to promote 
the orderly production of supplies of electric energy and natural gas at just 
and reasonable rates"). 
lfp/ss 04/30/83 
GOLDSl SALLY-POW .... 
Rider A, p. 5 (Goldsboro) 
In identifying these organization, largely taken at random 
t; .... ~~ 
from the hand-r'c'-1 on the list, of course):. I do not imply 
disapproval of their being exempt organizations. Rather, 
they illustrate the commendable tolerance by our 
government of even the views, 
and a recognition that 
entitled to share the privilege of tax exemption. ,See n. 
4-below . 
~- t.~~~.· 
?k_l. S-fa.&:s-/-..fd ~•~c-P. 
w~s~ 
~-I ~-::::.21. t;;._.,, 
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_ _ ~ v vv ~LL, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
I join the Court's judgment, along with part III of its opin-
ion holding that the denial of tax exemptions to petitioners 
does not violate the First Amendment. I write separately 
because I am troubled by the broader implications of the 
Court's opinion with respect to the authority of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) and its construction j1 §§ 17u~ -a---
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
I 
Federal taxes are not imposed on organizations "operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes .... " 26 
U. S. C. § 501(c)(3). The Code also permits a tax deduction 
for contributions made to these organizations. § 170(c). It 
is clear that petitioners, organizations incorporated for edu-
~l'17D ? 
~ 
. , *0·;,.,.J-'"µ 
J~~u-'f~ 
ll~•~k,_''• 91  
~~~~~ 
~9-~.£-<:i . 
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cational purposes, fall within the language of the statute. 
also is clear that the language itself does not mandate refusal 
of tax-exempt status to any private school that maintains a 
racially discriminatory admissions policy. Accordingly, 
ere is force in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's argument that 
§§ 1 c) and 501(c)(3) should be construed as setting forth 
the only iteria Congress has established for qualification as 
a tax-exem organization. See post, at 1-4 (REHNQUIST, 
J,~ s~e,n.ting). Indeed, were we writing 0ft a: dean 1'1Rk, 
1 tn1s".nttgttt well b the construction I would adopt. But 'the 
s · , I am persuaded that there are now suf-
cient reasons for · the Code ~ :r:,J1,M.til,e tax ex-
emptions for schools that discriminate on the 'basis'QJ 
a matter of policy. ~ 
~~ I cannot say that this construction of the Code, adop d by 
the IRS in 1970 and upheld by the Court of Appeals belo , is 
without logical support. The statutory terms are not s -
b-f.- ~~!!llllllliii:i¥1 defining, and it is plausible that in some instances an orga-
nization seeking a tax exemption might act in a manner so 
~I-~ clearly contrary to the purposes of our laws that it could not 
be deemed to serve the enumerated statutory purposes. 1 
And, as the Court notes, if any national policy is sufficiently 
fundamental to constitute such an overriding limitation on 
the availability of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), it is 
.,,_-i:::,b,:t_j the policy against racial discrimination in education. See 
ante, at 19. Finally, and of critical importance for me, the 
subsequent actions of Congress present "an unusually strong 
case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implica-
tion of the [IRS'] 1970 and 1971 rulings" with respect to ra-
cially discriminatory schools. Ante, at 23. In particular, 
Congress' enactment of § 501(i) in 1976 is strong evidence of 
1 I note that the Court has construed other provisions of the Code as con-
taining narrowly defined public policy exceptions. See Commissioner v. 
Tellier, 383 U. S. 687, 693-694 (1966); Tank Truck Renf,als, Inc. v. Com-
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agreement with these particular IRS rulings. 2 
II 
I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that tax-exempt 
status under §§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) is not available to private 
schools that concededly are racially discriminatory. I do not 
agree, however, with the Court's more general explanation of 
the justifications for the tax exemptions provided to chari-
table organizations. The Court states: 
"Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that 
the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit 
which the society or the community may not itself choose 
or be able to provide, or which supplements and ad-
vances the work of public institutions already supported 
by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear 
that, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institu-
tion must fall within a category specified in that section 
and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with 
the public interest. The institution's purpose must not 
be so at odds with the common community conscience as 
to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be 
2 The District Court for the District of Columbia in Green v. Connally, 
330 F. Supp. 1150 (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 
U. S. 997 (1971) (per curiam), held that racially discriminatory private 
schools were not entitled to tax-exempt status. The same District Court, 
however, later ruled that racially segregated social clubs could receive tax 
exemptions under § 501(c)(7) of the Code. See McGlotten v. Connally, 
338 F. Supp. 448 (DDC 1972) (three-judge court). Faced with these two 
important three-judge court rulings, Congress expressly overturned the 
relevant portion of McGlotten by enacting§ 501(i), thus conforming the pol-
icy with respect to social clubs to the prevailing policy with respect to pri-
vate schools. This affirmative step is a persuasive indication that Con-
gress has not just silently acquiesced in the result of Green. Cf. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, -- U.S.--, -- (1982) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting) (rejecting theory "that congressional intent can 
be inferred from silence, and that legislative inaction should achieve the 
force of law"). 
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conferred." Ante, at 1~16 (footnote omitted). 
Applying this test to petitioners, the Court concludes that 
"[c]learly an educational institution engaging in practices af-
firmatively at odds with [the] declared position of the whole 
government cannot be seen as exercising a 'beneficial and 
stabilizing influenc[e] in community life,' ... and is not 'char-
itable,' within the meaning of§ 501(c)(3)." Ante, at 22 (quot-
ing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970)). 
With all respect, I am unconvinced that the critical ques-
tion in determining tax-exempt status is whether an individ-
ual organization provides a clear "public benefit" as defined 
by the Court. Over 82,000 organizations filed § 501(c)(3) re-
turns in 1975. See Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of 
Income Bulletin, Fall 1981, at 6. I find it impossible to be-
lieve that all or even most of those organizations could prove 
that they "demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony with the 
public interest" or that they are "beneficial and stabilizing in-
fluences in community life." I\ Nor I am prepared to say that 
petitioners, because of their racially discriminatory policies, 
necessarily contribute nothing of benefit to the community. 
It is clear from the substantially secular character of the cur-
ricula and degrees offered that petitioners provide educa-
tional benefits. 
Even more troubling to me is the element of conformity 
that appears to inform the Court's analysis. The Court as-
serts that an exempt organization must "demonstrably serve 
and be in harmony with the public interest," must have a pur-
pose that comports with "the common community con-
science," and must not act in a manner "affirmatively at odds 
with [the] declared position of the whole government." 
Taken together, these passages suggest that the primary 
function of a tax-exempt organization is to act on behalf of the 
Government in carrying out governmentally approved poli-
cies. In my opinion, such a view of § 501(c)(3) ignores the 
important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging di-
~ 
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verse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and view-
points. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, private, non-
profit groups receive tax exemptions because "each group 
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and en-
terprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society." Walz, 
supra, at 689 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Far from repre-
senting an effort to reinforce any perceived "common commu-
nity conscience," the provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit 
groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of 
governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community 
life. 3 Given the importance of our tradition of pluralism, 4 
' Certainly § 501(c)(3) has not been applied in the manner suggested by 
the Court's analysis. The 1100-page list of exempt organizations in-
cludes-among countless examples-such organizations as American 
Friends Service Committee, Inc., Committee on the Present Danger, Je-
hovahs Witnesses in the United States, Moral Majority Foundation, Inc., 
Friends of the Earth Foundation, Inc., Mountain States Legal Foundation, 
National Right to Life Educational Foundation, Planned Parenthood Fed-
eration of America, Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy, Inc., and 
Union of Concerned Scientists Fund, Inc. See Internal Revenue Service, 
Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954, at 31, 221, 376, 518, 670, 677, 694, 795, 880, 
1001, 1073 (Rev'd Oct. 1981). It would be difficult indeed to argue that 
each of these organizations reflects the views of the "common community 
conscience" or "demonstrably ... [is] in harmony with the public interest." 
In identifying these organizations, largely taken at random from the tens of 
thousands on the list, I of course do not imply disapproval of their being 
exempt from taxation. Rather, they illustrate the commendable tolerance 
by our Government of even the most strongly held divergent views, ~ 
9':0~ti.rul that such disparate groups are entitled to share the privirege of I 
ax exemption. 
4 "A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for diver-
sity. This has been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands who 
have built our country. It is the essence of our democratic system." Mis-
sissippi University for Women v. Hogan, -- U. S. --, -- (1982) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). Sectarian schools make an important contribu-
tion to this tradition, for they "have provided an educational alternative for 
millions of young Americans" and "often afford wholesome competition 
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"[t]he interest in preserving an area of untrammeled choice 
for private philanthropy is very great." Jackson v. Statler 
Foundation, 496 F. 2d 623, 639 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J., dis-
senting from denial of reconsideration en bane). 
I do not suggest that these considerations always are or 
should be dispositive. Congress, of course, may find that 
some organizations do not warrant tax-exempt status. In 
this case I agree with the Court that Congress has deter-
mined that the policy against racial discrimination in educa-
tion should override the countervailing interest in permitting 
unorthodox private behavior. 
I would emphasize, however, that the balancing of these 
substantial interests is for Congress to perform. I am un-
willing to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue 
Service is invested with authority to decide which public poli-
cies are sufficient! "fundamental" to require denial of tax ex-
emptions. or do I beheve that t e agency 1s authorized to 
~I ,J~~~,:1c~~:~;i;;~}~~~~:i:~!~:~ ~~o~~~}~~tion's operations to 
<1J 9 f~ ~ ~ business of the ~ is to administer laws designed to 
/}lt,c, l i • produce revenue for the Government, not to promote "public 
policy." As former IRS Commissioner Kurtz has noted, 
questions concerning religion and civil rights "are far afield 
from the more typical tasks of tax administrators-determin-
ing taxable income." Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems 
in Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 Catholic Law-
yer 301, 301 (1978). This Court often has expressed concern 
that the scope of an agency's authorization be limited to those 
areas in which the agency fairly may be said to have exper-
tise, 5 and this concern applies with special force when the as-
serted administrative power is one to determine the scope of 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
5 See, e. g. , Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 
-- U. S. --, --, n. 17 (1983) ("[A]n agency's general duty to enforce 
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public policy. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN has noted, 
"where the philanthropic organization is concerned, 
there appears to be little to circumscribe the almost un-
fettered power of the Commissioner. This may be very 
well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of 
social policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating 
at the time . . . , but application of our tax laws should 
not operate in so fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in 
the first instance is a matter for legislative concern." 
Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U. S. 
752, 774-775 (1974) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
III 
The Court's decision upholds IRS Revenue Ruling 71~7, 
and thus resolves the question whether tax-exempt status is 
available to private schools that openly maintain racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies. There no longer is any jus-
tification for Congress to hesitate-as it apparently has-in 
articulating and codifying its desired policy as to tax exemp-
tions for discriminatory organizations. Many questions re-
main, such as whether organizations that violate other poli-
~tal eoseorn to m,,1r eoantl!j" should receive tax-exempt 
status under § 501(c)(3). These should be legislative policy 
choices. It is not appropriate to leave the IRS "on the cut-
ting edge of developing national policy." Kurtz, supra, at 
legislation that is not directed at the agency''); Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 114 (1976) ("It is the business of the Civil Service 
Commission to adopt and enforce regulations which will best promote the 
efficiency of the federal civil service. That agency has no responsibility 
for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration 
quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies"); NAACP v. 
FPC, 425 U. S. 662, 670 (1976) ("The use of the words 'public interest' in 
the Gas and Power Acts is not a directive to the [Federal Power] Commis-
sion to seek to eradicate discrimination, but, rather, is a charge to promote 
the orderly production of supplies of electric energy and natural gas at just 
and reasonable rates"). 
i_~ 
\ 
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308. The contours of public policy should be determined by 
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ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and .concurring in the 
judgment. 
I join the Court's judgment, along with part III of its opin-
ion holding that the denial of tax exemptions to petitioners 
does not violate the First Amendment. I write separately 
because I am troubled by the broader implications of the 
Court's opinion with respect to the authority of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) and its construction of §§ 170(c) and 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
I 
Federal taxes are not imposed on organizations "operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes .... " 26 
U. S. C. § 501(c)(3). The Code also permits a tax deduction 
for contributions made to these organizations. § 170(c). It 
is clear that petitioners, organizations incorporated for edu-
.. ' 
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cational purposes, fall within the language of the statute. It 
also is clear that the language itself does not mandate refusal 
of tax-exempt status to any private school that maintains a 
racially discriminatory admissions policy. Accordingly, 
there is force in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's argument that 
§§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) should be construed as setting forth 
the only criteria Congress has established for qualification as 
a tax-exempt organization. See post, at 1-4 (REHNQUIST, 
J., dissenting). Indeed, were we writing prior to the history 
detailed in the Court's opinion, this could well be the con-
struction I would adopt. But there has been a decade of ac-
ceptance that is persuasive in the circumstances of this case, 
and I conclude that there are now sufficient reasons for ac-
cepting the IRS's construction of the Code as proscribing tax 
exemptions for schools that discriminate on the basis of race 
as a matter of policy. 
I cannot say that this construction of the Code, adopted by 
the IRS in 1970 and upheld by the Court of Appeals below, is 
without logical support. The statutory terms are not self-
defining, and it is plausible that in some instances an orga-
nization seeking a tax exemption might act in a manner so 
clearly contrary to the purposes of our laws that it could not 
be deemed to serve the enumerated statutory purposes. 1 
And, as the Court notes, if any national policy is sufficiently 
fundamental to constitute such an overriding limitation on 
the availability of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), it is 
the policy against racial discrimination in education. See 
ante, at 19. Finally, and of critical importance for me, the 
subsequent actions of Congress present "an unusually strong 
case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implica-
tion of the [IRS'] 1970 and 1971 rulings" with respect to ra-
cially discriminatory schools. Ante, at 23. In particular, 
1 I note that the Court has construed other provisions of the Code as con-
taining narrowly defined public policy exceptions. See Commissioner v. 
Tellier, 383 U. S. 687, 69~94 (1966); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 356 U. S. 30, 35 (1958). 
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Congress' enactment of§ 501(i) in 1976 is strong evidence of 
agreement with these particular IRS rulings. 2 
II 
I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that tax-exempt 
status under §§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) is not available to private 
schools that concededly are racially discriminatory. I do not 
agree, however, with the Court's more general explanation of 
the justifications for the tax exemptions provided to chari-
table organizations. The Court states: 
"Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that 
the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit 
which the society or the community may not itself choose 
or be able to provide, or which supplements and ad-
vances the work of public institutions already supported 
by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear 
that, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institu-
tion must fall within a category specified in that section 
and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with 
the public interest. The institution's purpose must not 
be so at odds with the common community conscience as 
to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be 
2 The District Court for the District of Columbia in Green v. Connally, 
330 F. Supp. 1150 (three-judge court), affd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 
U. S. 997 (1971) (per curiam), held that racially discriminatory private 
schools were not entitled to tax-exempt status. The same District Court, 
however, later ruled that racially segregated social clubs could receive tax 
exemptions under § 501(c)(7) of the Code. See McGlotten v. Connally, 
338 F. Supp. 448 (D. D. C. 1972) (three-judge court). Faced with these 
two important three-judge court rulings, Congress expressly overturned 
the relevant portion of McGlotten by enacting§ 501(i), thus conforming the 
policy with respect to social clubs to the prevailing policy with respect to 
private schools. This affirmative step is a persuasive indication that Con-
gress has not just silently acquiesced in the result of Green. Cf. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, -- U.S.-- , -- (1982) 
(POWELL, J. , dissenting) (rejecting theory "that congressional intent can 
be inferred from silence, and that legislative inaction should achieve the 
force of law"). 
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conferred." Ante, at 1~16 (footnote omitted). 
Applying this test to petitioners, the Court concludes that 
"[c]learly an educational institution engaging in practices af-
firmatively at odds with [the] declared position of the whole 
government cannot be seen as exercising a 'beneficial and 
stabilizing influenc[e] in community life,' ... and is not 'char-
itable,' within the meaning of§ 501(c)(3)." ·Ante, at 22 (quot-
ing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970)). 
With all respect, I am unconvinced that the critical ques-
tion in determining tax-exempt status is whether an individ-
ual organization provides a clear "public benefit" as defined 
by the Court. Over 82,000 organizations filed § 501(c)(3) re-
turns in 1975. See Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of 
Income Bulletin, Fall 1981, at 6. I find it impossible to be-
lieve that all or even most of those organizations could prove 
that they "demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony with the 
public interest" or that they are "beneficial and stabilizing in-
fluences in community life." Nor I am prepared to say that 
petitioners, because of their racially discriminatory policies, 
necessarily contribute nothing of benefit to the community. 
It is clear from the substantially secular character of the cur-
ricula and degrees offered that petitioners provide educa-
tional benefits. 
Even more troubling to me is the element of conformity 
that appears to inform the Court's analysis. The Court as-
serts that an exempt organization must "demonstrably serve 
and be in harmony with the public interest," must have a pur-
pose that comports with "the common community con-
science," and must not act in a manner "affirmatively at odds 
with [the] declared position of the whole government." 
Taken together, these passages suggest that the primary 
function of a tax-exempt organization is to act on behalf of the 
Government in carrying out governmentally approved poli-
cies. In my opinion, such a view of § 501(c)(3) ignores the 
important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging di-
~. 
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verse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and view-
points. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, private, non-
profit groups receive tax exemptions because "each group 
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and en-
terprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society." Walz, 
supra, at 689 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Far from repre-
senting an effort to reinforce any perceived "common commu-
nity conscience," the provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit 
groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of 
governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community 
life. 3 Given the importance of our tradition of pluralism, 4 
3 Certainly § 501(c)(3) has not been applied in the manner suggested by 
the Court's analysis. The 1100-page list of exempt organizations in-
cludes-among countless examples-such organizations as American 
Friends Service Committee, Inc., Committee on the Present Danger, Je-
hovahs Witnesses in the United States, Moral Majority Foundation, Inc., 
Friends of the Earth Foundation, Inc., Mountain States Legal Foundation, 
National Right to Life Educational Foundation, Planned Parenthood Fed-
eration of America, Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy, Inc., and 
Union of Concerned Scientists Fund, Inc. See Internal Revenue Service, 
Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954, at 31, 221, 376, 518, 670, 677, 694, 795, 880, 
1001, 1073 (Rev'd Oct. 1981). It would be difficult indeed to argue that 
each of these organizations reflects the views of the "common community 
conscience" or "demonstrably ... [is] in harmony with the public interest." 
In identifying these organizations, largely taken at random from the tens of 
thousands on the list, I of course do not imply disapproval of their being 
exempt from taxation. Rather, they illustrate the commendable tolerance 
by our Government of even the most strongly held divergent views, includ-
ing views that at least from time to time are "at odds" with the position of 
our Government. We have consistently recognized that such disparate 
groups are entitled to share the privilege of tax exemption. 
'"A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for diver-
sity. This has been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands who 
have built our country. It is the essence of our democratic system." Mis-
sissippi University for Women v. Hogan, -- U. S. --, -- (1982) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). Sectarian schools make an important contribu-
tion to this tradition, for they "have provided an educational alternative for 
millions of young Americans" and "often afford wholesome competition 
~-
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"[t]he interest in preserving an area of untrammeled choice 
for private philanthropy is very great." Jackson v. Statler 
Foundation, 496 F. 2d 623, 639 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J., dis-
senting from denial of reconsideration en bane). 
I do not suggest that these considerations always are or 
should be dispositive. Congress, of course, may find that 
some organizations do not warrant tax-exempt status. In 
this case I agree with the Court that Congress has deter-
mined. that the policy against racial discrimination in educa-
tion should override the countervailing interest in permitting 
unorthodox private behavior. 
I would emphasize, however, that the balancing of these 
substantial interests is for Congress to perform. I am un-
willing to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue 
Service is invested with authority to decide which public poli-
cies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require denial of tax ex-
emptions. It's business is to administer laws designed to 
produce revenue for the Government, not to promote "public 
policy." As former IRS Commissioner Kurtz has noted, 
questions concerning religion and civil rights "are far afield 
from the more typical tasks of tax administrators-determin-
ing taxable income." Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems 
in Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 Catholic Law-
yer 301, 301 (1978). This Court often has expressed concern 
that the scope of an agency's authorization be limited to those 
areas in which the agency fairly may be said to have exper-
tise, 5 and this concern applies with special force when the as-
with our public schools." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
5 See, e. g., Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 
-- U. S. --, --, n. 17 (1983) ("[A]n agency's general duty to enforce 
the public interest does not require it to assume responsibility for enforcing 
legislation that is not directed at the agency"); Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 114 (1976) ("It is the business of the Civil Service 
Commission to adopt and enforce regulations which will best promote the 
.. 
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serted administrative power is one to determine the scope of 
public policy. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN has noted, 
"where the philanthropic organization is concerned, 
there appears to be little to circumscribe the almost un-
fettered power of the Commissioner. This may be very 
well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of 
social policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating 
at the time ... , but application of our tax laws should 
not operate in so fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in 
the first instance is a matter for legislative concern." 
Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U. S. 
752, 774-775 (1974) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
III 
The Court's decision upholds IRS Revenue Ruling 71--447, 
and thus resolves the question whether tax-exempt status is 
available to private schools that openly maintain racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies. There no longer is any jus-
tification for Congress to hesitate-as it apparently has-in 
articulating and codifying its desired policy as to tax exemp-
tions for discriminatory organizations. Many questions re-
main, such as whether organizations that violate other poli-
cies should receive tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). 
These should be legislative policy choices. It is not appro-
priate to leave the IRS "on the cutting edge of developing na-
tional policy." Kurtz, supra, at 308. The contours of public 
policy should be determined by Congress, not by judges or 
the IRS. 
efficiency of the federal civil service. That agency has no responsibility 
for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration 
quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies"); NAACP v. 
FPC, 425 U. S. 662, 670 (1976) ("The use of the words 'public interest' in 
the Gas and Power Acts is not a directive to the [Federal Power] Commis-
sion to seek to eradicate discrimination, but, rather, is a charge to promote 
the orderly production of supplies of electric energy and natural gas at just 
and reasonable rates"). 
. . .. ., 
~-
To: Justice Brennan 
Justice White 









From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: 
Recirculated: IIAY 1 6 1983 
4th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 81-3 AND 81-1 








ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1983] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners, non-
profit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially dis-
criminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious 
doctrine, qualify as tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c) 




Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-
exempt status to private schools, without regard to their 
racial admissions policies, under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3), 1 and granted chari-
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table deductions for contributions to such schools under § 170 
of the Code, 26 U.S. C. § 170. 2 
On January 12, 1970, a three-judge District Court for the 
District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing the IRS from according tax-exempt status to private 
schools in Mississippi that discriminated as to admissions on 
the basis of race. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F . Supp. 1127 (D. 
D. C.), app. dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U. S. 
956 (1970). Thereafter, in July 1970, the IRS concluded that 
it could "no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status 
[under§ 501(c)(3)] to private schools which practice racial dis-
crimination." IRS News Release (7/10/70), reprinted in 
App. in No. 81-3, p. A235. At the same time, the IRS an-
nounced that it could not "treat gifts to such schools as chari-
-table deductions for income tax purposes [ under § 170]." 
Ibid. By letter dated November 30, 1970, the IRS formally 
notified private schools, including those involved in this case, 
of this change in policy, "applicable to all private schools in 
the United States at all levels of education." See id., at 
A232. 
§ 501(a), are exempt from taxation unless denied tax exemptions under 
other specified sections of the Code: 
"Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or in-
ternational amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the preven-
tion of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or inditjdual, no substan-
tial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation ... , and which does not participate in, 
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any 
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." (Emphasis 
added). . • 
• Section l 70(a) allows deductions for certain "charitable contributions." 
Section l 70(c)(2)(B) includes within the definition of "charitable contribu-
tion" a contribution or gift to or for the use of a corporation "organized and 
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On June 30, 1971, the three-judge District Court issued its 
opinion on the merits of the Mississippi challenge. Green v. 
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D. D. C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit 
v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971) (per curiam). That court 
approved the IRS' amended construction of the Tax Code. 
The court also held that racially discriminatory private 
schools were not entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) and 
that donors were not entitled to deductions for contributions 
to such schools under § 170. The court permanently enjoined 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from approving tax-
exempt status for any school in Mississippi that did not pub-
licly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination. 
The revised policy on discrimination was formalized in 
Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230: 
"Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have 
long recognized that the statutory requirement of being 
'organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, ... or educational purposes' was intended to ex-
press the basic common law concept [of 'charity'] .... 
All charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, are sub-
ject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may 
not be illegal or contrary to public policy." Id.; at 230. 
Based on the "national policy to discourage racial discrimina-
tion in education," the IRS ruled that "a private school not 
having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is 
not 'charitable' within the common law concepts reflected in 
sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code." Id., at 231. 3 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes .... " 
3 Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230, defined "racially non-
discriminatory policy as to students" as meaning that: ~ 
"[T]he school admits the students of any race to all the 'rights, privileges, 
programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students 
at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race 
in administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship 
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The application of the IRS construction of these provisions 
to petitioners, two private schools with racially discrimina-
tory admissions policies, is now before us. 
B 
No. 81-3, Bob Jones University v. United States 
Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation located in 
Greenville, South Carolina. 4 Its purpose is "to conduct an 
institution of learning ... , giving special emphasis to the 
Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scrip-
tures." Certificate of Incorporation, Bob Jones University, 
Inc., of Greenville, S. C., reprinted in App. in No. 81-3, pp. 
A118-A119. The corporation operates a school with an en-
rollment of approximately 5,000 students, from kindergarten 
through college and graduate school. Bob Jones University 
is not affiliated with any religious denomination, but is dedi-
cated to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist 
Christian religious beliefs. It is both a religious and educa-
tional institution. Its teachers are required to be devout 
Christians, and all courses at the University are taught ac-
cording to the Bible. Entering students are screened as to 
their religious beliefs, and their public and private conduct is 
strictly regulated by standards promulgated by University 
authorities. 
The sponsors of the University genuinely believe that the 
Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. To effectuate 
these views, Negroes were completely excluded until 1971. 
From 1971 to May 1975, the University accepted no applica-
tions from unmarried Negroes, 5 but did accept applications 
from Negroes married within their race. 
and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs." 
'Bob Jones University was founded in Florida in i927. It moved to 
Greenville, South Carolina, in 1940, and has been incorporated as an 
eleemosynary institution in South Carolina since 1952. 
• Beginning in 1973, Bob Jones University instituted an exception to 
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Following the decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in M cCrary v. Runyon, 515 
F. 2d 1082 (CA4 1975), aff'd 427 U. S. 160 (1976), prohibiting 
racial exclusion from private schools, the University revised 
its policy. Since May 29, 1975, the University has permitted 
unmarried Negroes to enroll; but a disciplinary rule prohibits 
interracial dating and marriage. That rule reads: 
There is to be no interracial dating 
1. Students who are partners in an interracial mar-
riage will be expelled. 
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any 
group or organization which holds as one of its goals or 
advocates interracial marriage will be expelled. 
3. Students who date outside their own race will be 
expelled. 
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage oth-
ers to violate the University's dating rules and regula-
tions will be expelled. App. in No. 81-3, p. A197. 
The University continues to deny admission to applicants en-
gaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate inter-
racial marriage or dating. Id., at A277. 
Until 1970, the IRS extended tax-exempt status to Bob 
Jones University under§ 501(c)(3). By the letter of Novem-
ber 30, 1970, that followed the injunction issued in Green v. 
Kennedy, supra, the IRS formally notified the University of 
the change in IRS policy, and announced its intention to chal-
lenge the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing 
racial discrimination in their admissions policies. 
After failing to obtain an assurance of tax exemption 
through administrative means, the University instituted an 
action in 1971 seeking to enjoin the IRS from revoking the 
school's tax-exempt status. That suit culminated in Bob 
this rule, allowing applications from unmarried Negroes who had been 
members of the UniYersity staff for four years or more. 
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Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725 (1974), in which · 
this Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), prohibited the Univer-
sity from obtaining judicial review by way of injunctive ac-
tion before the assessment or collection of any tax. 
Thereafter, on April 16, 1975, the IRS notified the Univer-
sity of the proposed revocation of its tax-exempt status. On 
January 19, 1976, the IRS officially revoked the University's 
tax-exempt status, effective as of December 1, 1970, the day 
after the University was formally notified of the change 
in IRS policy. The University subsequently filed returns 
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act for the period 
from December 1, 1970, to December 31, 1975, and paid a tax 
totalling $21.00 on one employee for the calendar year of 
1975. After its request for a refund was denied, the Univer-
sity instituted the present action, seeking to recover the 
$21.00 it had paid to the IRS. The Government counter-
claimed for unpaid federal unemployment taxes for the tax-
able years 1971 through 1975, in the amount of $489,675.59, 
plus interest. 
The United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina held that revocation of the University's tax-exempt 
status exceeded the delegated powers of the IRS, was im-
proper under the IRS rulings and procedures, and violated 
the University's rights under the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment. 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D. S. C. 1978). 
The court accordingly ordered the IRS to pay the Univer-
sity the $21.00 refund it claimed and rejected the IRS 
counterclaim. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a divided 
opinion, reversed. 639 F. 2d 147 (CA4 1980). Citing Green 
v. Connally, supra, with approval, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that § 501(c)(3) must be read against the background 
of charitable trust law. To be eligible for an exemption 
under that section, an institution must be "charitable" in the 
common law sense, and therefore must not be contrary to 
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public policy. In the court's view, Bob Jones University did 
not meet this requirement, since its "racial policies violated 
the clearly defined public policy, rooted in our Constitution, 
condemning racial discrimination and, more specifically, the 
government policy against subsidizing racial discrimination in 
education, public or private." Id., at 151. The court held 
that the IRS acted within its statutory authority in revoking 
the University's tax-exempt status. Finally, the Court of 
Appeals rejected petitioner's arguments that the revocation 
of the tax exemption violated the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The case was re-
manded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the 
University's claim for a refund and to reinstate the Govern-
ment's counterclaim. 
C 
No. 81-1, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States 
Goldsboro Christian Schools is a nonprofit corporation lo-
cated in Goldsboro, North Carolina. Like Bob Jones Uni-
versity, it was established "to conduct an institution of learn-
ing ... , giving special emphasis to the Christian religion 
and the ethics revealed in the Holy scriptures." Articles of 
Incorporation, ~ 3(a); see Complaint, ~ 6, reprinted in App. in 
No. 81-1, pp. &-6. The school offers classes from kindergar-
ten through high school, and since at least 1969 has satisfied 
the State of North Carolina's requirements for secular educa-
tion in private schools. The school requires its high school 
students to take Bible-related courses, and begins each class 
with prayer. 
Since its incorporation in 1963, Goldsboro Christian 
Schools has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions 
policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible. 6 Golds-
.. 
e According to the interpretation espoused by Golcfsboro, race is de-
termined by descendance from one of Noah's three sons-Ham, Shem 
and J apheth. Based on this interpretation, Orientals and Negroes are 
Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Caucasians are J aphethitic. Cultural 
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boro has for the most part accepted only Caucasians. On 
occasion, however, the school has accepted children from 
racially mixed marriages in which one of the parents is 
Caucasian. 
Goldsboro never received a determination by the IRS that 
it was an organization entitled to tax exemption under 
§ 501(c)(3). Upon audit of Goldsboro's records for the years 
1969 through 1972, the IRS determined that Goldsboro was 
not an organization described in § 501(c)(3), and therefore 
was required to pay taxes under the Federal Insurance Con-
tribution Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. 
Goldsboro paid the IRS $3,459.93 in withholding, social se-
curity, and unemployment taxes with respect to one em-
ployee for the years 1969 through 1972. Thereafter, Golds-
boro filed a suit seeking refund of that payment, claiming 
that the school had been improperly denied § 50l(c)(3) ex-
empt status. 7 The IRS counterclaimed for $160,073.96 in 
unpaid social security and unemployment taxes for the years 
1969 through 1972, including interest and penalties. 8 
The District Court for the Eastern District of North Caro-
lina decided the action on cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E. D. N. C. 1977). In addressing 
the motions for summary judgment, the court assumed that 
Goldsboro's racially discriminatory admissions policy was 
based upon a sincerely held religious belief. The court 
or biological mixing of the races is regarded as a violation of God's com-
mand. App. in No. 81-1, pp. 40-41. 
1 Goldsboro also asserted that it was not obliged to pay taxes on lodging 
furnished to its teachers. Petitioner does not ask this Court to review the 
rejection of that claim. 
8 By stipulation, the IRS agreed to abate its assessment for 1969 and 
most of 1970 to reflect the fact that the IRS did not begin enforcing its pol-
icy of denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools 
until November 30, 1970. As a result, the amount of the counterclaim was 
reduced to $116,190.99. App. in No. 81-1, pp. 104, 110. 
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nevertheless rejected Goldsboro's claim to tax-exempt status 
under § 501(c)(3), finding that "private schools maintaining 
racially discriminatory admissions policies violate clearly de-
clared federal policy and, therefore, must be denied the fed-
eral tax benefits flowing from qualification under Section 
501(c)(3)." Id., at 1318. The court also rejected Golds-
boro's arguments that denial of tax-exempt status violated 
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, the court entered summary 
judgment for the Government on its counterclaim. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, No. 
80-1473 (CA4 Feb. 24, 1981) (per curiam). That court found 
an "identity for present purposes" between the Goldsboro 
case and the Bob Jones University case, which had been de-
cided shortly before by another panel of that court, and af-
firmed for the reasons set forth in Bob Jones University. 
We granted certiorari in both cases, 454 U. S. 892 (1981), 9 
and we affirm in each. 
II 
A 
In Revenue Ruling 71-447, the IRS formalized the policy 
9 After the Court granted certiorari, the Government filed a motion to 
dismiss, informing the Court that the Department of Treasury intended to 
revoke Revenue Ruling 71-447 and other pertinent rulings and to recog-
nize § 501(c)(3) exemptions for petitioners. The Government suggested 
that these actions were therefore moot. Before this Court ruled on that 
motion, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit enjoined the Government from granting § 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status to any school that discriminates on the basis of race. 
Wright v. R egan, No. 80-1124 (CADC Feb. 18, 1982) (per curiam order). 
Thereafter, the Government informed the Court that it would not revoke 
the revenue rulings and withdrew its request that the actions be dismissed 
as moot. The Government continues to assert that the IBS lacked author-
ity to promulgate Revenue Ruling 71-447, and does not defend that aspect 
of the rulings below. 
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first announced in 1970, that§ 170 and § 501(c)(3) embrace the 
common law "charity'' concept. · Under that view, to qualify 
for a tax exemption pursuant to § 501(c)(3), an institution 
must show, first, that it falls within one of the eight catego-
ries expressly set forth in that section, and second, that its 
activity is not contrary to settled public policy. 
Section 501(c)(3) provides that "[c]orporations ... orga-
nized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable ... or 
educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. Peti-
tioners argue that the plain language of the statute guaran-
tees them true-exempt status. They emphasize the absence 
of any language in the statute expressly requiring all exempt 
organizations to be "charitable" in the common law sense, 
and they contend that the disjunctive "or" separating the cat-
. egories in § 501(c)(3) precludes such a reading. Instead, 
they argue that if an institution falls within one or more of 
the specified categories it is automatically entitled to exemp-
tion, without regard to whether it also qualifies as "chari-
table." The Court of Appeals rejected that contention and 
concluded that petitioners' interpretation of the statute 
"tears section 501(c)(3) from its roots." United States v. Bob 
Jones University, supra, 639 F. 2d, at 151. 
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that 
a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if 
reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of 
the statute: 
"The general words used in the clause . . . , taken by 
themselves, and literally construed, without regard to 
the object in view, would seem to sanction the claim of 
the plaintiff. But this mode of expounding a statute has 
never been adopted by any enlightened tribunal-be-
cause it is evident that in many cases it would defeat the 
object which the Legislature intended 'to accomplish. 
And it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the 
court will not look merely to a particular clause in which 
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general words may be used, but will take in connection 
with it the whole statute .. . and the objects and policy of 
the law . . . . " Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 
(1857) (emphasis added). 
Section 501(c)(3) therefore must be analyzed and construed 
within the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and 
against the background of the Congressional purposes. 
Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, un-
derlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that enti-
tlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain com-
mon law standards of charity-namely, that an institution 
seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and 
not be contrary to established public policy. 
This "charitable" concept appears explicitly in § 170 of the 
Code. That section contains a list of organizations virtually 
identical to that contained in § 501(c)(3). It is apparent that 
Congress intended that list to have the same meaning in both 
sections.10 In § 170, Congress used the list of organizations 
in defining the term "charitable contributions." On its face, 
'
0 The predecessor of§ 170 originally was enacted in 1917, as part of the 
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917), 
whereas the predecessor of § 501(c)(3) dates back to the income tax law of 
1894, Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, see note 14 infra. 
There are minor differences between the lists of organizations in the two 
sections, see generally Liles & Blum, DeYelopment of the Federal Tax 
Treatment of Charities, 39 L. & Contemp. Prob. 6, 24-25 (No. 4, 1975) 
(hereinafter Liles & Blum). Nevertheless, the two sections are closely re-
lated; both seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the develop-
ment of certain organizations through the grant of tax _benefits. The lan-
guage of the two sections is in most respects identical, and the Commis-
sioner and the courts consistently have applied many of the same standards 
in interpreting those sections. See 5 J. Mertens, The Law of Federal In-
come Taxation §31.12 (1980); 6 id. §§34.01-34.13 (197~; B. Bittker & L. 
Stone, Federal Income Taxation 220-222 (5th ed. 1980). To the extent 
that § 170 "aids in ascertaining the meaning" of § 501(c)(3), therefore, it is 
"entitled to great weight," United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 64-65 
(1940). See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U. S. 106, 107 (1950). 
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therefore, § 170 reveals that Congress' intention was to pro-
vide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable pur-
poses. 11 The form of § 170 simply makes plain what common 
sense and history tell us: in enacting both § 170 and 
§ 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to chari-
table organizations, to encourage the development of private 
institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement 
or take the place of public institutions of the same kind. 
Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought beneficial 
to the social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular 
community, are deeply rooted in our history, as in that of 
England. The origins of such exemptions lie in the special 
privileges that have long been extended to charitable trusts. 12 
More than a century ago, this Court announced the caveat 
11 The dissent suggests that the Court "quite adeptly avoids the statute 
it is construing," post, at 1, and "seeks refuge ... by turning to § 170," 
post, at 2. This assertion dissolves when one sees that § 501(c)(3) and 
§ 170 are construed together, as they must be. The dissent aclrnowledges 
that the two sections are "mirror" provisions; surely there can be no doubt 
that the Court properly looks to § 170 to determine the meaning of 
§ 501(c)(3). It is also suggested that § 170 is "at best of little usefulness in 
finding the meaning of § 501(c)(3)," since "§ 170(c) simply tracks the re-
quirements set forth in§ 501(c)(3)," post, at 3. That reading loses sight of 
the fact that § 170(c) defines the term "charitable contribution." The plain 
language of § 170 reveals that Congress' objective was to employ tax ex-
emptions and deductions to promote certain charitable purposes. While 
the eight categories of institutions specified in the statute are indeed pre-
sumptively charitable in nature, the IRS properly considered principles of 
charitable trust law in determining whether the institutions in question 
may truly be considered "charitable," for purposes of entitlement to the tax 
benefits conferred by § 170 and § 501(c)(3). _ 
12 The form and history of the charitable exemption and deduction sec-
tions of the various income tax acts reveal that Congress was guided by the 
common law of charitable trusts. See Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of 
Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 Tax L. Eev. 477, 485--489 
(1981) (hereinafter Simon). Congress aclrnowledged as much in 1969. 
The House Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 
487, stated that the § 501(c)(3) exemption was available only to institutions 
that served "the specified charitable purposes," H. R. Rep. No. 413 (Part -
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that is critical in this case: 
"[I]t has now become an established principle of Ameri-
can law, that courts of chancery will sustain and protect 
. . . a gift . . . to public charitable uses, provided 
the same is consistent with local laws and public pol-
icy . ... " Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465, 501 (1861) (em-
phasis added). 
Soon after that, in 1878, the Court commented: 
"A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy 
forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to 
promote the well-doing and well-being of social man." 
Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U. S. 
303, 311 (1878) (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Jack- , 
son v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867). 
In 1891, in a restatement of the English law of charity 13 
which has long been recognized as a leading authority in this 
country, Lord MacNaghten stated: 
"'Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divi-
sions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the ad-
vancement of education; trusts for the advancement of 
religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the . 
community, not falling under any of the preceding 
heads." Commissioners v. Pemsel, (1891] A. C. 531, 
583 (emphasis added). See, e.g., 4 A. Scott, The Law 
1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1969), and described "charitable" as "a term 
that has been used in the law of trusts for hundreds of years." Id., at 43. 
We need not consider whether Congress intended to in-corporate into the 
Internal Revenue Code any aspects of charitable trust law other than the 
requirements of public benefit and a valid public purpose. 
'
3 The draftsmen of the 1894 income tax law, which included the first 
charitable exemption provision, relied heavily on English concepts of tax-
ation; and the list of exempt organizations appears to have been patterned 
upon English income tax statutes. See 26 Cong. Rec. 584-588, 6612-6615 
(1894). 
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of Trusts § 368, at 2853-2854 (3d ed. 1967) (hereinafter 
Scott). 
These statements clearly reveal the legal background against 
which Congress enacted the first charitable exemption stat-
ute in 1894: 14 charities were to be given preferential treat-
ment because they provide a benefit to society. 
What little floor debate occurred on the charitable exemp-
tion provision of the 1894 Act and similar sections of later 
statutes leaves no doubt that Congress deemed the specified 
organizations entitled to tax benefits because they served de-
sirable public purposes. See, e. g., 26 Cong. Rec. 585-586 
(1894); id., at 1727. In floor debate on a similar provision in 
1917, for example, Senator Hollis articulated the rationale: 
"For every dollar that a man contributes to these public 
charities, educational, scientific, or otherwise, the public 
gets 100 percent." 55 id., at 6728 (1917). See also, 
e.g., 44 id., at 4150 (1909); 50 id., at 1305-1306 (1913). 
In 1924, this Court restated the common understanding of 
the charitable exemption provision: 
"Evidently the exemption is made in recognition of the 
benefit which the public derives from corporate activities 
of the class named, and is intended to aid them when 
not conducted for private gain." Trinidad v. Sa.grad.a 
Orden, 263 U. S. 578, 581 (1924). 15 
"Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556--557 (1894). 
The income tax system contained in the 1894 Act was declared unconstitu-
tional, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601 (1895), for 
reasons unrelated to the charitable exemption provision. The terms of 
that exemption were in substance included in the corporate income tax con-
tained in the Payne Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 
(1909). A similar exemption has been included in evepr income tax act 
since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, beginning with the Reve-
nue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). See generally 
Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44 ABA J. 
525 (1958); Liles & Blum . 
10 That same year, the Bureau of Internal Revenue expressed a similar 
.. 
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In enacting the Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447 
(1938), Congress expressly reconfirmed this view with re-
spect to the charitable deduction provision: 
"The exemption from taxation of money and property de-
voted to charitable and other purposes is based on the 
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss 
of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which 
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from 
other public funds, and by the benefits resulting from 
the promotion of the general welfare." H. R. Rep. No. 
1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). 16 
A corollary to the public benefit principle is the require-
ment, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the purpose of 
a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established 
public policy. In 1861, this Court stated that a public chari-
table use must be "consistent with local laws and public pol-
icy," Perin v. Carey, supra, 24 How., at 501. Modern com-
mentators and courts have echoed that view. See, e. g., 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 377, comment c (1959); 4 
Scott § 377, and cases cited therein; Bogert § 378, at 
view of the charitable deduction section of the estate tax contained in the 
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 403(a)(3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098 (1919). The 
Solicitor of Internal Revenue looked to the common law of charitable trusts 
in construing that provision, and noted that "generally bequests for the 
benefit and advantage of the general public are valid as charities." Sol. 
Op. 159, III-1 C. B. 480 (1924). 
16 The common law requirement of public benefit is universally recog-
nized by commentators on the law of trusts. For example, Bogert states: 
"In return for the favorable treatment accorded charitable gifts which 
i'mply some disadvantage to the community, the courts must find in the 
trust which is to be deemed 'charitable' some real advantages to the public 
which more than offset the disadvantages arising out o~ special privileges 
accorded charitable trusts." G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts 
and Trustees § 361, at 3 (rev. 2d ed. 1977) (hereinafter Bogert). 
For other statements of this principle, see, e. g., 4 Scott § 348, at 2770; 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368, comment b (1959); E. Fisch, D. 
Freed & E. Schachter, Charities and Charitable Foundations § 256 (1974). 
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191-192. 17 
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deduc-
tions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemp-
tion or deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers 
can be said to be indirect and vicarious "donors." Charitable 
exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity 
confers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the 
community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or 
which supplements and advances the work of public insti-
tutions already supported by tax revenues. 18 History but-
tresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemption under 
11 Cf. Tank Truck Rent,als, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 
(1958), in which this Court referred to "the presumption against congres-
sional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy'' in upholding 
the Commissioner's disallowance of deductions claimed by a trucking com-
pany for fines it paid for violations of state maximum weight laws. 
18 The dissent acknowledges that "Congress intended ... to offer a tax 
benefit to organizations . .. providing a public benefit," post, at 3-4, but 
suggests that Congress itself fully defined what organizations provide a 
public benefit, through the list of eight categories of exempt organizations 
contained in § 170 and § 501(c)(3). Under that view, any nonprofit orga-
nization that falls within one of the specified categories is automatically en-
titled to the tax benefits, provided it does not engage in expressly prohib-
ited lobbying or political activities. Post, at 6. The dissent thus would 
have us conclude, for example, that any nonprofit organization that does 
not engage in prohibited lobbying activities is entitled to tax exemption as 
an "educational" institution if it is organized for the "instruction or training 
of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabili-
ties," 26 CFR § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3). See post, at 10. As Judge Leventhal 
noted in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (D. D. C.), aff'd sub 
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971) (per curiam), Fagin's school for 
educating English boys in the art of picking pockets would be an "educa-
tional" institution under that definition. Similarly, a band of former mili-
tary personnel might well set up a school for intensive training of subver-
sives for guerrilla warfare and terrorism in other countri e5t in the abstract, 
that "school" would qualify as an "educational" institution. Surely Con-
gress had no thought of affording such an unthinking, wooden meaning to 
§ 170 and § 501(c)(3) as to provide tax benefits to "educational" organiza-
tions that do not serve a public, charitable purpose. 
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§ 501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified 
in that section and must demonstrably serve and be in har-
mony with the public interest. 19 The institution's purpose 
must not be so at odds with the common community con-
science as to undermine any public benefit that might other-
wise be conferred. 
B 
We are bound to approach these questions with full aware-
ness that determinations of public benefit and public policy 
are sensitive matters with serious implications for the institu-
tions affected; a declaration that a given institution is not 
"charitable" should be made only where there can be no 
doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental 
public policy. But there can no longer be any doubt that ra-
cial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely ac-
cepted views of elementary justice. Prior to 1954, public 
education in many places still was conducted under the pall of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896); racial segregation 
in primary and secondary education prevailed in many parts 
of the country. See, e.g., Segregation and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the States (B. Reams & P. Wilson, eds. 
1975). 20 Thi-s Court's decision in Broum v. Board of Educa-
19 The Court's reading of § 501(c)(3) does not render meaningless Con-
gress' action in specifying the eight categories of presumptively exempt 
organizations, as petitioners suggest. See Brief of Petitioner Goldsboro 
Christian Schools 18-24. To be entitled to tax-exempt status under 
§ 501(c)(3), an organization must first fall "'ithin one of the categories speci-
fied by Congress, and in addition must serve a valid charitable purpose. 
'° In 1894, when the first charitable exemption provisi9n was enacted, ra-
cially segregated educational institutions would not have been regarded as 
against public policy. Yet contemporary standards must be considered in 
determining whether given activities provide a public benefit and are enti-
tled to the charitable tax exemption. In Walz v. Tax Qomm'n, 397 U. S. 
664, 67~73 (1970), we observed: · 
"Qualification for tax exemption is not perpetual or immutable; some tax-
exempt groups lose that status when their activities take them outside the 
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tion, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), signalled an end to that era. Over 
the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this 
Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders at-
test a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and 
discrimination in public education. 
An unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of 
Education establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that 
racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental 
national public policy, as well as rights of individuals. 
"The right of a student not to be segregated on racial 
grounds in schools . . . is indeed so fundamental and per-
vasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process 
of law." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 19 (1958). 
In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 468-469 (1973), we 
dealt with a non-public institution: 
"[A] private school-€ven one that discriminates-fulfills 
an important educational function; however, . . . [ that] 
legitimate educational function cannot be isolated from 
discriminatory practices . . . [D ]iscriminatory treat-
ment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educa-
tional process." (Emphasis added). See also Runyon 
v. Mccrary, 427 u. s. 160 (1976); Griffin V. County 
School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964). 
Congress, in Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. 88--352, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000c, 
2000c-6, 2000-d, clearly expressed its agreement that racial 
discrimination in education violates a fundamental public pol-
icy. Other sections of that Act, and numerous enactments 
since then, testify to the public policy against racial dis-
classification and new entities can come into being and qualify for the 
exemption." 
'" Charitable trust law also makes clear that the definitioh of "charity" de-
pends upon contemporary standards. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, § 374, comment a (1959); Bogert § 369, at 65--67; 4 Scott § 368, at 
2855-2856. 
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crimination. See, e. g., the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. 
L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1971 et seq.; Title VIII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, 
42 U. S. C. §§ 3601 et seq.; the Emergency School Aid Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 354 (repealed effective Sept. 
30, 1979; replaced by similar provisions in the Emergency 
School Aid Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2252, 20 
U. S. C. §§ 3191-3207 (1980 Supp.)). 
The Executive Branch has consistently placed its support 
behind eradication of racial discrimination. Several years 
before this Court's decision in Braum v. Board of Education, 
supra, President Truman issued Executive Orders prohibit-
ing racial discrimination in federal employment decisions, 
Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 CFR 720 (1943-1948 Comp.), and in 
classifications for the Selective Service, Exec. Order No. 
9988, id. 726, 729. In 1957, President Eisenhower employed 
military forces to ensure compliance with federal standards in 
school desegregation programs. Exec. Order No. 10730, 3 
CFR 389 (1954-1958 Comp.). And in 1962, President Ken-
nedy announced: 
"[T]he granting off ederal assistance for . . . housing and 
related facilities from which Americans are excluded be-
cause of their race, color, creed, or national origin is 
unfair, unjust, and inconsistent with the public policy of 
the United States as manifested in its Constitution and 
laws." Exec. Order No. 11063, 3 CFR 652 (1959-1963 
Comp.). 
These are but a few of numerous Executive Orders over the 
past three decades demonstrating the commitment of the Ex-
ecutive Branch to the fundamental policy of eliminating racial 
discrimination. See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 11197, 3 CFR 
278 (1964-1965 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 CFR 803 
(1966-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 11764, 3 CFR 849 
(1971-1975 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 12256, 3 CFR 298 
(1981). 
Few social or political issues in our history have been more 
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vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the 
issue of racial discrimination, particularly in education. 
Given the stress and anguish of the history of efforts to es-
cape from the shackles of the "separate but equal" doctrine of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, it cannot be said that educational 
institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial dis-
crimination, are institutions exercising ''beneficial and sta-
bilizing influences in community life," Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 
397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970), or should be encouraged by having 
all taxpayers share in their support by way of special tax 
status. 
There can thus be no question that the interpretation of 
§ 170 and § 501(c)(3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was cor-
rect. That it may be seen as belated does not undermine its 
soundness. It would be wholly incompatible with the con-
cepts underlying tax exemption to grant the benefit of tax-
exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities, 
which "exer[t] a pervasive influence on the entire educational 
process." Norwood v. Harrison, supra, 413 U. S., at 469. 
Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools' poli-
cies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial dis-
crimination in education is contrary to public policy. Ra-
cially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be 
viewed as conferring a public benefit within the "charitable" 
concept discussed earlier, or within the Congressional intent 
underlying § 170 and § 501(c)(3). 21 
C 
Petitioners contend that, regardless of whether the IRS 
" In view of our conclusion that racially discriminatory private schools 
violate fundamental public policy and cannot be deemed to confer a benefit 
on the public, we need not decide whether an organization providing a pub-
lic benefit and otherwise meeting the requirements of § 50l(c)(3) could 
nevertheless be denied tax-exempt status if certain of its:-activities violated 
a law or public policy. 
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properly concluded that racially discriminatory private 
schools violate public policy, only Congress can alter the 
scope of§ 170 and § 501(c)(3). Petitioners accordingly argue 
that the IRS overstepped its lawful bounds in issuing its 1970 
and 1971 rulings. 
Yet ever since the inception of the tax code, Congress has 
seen fit to vest in those administering the tax laws very 
broad authority to interpret those laws. In an area as com-
plex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with ad-
ministrative responsibility must be able to exercise its au-
thority to meet changing conditions and new problems. 
Indeed as early as 1918, Congress expressly authorized the 
Commissioner "to make all needful rules and regulations for 
the enforcement" of the tax laws. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 
18, § 1309, 40 Stat. 1057, 1143 (1919). The same provision, 
so essential to efficient and fair administration of the tax 
laws, has appeared in tax codes ever since, see 26 U. S. C. 
§ 7805(a) (1976); and this Court has long recognized the pri-
mary authority of the IRS and its predecessors in construing 
the Internal Revenue Code, see, e.g., Commissioner v. 
Portland Cement Co., 450 U. S. 156, 169 (1981); United 
States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 306-307 (1967); Boske v. 
Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 469-470 (1900). 
Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rul-
ings it considers improper; and courts exercise review over 
IRS actions. In the first instance, however, the responsibil-
ity for construing the Code falls to the IRS. Since Congress 
cannot be expected to anticipate every conceivable problem 
that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight, it relies 
on the administrators and on the courts to implement the leg-
islative will. Administrators, like judges, are under oath to 
do so. 
In § 170 and § 501(c)(3), Congress has identified categories 
of traditionally exempt institutions and has specified certain 
additional requirements for tax exemption. . Y.et the need for 
continuing interpretation of those statutes is unavoidable. 
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For more than 60 years, the IRS and its predecessors have 
constantly been called upon to interpret these and compara-
ble provisions, and in doing so have referred consistently to 
principles of charitable trust law. In Treas. Reg. 45, art. 
517(1) (1921), for example, the IRS denied charitable exemp-
tions on the basis of proscribed political activity before the 
Congress itself added such conduct as a disqualifying ele-
ment. In other instances, the IRS has denied charitable 
exemptions to otherwise qualified entities because they 
served too limited a class of people and thus did not provide 
a truly "public" benefit under the common law test. See, 
e.g., Crellin v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 1152, 115&-1156 
(1942); James Sprunt Benevolent Trust v. Commissioner, 
20 B. T. A. 19, 24-25 (1930). See also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959). Some years before the issu-
ance of the rulings challenged in these cases, the IRS also 
ruled that contributions to community recreational facilities 
would not be deductible and that the facilities themselves 
would not be entitled to tax-exempt status, unless those facil-
ities were open to all on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. 
See Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 113. These rulings 
reflect the Commissioner's continuing duty to interpret and 
apply the Internal Revenue Code. See also Textile Mills 
Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326, 337-338 
(1941). 
Guided, of course, by the Code, the IRS has the respon-
sibility, in the first instance, to determine whether a particu-
lar entity is "charitable" for purposes of§ 170 and § 501(c)(3). 22 
This in turn may necessitate later determinati_ons of whether 
given activities so violate public policy that the entities in-
volved cannot be deemed to provide a public benefit worthy 
of "charitable" status. We emphasize, however, that these 
sensitive determinations should be made only \vhere there is 
%! In the present case, the IRS issued its rulings denying exemptions to 
racially discriminatory schools only after a three-judge District Court had 
issued a preliminary injunction. See pp. 2-3, supra. 
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no doubt that the organization's activities violate funda-
mental public policy. 
On the record before us, there can be no doubt as to the 
national policy. In 1970, when the IRS first issued the rul-
ing challenged here, the position of all three branches of the 
Federal Government was unmistakably clear. The correct-
ness of the Commissioner's conclusion that a racially discrimi-
natory private school "is not 'charitable' within the common 
law concepts reflected in ... the Code," Rev. Rul. 71-447, 
1972-2 Cum. Bull., at 231, is wholly consistent with what 
Congress, the Executive and the courts had repeatedly de-
clared before 1970. Indeed, it would be anomalous for the 
Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches to reach conclu-
sions that add up to a firm public policy on racial discrimina-
- tion, and at the same time have the IRS blissfully ignore 
what all three branches of the Federal Government had de-
clared_:: Clearly an educational institution engaging in prac-
tices affirmatively at odds with this declared position of the 
whole government cannot be seen as exercising a ''beneficial 
and stabilizing influenc[e] in community life," Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, supra, 397 U. S., at 673, and is not "charitable," 
within the meaning of § 170 and § 501 ( c)(3). We therefore 
hold that the IRS did not exceed its authority when it an-
nounced its interpretation of§ 170 and § 501(c)(3) in 1970 and 
1971.24 
23 JUSTICE POWELL misreads the Court's opinion when he suggests that 
the Court implies that "the Internal Revenue Service is invested with au-
thority to decide which public policies are sufficiently 'fundamental' to re-
quire denial of tax exemptions," post, at 6. The Court's opinion does not 
warrant that interpretation. JUSTICE POWELL concedes that "if any na-
tional policy is sufficiently fundamental to constitute such an overriding 
limitation on the availability of tax-exempt status under§ 501(c)(3), it is the 
policy against racial discrimination in education." P~st,-at 2. Since that 
policy is sufficiently clear to warrant JUSTICE POWELL'S concession and for 
him to support our finding of longstanding Congressional acquiescence, it 
should be clear that his concerns about the Court's opinion are unfounded. 
2-1 Many of the amici curiae, including Amicus William T. Coleman, Jr. 
(appointed by the Court), argue that denial of tax-exempt status to racially 
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D 
The actions of Congress since 1970 leave no doubt that the 
IRS reached the correct conclusion in exercising its author-
ity. It is, of course, not unknown for independent agencies 
or the Executive Branch to misconstrue the intent of a stat-
ute; Congress can and often does correct such misconcep-
tions, if the courts have not done so. Yet for a dozen years 
Congress has been made aware--acutely aware-of the IRS 
rulings of 1970 and 1971. As we noted earlier, few issues 
have been the subject of more vigorous and widespread de-
bate and discussion in and out of Congress than those related 
to racial segregation in education. Sincere adherents ad-
vocating contrary views have ventilated the subject for well 
over three decades. Failure of Congress to modify the IRS 
rulings of 1970 and 1971, of which Congress was, by its own 
studies and by public discourse, constantly r eminded; and 
Congress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for 
racially discriminatory schools when enacting other and re-
lated legislation make out an unusually strong case of legisla-
tive acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 
and 1971 rulings. 
Ordinarily, and quite appropriately, courts are slow to 
attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on par-
ticular legislation. See, e. g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 
694 n. 11 (1980). We have observed that "unsuccessful at-
tempts at legislation are not the best of guides to legislative 
intent," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 
381-382 n. 11 (1969). Here, however, we do not have an or-
dinary claim of legislative acquiescence. Only one month 
after the IRS announced its position in 1970, Congress held 
its first hearings on this precise issue. Equal Educational 
'" 
discriminatory schools is independently required by the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment. In light of our resolution of this case, 
we do not reach that issue. See, e. g., United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 
23, 27 (1980); NLRB v. Catholic Bislwp of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 504 
(1979). 
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Opportunity: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on 
Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1991 
(1970). Exhaustive hearings have been held on the issue at 
various times since then. These include hearings in Febru-
ary 1982, after we granted review in this case. Administra-
tion's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of 
Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing Before 
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1982). 
Non-action by Congress is not often a useful guide, but the 
non-action here is significant. During the past 12 years 
there have been no fewer than 13 bills introduced to overturn 
the IRS interpretation of§ 501(c)(3). 25 Not one of these bills 
has emerged from any committee, although Congress has en-
- acted numerous other amendments to § 501 during this same 
period, including an amendment to § 501(c)(3) itself. Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, § 1313(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 
1730 (1976). It is hardly conceivable that Congress-and in 
this setting, any Member of Congress-was not abundantly 
aware of what was going on. In view of its prolonged and 
acute awareness of so important an issue, Congress' failure to 
act on the bills proposed on this subject provides added sup-
port for concluding that Congress acquiesced in the IRS rul-
ings of 1970 and 1971. See, e. g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, -- U.S. --, --
(1982); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, --U. S.--, 
-- (1983); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 554 
n. 10 (1979). 
The evidence of Congressional approval of the policy em-
25 H. R. 1096, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H. R. 802, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1981); H. R. 498, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H. R. 332, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H. R. 95, 97th Cong., 1st Sess, (1981); S. 995, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 1905, 96th Cong., 1st Sess: (1979); H. R. 96, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 3225, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 
H. R. 1394, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H. R. 5350, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1971); H. R. 2352, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. 68, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1971). 
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bodied in Revenue Ruling 71-447 goes well beyond the fail-
ure of Congress to act on legislative proposals. Congress af-
firmatively manifested its acquiescence in the IRS policy 
when it enacted the present § 501(i) of the Code, Act of Octo-
ber 20, 1976, Pub. L. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976). That pro-
vision denies tax-exempt status to social clubs whose char-
ters or policy statements provide for "discrimination against 
any person on the basis of race, color, or religion." 26 Both 
the House and Senate committee reports on that bill articu-
lated the national policy against granting tax exemptions to 
racially discriminatory private clubs. S. Rep. No. 1318, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 8 (1976). 
Even more significant is the fact that both reports focus on 
· this Court's affirmance of Green v. Connally, supra, as hav-
ing established that "discrimination on account of race is in-
consistent with an educational institution's tax exempt sta-
tus." S. Rep. No. 1318, supra, at 7-8 and n. 5; H. R. Rep. 
No. 1353, supra, at 8 and n. 5 (emphasis added). These ref-
erences in Congressional committee reports on an enactment 
denying tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private so-
cial clubs cannot be read other than as indicating approval of 
the standards applied to racially discriminatory private 
schools by the IRS subsequent to 1970, and specifically of 
Revenue Ruling 71-447. 27 
III 
26 Prior to the introduction of this legislation, a three-judge district court 
had held that segregated social clubs were entitled to tax exemptions. 
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D. D. C. 1972). Section 501(i) 
was enacted primarily in response to that decision. See S. Rep. No. 1318, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
8 (1976). 
,., Reliance is placed on scattered statements in floor,._ debate by Con-
gressmen critical of the IRS' adoption of Revenue R{i.Jing 71-447. See, 
e. g., Brief of Petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools 27-28. Those views 
did not prevail. That several Congressmen, expressing their individual 
views, argued that the IRS had no authority to take the action in question, 
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Petitioners contend that, even if the Commissioner's policy 
is valid as to nonreligious private schools, that policy cannot 
constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial 
discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. 28 
As to such schools, it is argued that the IRS construction of 
§ 170 and § 501(c)(3) violates their free exercise rights under 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. This conten-
tion presents claims not heretofore considered by this Court 
in precisely this context. 
This Court has long held the Free Exercise Clause of the 
is hardly a balance for the overwhelming evidence of Congressional aware-
ness of and acquiescence in the IRS rulings of 1970 and 1971. Petitioners 
also argue that the Ashbrook and Dornan Amendments to the Treasury, 
· Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980; Pub. 
L. 96-74; §§ 103, 614, 615; 93 Stat. 559, 562, 576-577 (1979), reflect con-
gressional opposition to the IRS policy formalized in Revenue Ruling 
71-447. Those amendments, however, are directly concerned only with 
limiting more aggressive enforcement procedures proposed by the IRS in 
1978 and 1979 and preventing the adoption of more stringent substantive 
standards. The Ashbrook Amendment, § 103 of the Act, applies only to 
procedures, guidelines or measures adopted after August 22, 1978, and 
thus in no way affects the status of Revenue Ruling 71-447. In fact, both 
Congressman Dornan and Congressman Ashbrook explicitly stated that 
their amendments would have no effect on prior IRS policy, including Rev-
enue Ruling 71-447, see 125 Cong. Rec. H5982 (daily ed. July 16, 1979) 
(Cong. Dornan: "[M]y amendment will not affect existing IRS rules which 
IRS has used to revoke tax exemptions of white segregated academies 
under Revenue Ruling 71-447 .... "); 125 Cong. Rec. H5882 (daily ed. July 
13, 1979) (Cong. Ashbrook: "My amendment very clearly indicates on its 
face that all the regulations in existence as of August 22, 1978, would not 
be touched."). These amendments therefore do not indicate Congres-
_sional rejection of Revenue Ruling 71-447 and the standards contained 
therein. 
28 The District Court found, on the basis of a full evidentiary record, that 
the challenged practices of petitioner Bob Jones Univer5lty were based on 
a genuine belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. 
468 F. Supp., at 894. We assume, as did the District Court, that the same 
is true with respect to petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools. See 436 
F. Supp., at 1317. 
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First Amendment an absolute prohibition against govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U. S. 205, 219 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 
402 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 
(1940). As interpreted by this Court, moreover, the Free 
Exercise Clause provides substantial protection for lawful 
conduct grounded in religious belief, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
supra, 406 U. S., at 220; Tlwmas v. Review Board of the In-
diana Emp. Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. 
Verner, supra, 374 U. S., at 402-403. However, "[n]ot all 
burdens on religion are unconstitutional. . . . The state may 
justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is 
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest." 
United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 257-258 (1982) (citations 
omitted). See, e. g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 628 
and n. 8 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U. S., at 215; 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971). 
On occasion this Court has found certain governmental in-
terests so compelling as to allow even regulations prohibiting 
religiously based conduct. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U. S. 158 (1944), for example, the Court held that neutrally 
cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of printed materials on 
public streets could be applied to prohibit children from dis-
pensing religious literature. The Court found no constitu-
tional infirmity in "excluding [Jehovah's Witness children] 
from doing there what no other children may do." Id., at 
170. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 
(1878); United States v. Lee, supra; Gillette v. United States, 
supra. Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substan-
tial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but 
will not prevent those schools from observing their religious 
tenets. 
The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. 
As discussed in Part II(B), supra, the Gov~rnment has a 
fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial dis-
crimination in education 29--<liscrimination that prevailed, 
'}!JWe deal here only with religious sch-0ols-not with churches or other 
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with official approval, for the first 165 years of this Nation's 
history. That governmental interest substantially out-
weighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on peti-
tioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. The interests as-
serted by petitioners cannot be accommodated with that 
compelling governmental interest, see United States v. Lee, 
supra, 455 U. S., at 259-260; and no "less restrictive means," 
see Thomas v. Review Board, supra, 450 U. S., at 718, are 
available to achieve the governmental interest. 30 
IV 
The remaining issue is whether the IRS properly applied 
its policy to these petitioners. Petitioner Goldsboro Chris-
· purely religious institutions; here, the governmental interest is in denying 
public support to racial discrimination in of education. As noted earlier, 
racially discriminatory schools "exer[t] a pervasive influence on the entire 
educational process," outweighing any public benefit that they might oth-
erwise provide, Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 469 (1973). See gen-
erally Simon 49&--496. 
"' Bob Jones University also contends that denial of tax exemption vio-
lates the Establishment Clause by preferring religions whose tenets do not 
require racial discrimination over those which believe racial intermixing is 
forbidden. It is well settled that neither a State nor the Federal Govern-
ment may pass laws which ''prefer one religion over another," E verson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947), but "[i]t is equally true" that a 
regulation does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it 
''happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961). See Harris v. McRae, 
448 U. S. 297, 319--320 (1980). The IRS policy at issue here is founded on 
a "neutral, secular basis," Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 452 
(1971), and does not violate the Establishment, Clause. See generally 
U. S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Distriminatory Religious Schools and .Tax 
Exempt Status 10-17 (1982). In addition, as the Court of Appeals noted, 
''the uniform application of the rule to all religiously operated schools 
avoids the necessity for a potentially entangling inquiry into whether a ra-
cially restrictive practice is the result of sincere religious belief." United 
States v. Bob Jones Univ., 639 F. 2d 147, 155 (CA4 1980) (emphasis in orig-
inal). Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979). 
But see generally Note, 90 Yale L. J. 350 (1980). 
. ' . ~ 
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tian Schools admits that it "maintain[s] racially discrimina-
tory policies," Brief of Petitioner, Goldsboro Christian 
Schools, No. 81-1, at 10, but seeks to justify those policies on 
grounds we have fully discussed. The IRS properly denied 
tax-exempt status to Goldsboro Christian Schools. 
Petitioner Bob Jones University, however, contends that it 
is not racially discriminatory. It emphasizes that it now 
allows all races to enroll, subject only to its restrictions on 
the conduct of all students, including its prohibitions of asso-
ciation between men and women of different races, and of in-
terracial marriage. 31 Although a ban on intermarriage or in-
terracial dating applies to all races, decisions of this Court 
firmly establish that discrimination on the basis of racial affil-
iation and association is a form of racial discrimination, see, 
· e. g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U. S. 431 (1973). We therefore find 
that the IRS properly applied Revenue Ruling 71-447 to Bob 
Jones University. 32 
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, accordingly, 
Affirmed. 
31 This argument would in any event apply only to the final eight months 
of the five tax years at issue in this case. Prior to May 1975, Bob Jones 
University's admissions policy was racially discriminatory on its face, since 
the University excluded unmarried Negro students while admitting un-
married Caucasians. 
32 Bob Jones University also argues that the IRS policy should not apply 
to it because it is entitled to exemption under § 501(c)(3) as a "religious" 
organization, rather than as an "educational" institution. The record in 
this case leaves no doubt, however, that Bob Jones University is both an 
educational institution and a religious institution. As"; discussed previ-
ously, the IRS policy properly extends to all private schools, including reli-
gious schools. See note 29 supra. The IRS policy thus was properly ap-
plied to Bob Jones University. 
~-
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ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
I join the Court's judgment, along with part III of its opin-
ion holding that the denial of tax exemptions to petitioners 
does not violate the First Amendment. I write separately 
because I am troubled by the broader implications of the 
Court's opinion with respect to the authority of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) and its construction of §§ 170(c) and 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
I 
Federal taxes are not imposed on organizations "operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes. . . . " 26 
U. S. C. § 501(c)(3). The Code also permits a tax deduction 
for contributions made to these organizations. § 170(c). It 
is clear that petitioners, organizations incorporated for edu-
". 
81-3 & 81-1-CONCUR 
2 BOB JONES UNIVERSITY v. UNITED STATES 
cational purposes, fall within the language of the statute. It 
also is clear that the language itself does not mandate refusal 
of tax-exempt status to any private school that maintains a 
racially discriminatory admissions policy. Accordingly, 
there is force in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's argument that 
§§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) should be construed as setting forth 
the only criteria Congress has established for qualification as 
a tax-exempt organization. See post, at 1-4 (REHNQUIST, 
J., dissenting). Indeed, were we writing prior to the history 
detailed in the Court's opinion, this could well be the con-
struction I would adopt. But there has been a decade of ac-
ceptance that is persuasive in the circumstances of this case, 
and I conclude that there are now sufficient reasons for ac-
cepting the IRS's construction of the Code as proscribing tax 
exemptions for schools that discriminate on the basis of race 
as a matter of policy. 
I cannot say that this construction of the Code, adopted by 
the IRS in 1970 and upheld by the Court of Appeals below, is 
without logical support. The statutory terms are not self-
defining, and it is plausible that in some instances an orga-
nization seeking a tax exemption might act in a manner so 
clearly contrary to the purposes of our laws that it could not 
be deemed to serve the enumerated statutory purposes. 1 
And, as the Court notes, if any national policy is sufficiently 
fundamental to constitute such an overriding limitation on 
the availability of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), it is 
the policy against racial discrimination in education. See 
ante, at 19. Finally, and of critical importance for me, the 
subsequent actions of Congress present "an unusually strong 
case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implica-
tion of the [IRS'] 1970 and 1971 rulings" with respect to ra-
cially discriminatory schools. Ante, at 23. In particular, 
' I note that the Court has construed other provisions of the Code as con-
taining narrowly defined public policy exceptions. See Commissioner v. 
Tellier, 383 U. S. 687, 69~94 (1966); Tank Truck Rentals , Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 356 U. S. 30, 35 (1958). 
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Congress' enactment of § 501(i) in 1976 is strong evidence of 
agreement with these particular IRS rulings. 2 
II 
I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that tax-exempt 
status under§§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) is not available to private 
schools that concededly are racially discriminatory. I do not 
agree, however, with the Court's more general explanation of 
the justifications for the tax exemptions provided to chari-
table organizations. The Court states: 
"Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that 
the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit 
which the society or the community may not itself choose 
or be able to provide, or which supplements and ad-
vances the work of public institutions already supported 
by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear 
that, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institu-
tion must fall within a category specified in that section 
and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with 
the public interest. The institution's purpose must not 
be so at odds with the common community conscience as 
to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise ·be 
2 The District Court for the District of Columbia in Green v. Connally, 
330 F. Supp. 1150 (three-judge court), affd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 
U. S. 997 (1971) (per curiam), held that racially discriminatory private 
schools were not entitled to tax-exempt status. The same District Court, 
however, later ruled that racially segregated social clubs could receive tax 
exemptions under § 501(c)(7) of the Code. See McGlotten v. Connally, 
338 F. Supp. 448 (D. D. C. 1972) (three-judge court). Faced with these 
two important three-judge court rulings, Congress expressly overturned 
the relevant portion of McGlotten by enacting§ 501(i), thus conforming the 
policy with respect to social clubs to the prevailing policy with respect to 
private schools. This affirmative step is a persuasive indication that Con-
gress has not just silently acquiesced in the result of Green. Cf. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 402 (1982) (POW-
ELL, J., dissenting) (rejecting theory "that congressional intent can be in-
ferred from silence, and that legislative inaction should achieve the force of 
Jaw"). 
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conferred." Ante, at 15-16 (footnote omitted). 
Applying this test to petitioners, the Court concludes that 
"[c]learly an educational institution engaging in practices af-
firmatively at odds with [the] declared position of the whole 
government cannot be seen as exercising a 'beneficial and 
stabilizing influenc[e] in community life,' ... and is not 'char-
itable,' within the meaning of§ 501(c)(3)." Ante, at 22 (quot-
ing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970)). 
With all respect, I am unconvinced that the critical ques-
tion in determining tax-exempt status is whether an individ-
ual organization provides a clear "public benefit" as defined 
by the Court. Over 106,000 organizations filed § 501(c)(3) re- \ 
turns in 1981. Internal Revenue Service, 1982 Exempt 
Organization/Business Master File. I find it impossible to 
believe that all or even most of those organizations could 
prove that they "demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony 
with the public interest" or that they are "beneficial and sta-
bilizing influences in community life." Nor I am prepared to 
say that petitioners, because of their racially discriminatory 
policies, necessarily contribute nothing of benefit to the com-
munity. It is clear from the substantially secular character 
of the curricula and degrees offered that petitioners provide 
educational benefits. 
Even more troubling to me is the element of conformity 
that appears to inform the Court's analysis. The Court as-
serts that an exempt organization must "demonstrably serve 
and be in harmony with the public interest," must have a pur-
pose that comports with "the common community con-
science," and must not act in a manner "affirmatively at odds 
with [the] declared position of the whole government." 
Taken together, these passages suggest that the primary 
function of a tax-exempt organization is to act on behalf of the 
Government in carrying out governmentally approved poli-
cies. In my opinion, such a view of § 501(c)(3) ignores the 
important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging di-
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verse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and view-
points. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, private, non-
profit groups receive tax exemptions because "each group 
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and en-
terprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society." Walz, 
supra, at 689 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Far from repre-
senting an effort to reinforce any perceived "common commu-
nity conscience," the provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit 
groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of 
governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community 
life. 3 Given the importance of our tradition of pluralism, 4 
3 Certainly § 501(c)(3) has not been applied in the manner suggested by 
the Court's analysis. The 1100-page list of exempt organizations in-
cludes-among countless examples-such organizations as American 
Friends Service Committee, Inc., Committee on the Present Danger, Je-
hovahs Witnesses in the United States, Moral Majority Foundation, Inc., 
Friends of the Earth Foundation, Inc., Mountain States Legal Foundation, 
National Right to Life Educational Foundation, Planned Parenthood Fed-
eration of America, Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy, Inc., and 
Union of Concerned Scientists Fund, Inc. See Internal Revenue Service, 
Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954, at 31, 221, 376, 518, 670, 677, 694, 795, 880, 
1001, 1073 (Rev'd Oct. 1981). It would be difficult indeed to argue that 
each of these organizations reflects the views of the "common community 
conscience" or "demonstrably ... [is] in harmony with the public interest. " 
In identifying these organizations, largely taken at random from the tens of 
thousands on the list, I of course do not imply disapproval of their being 
exempt from taxation. Rather, they illustrate the commendable tolerance 
by our Government of even the most strongly held divergent views, includ-
ing views that at least from time to time are "at odds" with the position of 
our Government. We have consistently recognized that such disparate 
groups are entitled to share the privilege of tax exemption. 
• "A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for diver-
sity. This has been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands who 
have built our country. It is the essence of our democratic system." Mis-
sissiwi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. --, -- (1982) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). Sectarian schools make an important contribu-
tion to this tradition, for they "have provided an educational alternative for 
millions of young Americans" and "often afford wholesome competition 
.__ 
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"[t]he interest in preserving an area of untrammeled choice 
for private philanthropy is very great." Jackson v. Statler 
Foundation, 496 F. 2d 623, 639 (CA21974) (Friendly, J., dis-
senting from denial of reconsideration en bane). 
I do not suggest that these considerations always are or 
should be dispositive. Congress, of course, may find that 
some organizations do not warrant tax-exempt status. In 
this case I agree with the Court that Congress has deter-
mined that the policy against racial discrimination in educa-
tion should override the countervailing interest in permitting 
unorthodox private behavior. 
I would emphasize, however, that the balancing of these 
substantial interests is for Congress to perform. I am un-
willing to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue 
_ Service is invested with authority to decide which public poli-
cies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require denial of tax ex-
emptions. Its business is to administer laws designed to 
produce revenue for the Government, not to promote "public 
policy." As former IRS Commissioner Kurtz has noted, 
questions concerning religion and civil rights "are far afield 
from the more typical tasks of tax administrators-determin-
ing taxable income." Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems 
in Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 Catholic Law-
yer 301, 301 (1978). This Court often has expressed concern 
that the scope of an agency's authorization be limited to those 
areas in which the agency fairly may be said to have exper-
tise, 5 and this concern applies with special force when the as-
with our public schools." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) 
(POWELL, J ., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
5 See, e. g., Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 
459 U. S. --, --, n. 17 (1983) ("[A]n agency's general duty to enforce 
the public interest does not require it to assume responsibility for enforcing 
Iegialation that is not directed at the agency"); Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 114 (1976) ("It is the business of the Civil Service 
Commission to adopt and enforce regulations which will best promote the 
~ 
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serted administrative power is one to determine the scope of 
public policy. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN has noted, 
"where the philanthropic organization is concerned, 
there appears to be little to circumscribe the almost un-
fettered power of the Commissioner. This may be very 
well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of 
social policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating 
at the time ... , but application of our tax laws should 
not operate in so fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in 
the first instance is a matter for legislative concern." 
Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U. S. 
752, 774-775 (1974) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). 
III 
The Court's decision upholds IRS Revenue Ruling 71-447, 
and thus resolves the question whether tax-exempt status is 
available to private schools that openly maintain racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies. There no longer is any jus-
tification for Congress to hesitate-as it apparently has-in 
articulating and codifying its desired policy as to tax exemp-
tions for discriminatory organizations. Many questions re-
main, such as whether organizations that violate other poli-
cies should receive tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). 
These should be legislative policy choices. It is not appro-
priate to leave the IRS "on the cutting edge of developing na-
tional policy." Kurtz, supra, at 308. The contours of public 
policy should be determined by Congress, not by judges or 
the IRS. 
efficiency of the federal civil service. That agency has no responsibility 
for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration 
quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies"); NAACP v. 
FPC, 425 U. S. 662, 670 (1976) ("The use of the words 'public interest' in 
the Gas and Power Acts is not a directive to the [Federal Power] Commis-
sion to seek to eradicate discrimination, but, rather, is a charge to promote 
the orderly production of supplies of electric energy and natural gas at just 
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Do~DleerSoLoud 
The Sum-eme Court has just 
handed dt"wn its vehitff"1lt the case of 
Bgb,,. J,nes Universit~ vs. United 
States. he rules of Bo Jones U. for-
bid interracial dating, so the Internal 
Revenue Service denied the school the 
tax exemption usually given to chari-
table and educational institutions. The 
college went to court. The justices 
have now decided that the IRS was 
right. Some of our elite newspapers-
and presumably the strains of opinion 
they represent-are almost unrelie-
vedly joyous about the outcome. This 
reaction is perhaps the most unap-
pealing feature of the case. 
Bob Jones argued that nothing in 
the tax laws passed by Congress justi· 
fied penalizing one group out of all our 
diverse charitable institutions because 
the group holds a particular set of ra-
cial beliefs. Indeed, said the school, 
its racial beliefs grow out of its reli-
gious doctrines, and penalizing it for . 
these doctrines is a blow to freedom 
of religion. 
Seven of the Supreme Court jus-
tices rejected this thinking flat out. 
Contained within the very meaning of 
a charitable institution, said the ma-
jority, is the idea that the organization 
s~rves a purpose the public considers 
good or at least not obnoxious. Racial 
discrimination surely falls within the 
"obnoxious" category. 
One justice, William Rehnquist, ar-
gued that such intentions could not be 
found in the congressional history of 
the disputed tax laws. Even in concur-
ring with the majority outcome, Jus-
' 
tice Lewis Powell confessed to some 
troubles. Despite the narrow scope of 
the statute, he said, recent history 
made clear that Congress had indeed 
established the fight against racial 
discrimination as an overriding public 
purpose. The IRS had been reasonable 
in building this concern into its rules, 
and Bob Jones deserved to lose its ex-
emption. 
What Mr. Powell did not like, 
.though, was this business of the ma-
jority declaring that private charities 
had to embody public purposes. He 
thought the purpose of our tax exemp-
tion system was just the opposite : to 
foster pluralism of belief and limit the 
power that officially sanctioned 
thought holds over the private sector. 
If we want to override this presump-
tion in particular cases, it is Congress 
that should do the overriding, not just 
administrative agencies exercising 
their discretion. 
It's no surprise that many people 
should have been repelled by the idea 
of the federal government doing a tax 
favor for a racially discriminatory 
1 1 
school. But it's more than a little an-
noying that so few of these people 
seem to worry about what harm we 
might be doing to the exemption sys-
tem in our haste to squash Bob Jones. 
And it's even more upsetting that Con-
gress, which always had the power to { 
act specifically to end this ambiguity, c 
never got up the nerve to do so. Isn't t 
it possible that the legislators were r 
not as convinced as the court seems to t 
be that there was an overwhelming ti 
public consensus on this issue and that ct 
this explains why they preferred to e, 
duck it? g 
It's all very well to be satisfied ~'. 
with the bottom-line outcome of the ct, 
Bob Jones case. But those who view it 
with unalloyed jubilation aren't look-1 to 
ing very far_ down the road at what it P< 
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ob Jone : Why Didn't Congress -Act? 
1
· \ Again the . Suprem~ 0ttrt has done some-
thingjuno!!ld_oot.-nave done, and has done it 
because Congress has not done something it 
should have done. When liberals are done ap-
plauding Chief Justice Warren Burger's opinion 
for the majority in the Bob Jones University 
case, they should read it, and should ponder the 
formulation on which it turns. The formulation 
is factually false and philosophically illiberal. 
Bob Jones University forbids the practice or 
advocacy of interracial marriage or dating. All 
nine justices believe that elimination of such 
discrimination is a fundamental government in-
terest, and that Congress could choose to deny 
tax-exempt status to schools that discriminate. 
Burger argues tha_t Congress has chosen, im-
plicitly, by inaction. Justice William Rehnquist, 
dissenting alone, disagreed. 
In 1970, parents of black pupils in Missis-
sippi public schools sued the Internal Revenue 
Service to stop it from giving tax-exempt status 
to private schools that discriminate. IRS said it · 
did not have the power to deny tax exemption 
to schools that met the requirements of the law. 
The law simply says that tax exemption shall 
be awarded to institutions that are organized 
for any of eight purposes (including education), 
that are nonprofit and are not involved in lob-
bying or political campaigns. 
But during the litigation, the IRS suddenly 
reversed itself and said a tax-exempt school 
must be a "charity" within common-law con-
cepts, and the IRS said that means the institu-
tion must "serve a public purpose and not be 
contrary to public policy." At various points in 
his opinion Burger says the common-law defini-
tion of a charity means the institution must not 
have practices "contrary to established public 
policy," must not be "contrary to settled public 
policy," must not violate "a fundamental public 
policy," and must be "in harmony with the 
public interest." Burger says Bob Jones Univer-
sity is disqualified from exemption because its 
practices are "affirmatively at odds with" a fun-
damental public policy. 
But is it reasonable to suppose that Congress 
ever intended the IRS to exercise the untram-
meled discretion involved in improvising judg-
ments about which institutions are and which 
are not in harmony with "settled" or "estab-
lished" or "fundamental" (those are not syno-
nyms) policy? Rehnquist thinks not. 
Congress, he says, has been remarkably explicit 
about the criteria for tax-exempt status, adding 
new criteria from time to time. And he reminds 
the court that it has traditionally been reluctant 
to infer Congress' ratification of a policy from the 
mere fact of Congress' acquiescence in the policy. 
Now the court says Congress adopted the IRS 
position by not reversing it. 
Burger says this is an unusually strong case 
of legislative acquiescence, in part because in 
1976 Congress amended the law to require 
denial of tax-exempt status to social clubs that 
discriminate racially. Rehnquist says, reason-
ably, that Burger's example refutes Burger's 
position. The example shows that when Con-
gress wants a policy change, it makes its il)ten-
tion clear in action. 
Paradoxically, the severest criticism of the 
ruling is in Justice Lewis Powell's concurring 
opinion, a notably uneasy concurrence. He 
notes that in 1981 more than 106,000 organiza-
tions received tax-exempt status, organizations 
as different as the Moral Majority and Friends 
of the Earth. How many of these could prove 
that they are (in Burger's words) not acting 
contrary to established or settled or fundamen-
tal public policy, or are in harmony with the 1 
public interest? How many liberals now ap-
plauding Burger's opinion really want a bu-
reaucracy enforcing the "element of conform-
ity" that Powell detects in Burger's opinion? 
As Powell says, Burger's analysis suggests 
that the primary function of tax-exempt organi-
zations is to carry out government-approved , 
aims and strengthen government orthodoxy. 
But Powell believes that another, better justi-
fication is that tax exemptions nurture creative 
disharmony by leavening America's pluralism 
with groups that challenge settled, established 
policy. My libertarian impulses are few and 
weak, so Burger's analysis does not scandalize 
me. But why are liberals so tickled? 
Powell concludes by saying that the legisla-
ture, not the IRS, should develop national 
policy regarding tax exemption: "There no 
longer is any justification for Congress to hesi-
tate-as it apparently has-in articulating and 
codifying its desired policy as to tax exemptions 
for discriminatory organizations." But the rul-
ing with which Powell concurs means there is 
no reason for Congress to act. Policy is suppos-
edly packed into the concept of a "charitable" 
organization, and Congress supposedly has af-
firmed, by acquiescence, the IRS's power to un-
pack the policy. 
Denial of tax exemptions for organizations 
that discriminate racially is proper policy. But 
this sort of jurisprudence contributes to the 
decay of representative institutions. 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
SAMUEL B. STERRETT 
J UDGE 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20217 
May 31, 1983 
JU 
The Honorable Lewis F . Powell, Jr. 
Justice, Supreme Court of the 
United States 




In accordance with our telephone conversation this 
morning, I enclose a covering letter dated October 30, 
1980 together with a 5-page memorandum to the parties 
in the docketed case of Church of Scientology of Califor-
nia v. Commissioner. I hope that you will find my 
memorandum of interest. 
Respectfully, 
~ 
Samuel B. Sterrett 
Enc. 
